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This thesis focuses on opposition groups as parties to internal armed conflicts 
and the concept of the R2P. Accordingly, this research aims to examine the extent to 
which opposition groups, as parties to internal armed conflicts, could contribute to the 
objective of protecting civilian populations. The significance of this subject lies in the 
fact that although the primary objective behind the adoption of the R2P is to improve 
the protection provided for civilians within the context of internal armed conflicts, the 
framework regulating the R2P does not include any reference to opposition groups as a 
main party in internal armed conflicts. It is practically unseen how civilians could be 
effectively protected in internal armed conflicts without the involvement of opposition 
groups. 
The concept of the R2P is used as an interpretive tool to determine the role of 
opposition groups in the protection of civilians. This research intends to define the 
elements related to the concept of civilian protection within the framework regulating 
internal armed conflicts and to trace any potential development after the adoption of the 
R2P. To this end, it attempts to consult and analyse the relevant primary and secondary 
materials, such as conventions, reports, cases, books and articles. 
First, this project defines the concept of organised armed groups and evaluates 
how organised armed groups are bound by IHL. Second, this thesis determines the 
extent to which organised armed groups already have a responsibility to protect under 
the framework regulating internal armed conflicts. This assessment is based on the 
examination of selected obligations that are fundamentally related to the concept of 
civilian protection. Third, the research evaluates the extent to which the adoption of the 
R2P could contribute to the international recognition of the political organs of 
opposition groups. Finally, this thesis examines the international R2P and the role of 
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opposition groups. It focuses on the provision of arms to opposition groups by third 
states as well as the legality and scope of the authorised use of force for the purpose of 
civilian protection. 
The research concludes that opposition groups could play a fundamental role in 
the protection of civilians within the context of internal armed conflicts. Like host 
states, opposition groups are bound by IHL. The level of civilian protection that 
opposition groups are required to provide depends on their level of organisation. 
Opposition groups already have a responsibility to protect under the existing rules of 
IHL. Since the adoption of the R2P concept, there have been indications that opposition 
groups could be politically recognised at the international level. It has been suggested 
that the right to self-determination can be relied upon to justify the struggle against 
repressive regimes. Opposition groups, under very strict conditions, could receive arms 
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Brief General Background 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic shift in the types of 
challenges facing the international community. Various armed conflicts have erupted 
within states rather than between states. The changing nature of armed conflicts, 
causing the injury and death of millions of innocent people, has proven the inadequacy 
of the interstate system.1 The reliance on the interstate system as the basis upon which 
the definition of international security is founded2 has failed to face the new challenges. 
Hence, it has been deemed necessary to advance the efforts to reach a suitable formula 
for filling in the gap in the international legal system and insuring more effective 
responses to the new security challenges. It was considered essential to include the issue 
of the protection of civilians within the international system to strengthen the 
obligations imposed on the international community to protect populations during 
armed conflicts.3  
Various efforts were advanced to further protect civilians in internal armed 
conflicts.4 In an early stage, these attempts focused mainly on introducing the concept 
of  human security, and redefining the notion of sovereignty.5 They primarily intended 
                                                 
1 L. Axworthy, ‘R to P and the Evolution of State Sovereignty’, in J Genser & I Cotler (eds.), the 
Responsibility to Protect the Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in our Time (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2012), at 8. 
2 S. M. Makinda, ‘Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations’ (1996) 2 
Global Governance 149, at 152. 
3 See Report of the Security General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2005) UN Doc 
S/2005/740, 15, at para. 53. 
4 See Our Global Neighborhood, The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1995).   
5 See UN Press Release SG/SM/4560, April 24, 1991 cited in G. M. Lyons & M. Mastanduno, Beyond 
Westphalia?: state sovereignty and international intervention (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
USA, 1995), at 2; J. P.  Cuellar, report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organisation 
(United Nations, New York, 1991); B. Boutros- Ghali, an Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted 
by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York, United Nations, 1992), 
available online at: http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf; B. Boutros- Ghali, ‘Empowering the 
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to enhance the protection provided for civilians by extending the definition of 
international peace and security.6 As explicitly adopted in the UNSC resolution 1296,7 
intentionally targeting civilians ‘or other protected persons and the committing of 
systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human 
rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace 
and security’.8 Nevertheless, despite their theoretical significance, the practical 
effectiveness of these efforts proved to be minimal.  
The failure of these efforts  to prevent international crimes and preserve peace 
and security was particularly clear in three cases; the Rwandan genocide of 1994,9 the 
Bosnian massacre of 199510 and in the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo prior to the NATO 
military intervention in 1999.11 In response to these horrific incidents, there has been 
almost an agreement that such an effective protection of vulnerable people could not 
possibly be achieved without the establishment of ‘a systematic and responsive 
framework of rules and procedures’.12 It was considered essential to found a body that 
could contribute to the creation of such a system.13 Thus, focusing on the necessity to 
solve the uncertainty surrounding the concept of sovereignty, the protection of human 
rights and the right of humanitarian intervention, the concept of the R2P was introduced 
                                                 
United Nations’ (1991-1993) 71 Foreign Affairs 89, at 99; Our Global Neighborhood, The Report of 
the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995).   
6 See M. Makinda, ‘the United Nations and State Sovereignty: Mechanism for Managing International 
Security’ (1998) 33 (1) Australian Journal of Political Science 101, at 108. 
7 United Nations Security Council, Security Council resolution 1296 (2000) [on protection of civilians 
in armed conflicts], 19 April 2000, S/RES/1296 (2000), available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00efb824.html.  
8 Ibid, at para. 5.  
9 Axworthy, (n 1), at 9; International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo: An Ongoing Crisis (2007), at ii, available online at: 
http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/migrated/resources/2007/2006-7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf.   
10 See C. G. Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and 
Human Rights (Routledge, Oxon, 2011), at 1. 
11 See O. Corten, The Law against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law (Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2010), at 512. 




for the first time by the ICISS in 2001.14 The concept of the R2P further developed 
through time until it achieved its final version introduced by the World Summit 
document in 2005.15   
Despite the fact that the introduction of the R2P is considered to be of crucial 
significance for the development of the concept of the protection of civilians, it still 
may raise some degree of uncertainty as to its effective implementation over internal 
armed conflicts. Even though the concept of the R2P paid notable attention to various 
obstacles that previously prevented effective protection of civilians such as; the notion 
of sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention and the role of the international 
community, the framework of the R2P did not include any explicit reference to primary 
actors in internal armed conflicts that are armed groups. Nonetheless, the absence of a 
direct inclusion of opposition groups within the framework of the R2P ought not to be 
taken as affirmative evidence declining any role that could be played by these groups 
for the purpose of protecting populations. In fact, the issue concerning the status of 
armed groups, and the role they could play under international law has been always a 
controversial one. 
Generally, states have been considered to be the primary actors of the 
international community,16 and therefore, their recognised governments are the main 
subjects of international law.17 Nevertheless, there has been indications that as the 
international community has developed, entities other than states have started to 
emerge. Some of these entities exist and operate within the territories controlled by 
                                                 
14 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Report on the 
Responsibility to Protect, December 2001.  
15 See United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/44168a910.html.  
16 R. Wolfrum & C. E. Philipp, ‘The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights Under 
International Law’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 559, at 585. 
17 J. V. Essen, ‘De Facto Regimes in International Law’ (2012) 28 (74) Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 32. 
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functioning governments.18 In fact, in some cases, non-state entities may exercise 
powers that go beyond the control of the parent states.19  Moreover, such cases are 
evident in situations of internal armed conflicts where non-state entities take the form 
of armed groups and fight against the de jure governments.20 
It is noteworthy to mention that one of the primary reasons behind the 
uncertainty surrounding the status of opposition groups as parties to internal armed 
conflict is attributed to the approach adopted under contemporary international law after 
the drafting of the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols. After 
the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, contemporary international law 
has adopted an objective measure based on the concept of protection.21 The focus of 
Geneva Conventions was primarily to provide a minimum protection for non-
participants in non-international conflicts rather than to grant rights to the parties to 
armed conflicts.22 Nonetheless, although the approach of the Geneva Conventions 
represents  a departure from the doctrine of belligerency adopted under traditional 
international law which explicitly recognised different criteria of opposition groups, the 
Geneva Conventions System still consider the capacity of armed groups. In the various 
attempts made to define non-international armed conflicts for the purpose of 
implementing IHL, significant attention was paid to the level of organisation that ought 
to be enjoyed by armed groups and their capability to undertake certain obligations.23  
                                                 
18 See M. Schoiswohl, ‘De Facto Regimes and Human Rights Obligations-The Twilight Zone of Public 
International Law?’ (2001) 6 Austrian Review of International and European Law 46, at 50. 
19 Y. Ronen, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors’ (2013) 46 Cornell 
International Law Journal 21, at 23. 
20 See E. Lieblich, International law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent (Routledge, UK, 2013). 
21 See for ex. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Art. 3, 
available online at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html.   
22 H. A. Wilson, International Law and The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1988), at 44. 




Article 1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol of 1977 recognises opposition 
groups ‘which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement this Protocol’.24 It is suggested that the definition of opposition groups 
under the protocol intends to enhance the protection provided for civilians. it requires 
that the armed groups must reach certain level of capacity enabling them to comply 
with the Protocol. 
The consideration of armed groups under contemporary international law for 
the purpose  of civilians protection was further developed by the ICTY in the Tadic 
case.25 As interpreted by the Tadic Trial Chamber, the definition of armed conflict 
provided by the Appeal Chamber is founded primarily on two criteria: ‘the intensity of 
the conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict’.26 The Tadic criteria 
provides a lower threshold in comparison to the formula provided in Article 1 (1) of the 
second Additional Protocol. It implies that an armed conflict may exist whether the 
armed group exercises territorial effective control or not. It also seems to eliminate the 
requirement as to the ability of the armed group to apply IHL.27 Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that the increase importance of the concept of population protection has 
significantly contributed to the efforts toward further considering armed groups, such 
                                                 
24 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, at Art. 1 (1), available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html.  
25 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (a/k/a Dule), IT-94-1-AR, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) 2 October 1995, at para. 70, available online at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. 
26 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Opinion and Judgment), IT-94-1-T, International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 7 May 1997, at para. 562, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4027812b4.html.  
27 A. Cullen, ‘Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian’ (2005) 183 Military Law Review 66, at 104. 
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consideration is still restricted to implement the obligations emanating from Common 
Article 3.  
In fact, it is suggested that armed groups maintaining a lower capacity than the 
one adopted in Tadic case could be still considered for the purpose of  satisfying the 
level of protection provided under Common Article 3.28 It is asserted that the objective 
approach as well as the nature of Common Article 3 indicates that the obligations 
imposed by the Article are applicable regardless of the capacity of  the armed groups.29 
In other words, armed groups would be considered for the purpose of applying 
Common Article 3 as far as an internal armed conflict emerged. Hence, the formula 
adopted by the ICTY in Tadic case seems to intend to further affirm the implementation 
of Common Article 3 rather than enhancing the protection provided under the 
framework regulating internal armed conflicts. It aims to further restrict the will of 
parties engaged in armed conflicts to acknowledge the applicability of Common Article 
3.30   
States’ reactions to the crises in Libya and Syria indicates further development 
as to what is meant by the expression ‘opposition groups’ and what role they could play 
for the purpose of protecting populations. It suggests further focus on the status of 
opposition groups. The international reaction towards the Libyan and Syrian conflicts 
indicates that opposition groups could play roles that could go beyond the context of 
internal armed conflicts. It indicates the emergence of a new trend towards recognising 
opposition groups at the international level as the legitimate representatives of the 
people.31 Moreover, such recognition may not only represent a high level of political 
                                                 
28 See Wilson, (n 22), at 44. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See Cullen, (n 27), at 88. 
31 See D. Akande, ‘Self Determination and the Syrian Conflict- Recognition of Syrian Opposition as 
Sole Legitimate Representative of the Syrian People: What Does This Mean and What Implications 
Does It Have?’ (2012) European Journal of International Law: Talk!, available online at: 
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recognition, but it could suggest the emergence of a legal status based on the right to 
self-determination. The use of the expression ‘the legitimate representatives of the 
peoples’ to describe the Libyan and Syrian oppositions reveals some similarities 
between the status of opposition groups after the adoption of the R2P and the status of 
NLMs under international law where these groups are entitled to exercise the right to 
self-determination in behalf of their peoples.32  
In fact, state practice as to the Libyan and Syrian situations does not only 
suggest that opposition groups maintaining the required capacity to protect could 
receive further international assistance including the supply of weaponry for the 
purpose of achieving such an objective, but it also indicates that such a capacity may 
impact the level of the international responsibility to react. As it will be explained in 
the project, it is argued, although debatable, the credibility and stability of opposition 
groups may not only speed up the process required for the authorisation of the use of 
force by the UNSC, but it could also facilitate the achievement of the practical 
objectives behind such an action on the ground.  
It is noteworthy to mention that the absence of an explicit reference to the 
opposition groups/armed groups within the framework of the R2P does not mean that 
opposition groups cannot play a role within the concept of the R2P.  It is undeniable 
that the primary objective behind the creation of the R2P is to enhance the level of 
protection provided for civilians.33 Nevertheless, the various documents representing 
the R2P approached such an objective differently. Furthermore, the continued 




32 See Akande, (n 31). 
33 See, ICISS, (n 14), at VII; Corten, (n 11), at 517. 
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development of the concept of the R2P through these documents indicates further role 
to be played by these groups for the purpose of protecting populations. 
The primary task behind introducing the concept of the R2P by the ICISS in 
200134 was to draft a text that could satisfy both the necessity for more effective 
capacity to intervene in cases of extreme violations of human rights and for responding 
to the demands of the UN member states to prevent any potential misuse of such a 
mechanism.35 As it was argued in the ICISS report, ‘sovereign states have a 
responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass 
murder and rape, from starvation—but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states’.36 Nevertheless, albeit 
the significance of the contribution made by the R2P as introduced by the ICISS as to 
violations committed in internal armed conflicts in general, the new concept did not 
pay direct attention to opposition groups as primary actors in such conflicts. 
 In fact, although the ICISS version of the R2P imposed an obligation to protect 
on host states, the primary focus of the R2P as introduced in 2001 was on the 
international responsibility to react through forcible intervention.37 In other words, the 
narrow approach based on the concept of sovereignty as responsibility and the 
possibility to forcibly intervene did not leave sufficient room to consider any notable 
role to be played by opposition groups. Moreover, such an assertion finds support in 
the subsequent documents reintroducing the concept of the R2P.  
The later documents representing the concept of the R2P revealed a departure 
from the heavy reliance on the threshold of intervention in favour of more focus on the 
                                                 
34 ICISS, (n 14). 
35 See Ibid; Corten, (n 11), at 517.  
36 ICISS, (n 14), at VIII. 
37 See M. Payandeh, ‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking’ (2010) 35 (2) Yale Journal of 
International Law, 469, at 471. 
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concept of civilians protection.  In its report, the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change38 stated that ‘[t]here is a growing recognition that the issue is 
not the ‘right to intervene’ of any State, but the ‘responsibility to protect... when it 
comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe—mass murder and rape, ethnic 
cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to 
disease’.39 Furthermore, unlike the ICISS, the report of the High Level Panel focused 
heavily on the responsibility to prevent.40 In addition, even though the High-Level 
Panel’s report41 continued to ‘apply threshold criteria for RtoP-based intervention’,42 it 
intended to narrow its scope.43 It did not only exclude the UNGA and regional 
organisations as alternatives to the UNSC authorisations, and restricted the 
implementation of the international responsibility on the UNSC authorisation,44 but it 
also reconsidered the scope of the R2P.   
The report of the High Level Panel explicitly recognised the emergence of ‘a 
collective international responsibility to protect,..., in the event of genocide and other 
large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling 
to prevent’.45 Hence, in contrast to the ICISS report, the Panel’s report excluded civil 
war, mass starvation, and natural or environmental catastrophes from the threshold of 
intervention. Nevertheless, as indicated above, it seemed to reduce the restrictions 
imposed on relying on forcible intervention regarding war crimes and crimes against 
                                                 
38 United Nations Secretary General’s High- Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565, 65-66, at paras. 201-202.  
39 Ibid, at para. 201. 
40 See Ibid, at para. 203. 
41 Ibid 
42 T. Chhabra & J. B. Zucker ‘Defining the Crimes’, in J Genser & I Cotler (eds.), the Responsibility to 
Protect the Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in our Time (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2012), at 39. 
43 Ibid. 




humanity by requiring the seriousness of the violation rather than on whether evidence 
exists that it amounts to large-scale or ethnic cleansing.46 Therefore, as contended by 
Axworthy, what could be concluded from the work of the Panel is the necessity of 
creating ‘a framework governing international action to prevent or halt the suffering of 
civilian populations’ rather than regulating intervention per se.47 
In the World Summit document of 2005, considered to be the most notable 
normative development of the R2P, the concept of sovereignty as responsibility was 
reintroduced in a more formal and detailed way.48 In paragraph 138, the report imposed 
responsibility upon states to protect their citizens from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity’. It also encouraged the international 
community to help ‘states to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations 
in establishing an early warning capacity’.49  
Furthermore, in paragraph 139, the report outlined the obligations imposed upon 
other states once the responsibility to protect moved to the international community due 
to the failure of the state to fulfil its duties and protect its nation. It clearly stated, ‘[t]he 
international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations’ from being victims 
of the international crimes referred to previously.50 Furthermore, since these peaceful 
methods can, in some cases, fail to protect citizens from the crimes mentioned above, 
as a last resort, the report referred to the option to ‘take collective action…through the 
                                                 
46 Chhabra & Zucker, (n 42), at 39. 
47 Axworthy, (n 1), at 13. 
48 See A. J. Bellamy, ‘Realizing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 10 International Studies 
Perspectives 111, at 114; Badescu, (n 10), at 7. 
49 World Summit Outcome, (n 15), at para. 138. 
50 Ibid, at para. 139; see W. R. Pace & N. Deller, ‘Preventing Future Genocides: An International 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2005) 36 (4) World Order 15. 
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Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis, in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate’.51  
Hence, it is apparent that the World Summit document has a wider approach as 
to the objective of protecting populations. Although it highly restricted the possibility 
to rely on forcible intervention, it added further emphasis on the responsibility to 
prevent and help to protect. The world Summit document introduced various options 
that could be implemented by the international community to protect, such as the use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. It also further framed 
the scope of the R2P by restricting it to four international crimes representing violations 
of jus cogens. The R2P as introduced by the World Summit primarily focused on the 
objective of protection rather than the various actors involved. Yet, despite its 
normative significance, the legal status of the R2P is still contested. 
  
The Legal Status of the R2P Concept: Political Concept, Soft Law or Hard Law 
The articulation of the R2P in the relevant documents, mentioned above, 
suggests that it is not a conclusively legal concept. The framework of the R2P, as 
represented in the various documents from 2001 to 2009, contains legal, moral and 
political elements.52 It does not satisfy any of the requirements stated under Article 38 
(1) of the Statute of the ICJ to be considered a source of international law.53 The R2P 
concept has never been included in an international treaty,54  it has not yet satisfied the 
elements of a settled state practice or opinio juris required for the emergence of 
                                                 
51 World Summit Outcome, (n 15), at para. 139. 
52 See ICISS, (n 14): A. S. Kolb, The UN Security Council Members’ Responsibility to Protect: A Legal 
Analysis (Springer, Heidelberg, 2018), at 105- 110. 
53 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, at Art. 38 (1), available 
online at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3deb4b9c0.html.  
54 Ibid, at Art. 38 (1) (a). 
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customary international law55 and there has been no evidence yet to suggest that it has 
become a general principle of international law.56 
Despite the significance of the R2P adoption by the heads of states in the World 
Summit document of 2005,57 the legal status of this document is highly controversial.58 
The UNGA is not a law-making body; therefore, it does not have the capacity to create 
legally binding rules. According to Shaw, by nature, the UNGA is intended to function 
primarily as ‘a parliamentary advisory body’.59 Therefore, unlike the UNSC, which has 
the capacity to adopt resolutions that bind states, resolutions issued by the UNGA are 
recommendatory in nature, ‘putting forward opinions in various issues with varying 
degrees of majority support’.60 Therefore, the R2P, as adopted in the World Summit 
document, cannot be considered a source of binding international law. However, even 
though the UNGA resolutions are not legally binding, neither are they empty of any 
legal significance.  
The UNGA resolutions could contribute to the emergence of new binding rules 
under international law. They could affirm the creation of consistent state practices 
pertaining to certain issues and facilitate the existence of international opinio juris that 
lead to the creation of new customary rules.61 Nonetheless, this does not seem to be the 
case regarding the World Summit of 2005. 
                                                 
55 See ICJ Statute, (n 53), at Art. 38 (1) (b); Payandeh, (n 37), at 471. 
56 See Ibid, at Art. 38 (1) (c). 
57 See World Summit Outcome, (n 15). 
58 See Payandeh, (n 37), at 469; M. Welsh & M. Banda, ‘International Law and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States’ Responsibilities?’ (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 
113, at 229. 
59 M. N. Shaw, International law, 6th ed. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008), at 115. 
60 Ibid, at 114-115. 
61 See Ibid, at 114. 
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During the debates that took place within the UNGA concerning the R2P, it was 
apparent that states were unwilling to legally bind themselves to such a concept.62 Many 
states clearly affirmed that the R2P is neither a part of existing international law nor 
establishes legally binding obligations.63 Others, including significantly outspoken 
advocates of the concept, asserted that it is not intended to create new laws.64 Instead, 
they referred to the framework of the R2P adopted in the 2005 World Summit as a 
moral or political commitment.65  
Although most states acknowledge that the R2P concept is rooted in existing 
international law, its legal character is limited to the first pillar concerning the primary 
responsibility of host states to protect their populations.66 Unlike the legality of the first 
pillar of the R2P that was affirmed in many statements,67 the legal status of the 
complementary responsibility of the international community to protect was either 
ignored or denied.68 Therefore, the World Summit document cannot be relied on to 
establish the legality of the R2P. However, it has been argued that the concept of the 
R2P, as a whole, is not devoid of legal character.69  
The R2P, and more specifically the complementary international responsibility 
to protect, as adopted in paragraph 139 of the World Summit document, can be 
                                                 
62 See Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The 
2009 General Assembly Debates: An Assessment, August 2009, at 5, available online at: 
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gcr2p_-general-assembly-debate-assessment.pdf.   
63 Ibid. 
64 See Philippines, Statement at the General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect, UN 
GAOR, 63rd Sess., 97th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/63/PV.97 (23 July 2009) 10, at 11; Brazil, Statement at 
the General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect, UN GAOR, 63rd Sess., 97th Plen. Mtg., 
UN Doc. A/63/PV.97 (23 July 2009) 12, at 13; Singapore, Statement at the General Assembly Debate 
on the Responsibility to Protect, UN GAOR, 63rd Sess., 98th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/63/PV.98 (24 July 
2009) 6, at 7. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See Italy, Statement at the General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect, UN GAOR, 
63rd Sess., 97th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/63/PV.97 (23 July 2009) 27, at 27-28; Sudan, Statement at the 
General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect, UN GAOR, 63rd Sess., 101st Plen. Mtg., UN 
Doc. A/63/PV.101 (28 July 2009) 10, at 10-11. 
67 See Ibid. 
68 See Ibid. 
69 Welsh & Banda, (n 58), at 229. 
14 
 
described as a political commitment that does not yet have legal responsibilities.70 
Moreover, considering the articulation of the R2P concept and how states reacted to it, 
especially in 2005, the R2P can best be described as soft law.71  
Although it is by nature a highly ambiguous idea, soft law can generally be 
defined as an intermediate stage ‘between fully binding treaties and fully political 
positions’.72 In legal literature, the expression soft law is widely used to refer to ‘law-
like promises or statements that fall short of hard law’.73 Soft law often takes the form 
of an international instrument that has some of the characteristics of a formal 
convention, yet does not satisfy the conditions required for their legal formation.74 More 
specifically, soft law has the character of law; however, it does not have its legally 
binding nature. Therefore, soft law does not create precise rights and obligations. 
However, it is contended that although soft law does not contain legally binding rules, 
it can still have legal consequences.75 Moreover, according to Higgins’s argument, it 
can be asserted that soft law can play the role of influencing states. Higgins stated that: 
[T]he passing of binding decisions is not the only way in which law development 
occurs. Legal consequences can also flow from acts which are not, in the formal sense, 
‘binding’. And further, law is developed by a verity of non-legislative acts which do 
not seek to secure, in any direct sense, ‘compliance’ from Assembly members.76 
As argued by Guzman and Meyer, soft law consists of ‘nonbinding rules or 
instruments that interpret or inform our understanding of binding legal rules or 
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represent promises that in turn create expectations about future conduct’.77 Welsh and 
Banda further clarified that: 
Soft laws interact in complex ways with the hard rules of law. For instance, soft laws 
can signal the direction of future legal developments, act as a precursor to binding 
treaties, or ‘harden’ into custom over time by mobilising state practice or providing 
evidence of opinio juris. They may also help shape legal interpretation of existing rules 
by emphasizing particular normative understandings and rules of international 
conduct… Articles 138 and 139 [of the World Summit], given their virtually 
unanimous endorsement, can be accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the 
Charter’s provisions on sovereignty, human rights, and the use of force. Thus, even if 
the Outcome Document is not legally enforceable per se, it does represent an important 
step in the evolution of international protection law.78  
In conclusion, the concept of the R2P is best considered as a form of soft law 
defined and influenced by existing principles of international law.79 Accordingly, the 
World Summit document is intended to provide a pure framework that facilitates a 
smoother and more adjustable implementation of the existing laws rather than create 
new substantive rules.80 The R2P, as introduced by the World Summit document, can 
be considered as a mechanism with the purpose of filling the gaps in the UN system by 
providing an ideal environment for an improved interaction between the relevant 
branches of international law. Furthermore, the advantage of such an interaction is not 
limited to providing a superior understanding of certain areas of international law, but 
also to facilitating the emergence of new substantive rules that are rooted in pre-existing 
laws.81 Therefore, states’ reactions towards the Libyan and Syrian opposition groups 
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could be seen as a reinterpretation of the framework regulating internal armed conflicts 
based on the R2P.82 
 
The Importance of This Research 
In accordance with the evaluation provided above regarding the evolution of the 
R2P concept, the consideration of opposition groups within the framework of the R2P 
is of crucial legal and practical significance. As the primary objective of the R2P 
concept, the protection of civilians must remain a focal point for all parties during times 
of hostility. As clarified by the UNSG, all concerned parties must ‘understand how their 
responsibilities for the protection of civilians should be translated into action’.83 In the 
context of internal armed conflicts, it is expected that opposition groups will take 
control over significant parts of a territory. The control of some populated areas by 
these groups indicates that the host state has already lost its effective control over these 
parts of the territory; therefore, it could not be held responsible for fulfilling the first 
pillar of the R2P. Moreover, in order to preserve the required level of civilian 
protection, the authorities of a host state may be substituted by another entity that has 
the capacity to fulfil the responsibilities of the R2P. This entity could be the opposition 
group. In fact, the transfer of these responsibilities to the opposition could serve as a 
measure to prevent violations of jus cogens by these groups.  
The significance of considering opposition groups for the implementation of the 
R2P is more apparent when the host state is the perpetrator of the violations of jus 
cogens against its population. In this case, as mentioned above, the host state should be 
                                                 
82 See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 21 June 1971, at para. 53, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a2531.html. ‘an international instrument has to be interpreted 
and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’;  
83 Report of the Security General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2005) UN Doc 
S/2005/740, 15, at para. 53; Payandeh, (n 37), at 471. 
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considered unwilling to fulfil its mandates under the first pillar;84 therefore, the 
responsibility to protect would be transferred to the international community.85 The 
consideration of opposition groups for the purpose of civilian protection could facilitate 
the fulfilment of the responsibility to protect under the third pillar. It would provide 
third states a connection with a reliable entity in the territory that is willing to undertake 
responsibilities necessary for the protection of the population. In other words, the 
recognition of opposition groups within the framework of the R2P would make 
international intervention more effective.  
Accordingly, the reactions of states towards the Libyan and Syrian opposition 
groups adhere to the developed approach of the R2P. Nonetheless, the reliance on state 
practice as to the Libyan and Syrian situations is not sufficient in itself to clarify the 
ambiguity surrounding the status of opposition groups and the roles that they could play 
in protecting civilians under international law. States’ reactions to the Libyan and 
Syrian crises are represented in political statements. These statements could imply 
different meanings based on the intention of the issuers. Therefore, these statements 
ought to be interpreted in accordance with the existing laws. Nevertheless, the subject 
concerning opposition groups has always created a high level of controversy. There has 
not been a clear and complete framework regulating the roles that could be played by 
these groups for the purpose of protecting populations. The absence of a detailed legal 
framework for the status of opposition groups and their duty to protect populations 
creates a gap in the legal literature. Hence, it is essential to conduct intensive analysis 
in order to fill this gap. 
 
 
                                                 
84 See World Summit Outcome, (n 15), at para. 138. 
85 See Ibid, at para. 139. 
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The Rationale of Choosing the Libyan and Syrian Conflicts 
 
This thesis focuses primarily on two cases: the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. The 
focus on these two conflicts is justified for some significant reasons. First, the focus on 
the Libyan and Syrian conflicts in this research is attributed to the solid link between 
these two conflicts and the concept of the R2P. Since its adoption in the 2005 World 
Summit document, the R2P has been invoked during various humanitarian crises, 
including those in Darfur, Kenya, Gaza, Sri Lanka and Burma. Nonetheless, there have 
been no clear indications that the concept of the R2P led to timely and coordinated 
international action.86 In fact, in some crises, contestation was made as to whether the 
concept of the R2P was relevant at all.87   
In contrast, there have been many indications that the concept of the R2P is 
directly relevant to the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. In fact, Resolution 1970 concerning 
the Libyan crisis included an explicit reference to the R2P.88 Moreover, the R2P has 
been clearly implemented, both directly and indirectly, in various statements made by 
states regarding these two conflicts. In many documents related to the Libyan and 
Syrian conflicts, various references have been made to the concept of the protection of 
civilians and the responsibility of the Libyan and Syrian opposition groups to offer this 
protection.89 
Secondly, the Libyan and Syrian crises share some similarities as to their 
characteristics that make their use more logical and effective for achieving the primary 
objective of this project. The Libyan and Syrian crises satisfy the requirements of 
                                                 
86 See World Summit Outcome, (n 15). 
87 See Welsh & Banda, (n 58), at 113. 
88 See UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) [on establishment of a Security 
Council Committee to monitor implementation of the arms embargo against the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya], 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d6ce9742.html.  
89 See S. Talmon, ‘Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People’ 
(2013) Chinese Journal of International Law 219. 
19 
 
internal armed conflict.  Both armed conflicts erupted in Arab countries and constitute 
an important part of what is known as the Arab Spring.90  
In general, the Libyan and Syrian opposition groups claim to represent the vast 
majority of their respective populations. Moreover, the Libyan and Syrian regimes are 
considered dictatorships and claimed to lose their legitimacy. The international 
community has shown great interest in these opposition groups. Many arguments and 
statements have been made by the representatives of states as to the capacities of the 
Libyan and Syrian opposition groups. There have been strong indications that various 
states are willing to work closely with these groups for the purpose of protecting 
civilians.91 
Moreover, the Libyan and Syrian conflicts have developed in similar ways. 
They moved from civil unrests to internal armed conflicts. During the early stages of 
the Syrian conflict, it was viewed similarly to the Libyan crisis. Both the Libyan and 
Syrian opposition groups are labelled similarly based on their progress in their 
respective territories. Furthermore, states use the Libyan example to further encourage 
the development of Syrian opposition groups.  
Although the Libyan and Syrian crises reveal some similarities, the outcomes 
of states’ reactions towards these two conflicts have been significantly different. 
However, the different outcomes can be understood and explained based on political 
and legal grounds. Hence, studying these two cases side by side and focusing on their 
similarities and differences can help to understand the international reaction towards 
these two conflicts as well as how the R2P has contributed to such reaction.  
 
                                                 
90 The definition of Arab Spring is the media’s name for a series of uprisings and protests throughout 
the middle east, beginning in December of 2010 including Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
91 See Talmon, (n 89), at 219. 
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The Focus of the Research and Methodology 
This research focuses on the concept of R2P in relation to opposition groups as 
parties to internal armed conflict. This project aims to evaluate the extent to which 
opposition groups could play a role in civilian protection in the context of internal 
armed conflicts following the adoption of the R2P. As stated above, because the concept 
of the R2P has no direct legal power and is best described as a soft law, it has been 
employed in this research as an interpretive tool to clarify the meaning of the existing 
laws and trace any potential changes and development with respect to the role of 
opposition groups in the protection of civilians.92 Accordingly, the project intends to 
achieve two objectives. First, it attempts to examine the extent to which opposition 
groups have the responsibility to protect civilians under IHL. Second, it aims to trace 
any potential changes or developments regarding the protective role of opposition 
groups as a result of the implementation of the R2P. 
To achieve these objectives, the research intends to address five issues. As a 
starting point, this thesis seeks to address two questions, namely, what the concept of 
organised armed groups means and how these groups are bound by IHL. Next, it 
discusses the matters concerning the extent to which opposition groups have a 
responsibility to protect civilians. Thereafter, it identifies the extent to which the 
adoption of the R2P could contribute to the international recognition of opposition 
groups. Finally, the project addresses how international accountability has changed as 
a result of the adoption of the R2P, especially in relation to opposition groups. 
This study seeks to answer these questions by using a positivist methodology 
based on doctrinal research. The method is a literature-based quantitative research. 
Primary and secondary literature sources, such as conventions, reports, resolutions, 
                                                 
92 See Namibia (Advisory Opinion), (n 82), at para. 53. 
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cases, books, articles and other legal documents, were accessed through libraries and 
Internet databases and then analysed and used in the research process. No field study 
was conducted. It is important to clarify that the research does not intend to cover all of 
the issues related to the role of opposition groups in civilian protection and the R2P. 
Due to space constraints, the discussion in this research is limited to certain aspects 
related to the subject. 
 
A Note on Terminology: Opposition Groups and Organised Armed Groups 
Generally, opposition groups and organised armed groups are two different 
terms. The term opposition group is usually used to refer to a body of people that have 
the intention of opposing and resisting establishment, either forcibly or non-forcibly. 93 
These can exist and operate in times of war or peace. Opposition groups, according to 
this general meaning, could have different motives, characters and agendas.94 In 
contrast, the term organised armed group, as clarified above, refers specifically to 
armed groups that already achieved certain levels of organisation qualifying them to be 
parties to internal armed conflicts. 
 Despite the fact that the terms opposition groups and organised armed groups 
are different, they can be used interchangeably in the context of internal armed 
conflicts. The utilisation of these two phrases as synonymous during internal armed 
conflicts is quite common in the legal literature. Despite the fact that it is a general term, 
the meaning of the expression opposition groups is often restricted by the definition of 
the concept of internal armed conflict. The emergence of internal armed conflict 
suggests that the intensity of the conflict has already achieved a high level of armed 
                                                 
93 See Oxford Dictionaries, available online at: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/opposition.  
94 See Essen, (n 17), at 32-33. 
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violence, and the non-state party to the conflict has achieved the level of organisation 
required for the implementation of common Article 3.95 
 In this thesis, the terms opposition groups and organised armed groups are used 
interchangeably, especially when the reference to armed groups is general, and no 
specification or emphasis is required. However, in certain parts of the thesis where more 
emphasis as to the structure of armed groups is needed, the phrase organised armed 
groups is used to specifically refer to those armed groups fighting on the ground, while 
the term opposition groups is utilised to refer to the wide structure of these groups, 
including the armed forces in the field as well as the political organs representing them 
internationally. Opposition group is also used to refer to these groups prior to qualifying 
as armed groups as defined under IHL. 
 
The Structure of the Research 
The project responds to the research questions through a discussion organised 
into four chapters. Two of these chapters focus on issues related to the relationship 
between organised armed groups and the host state, and the other two focus on the 
relationship between opposition groups and the international community.  
Chapter one focuses on the legal framework regulating organised armed groups 
as parties to internal armed conflicts and the concept of the R2P. It aims to further 
clarify the legal framework concerning organised armed groups as parties to internal 
armed conflicts. In order to do so, it evaluates two main issues: first, the development 
of the concept of ‘organised armed groups’, and second, the question of how organised 
armed groups could be bound by the rules of IHL. This chapter aims not only to 
determine the development of the legal framework related to organised armed groups 
                                                 
95 See L. Moir, Internal Armed Conflict, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002), at, at 36. 
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under contemporary international law but also to indicate any potential development 
after the adoption of the R2P whenever possible. 
Chapter two addresses the international obligations of organised armed groups 
for the purpose of civilian protection and the extent to which the R2P contributed to 
their interpretation and implementation. This chapter is divided into three sections. 
Section one relates to civilians’ right to adequate food where the prohibition of 
starvation and the obligation to allow humanitarian assistance are evaluated. Section 
two addresses the prohibition of the act of forced displacement and the role of organised 
armed groups. Finally, section three focuses on IDPs and the responsibilities of 
organised armed groups. 
Chapter three focuses on the international recognition of the political organs of 
opposition groups and the concept of the protection of populations. After addressing 
the issue related to the status of opposition groups as parties to internal armed conflicts 
and the protection of the population, the discussion in this chapter will be extended to 
examine the extent to which the protection of the population, as the cornerstone of the 
R2P, contributed to the recognition of the political organs of opposition groups. This 
chapter not only aims to determine the extent to which civilian protection contributed 
to the development of this recognition but also intends to determine the consequences 
of the recognition for the purpose of civilian protection. Based on the international 
reactions to the Libyan and Syrian crises, the chapter attempts to determine to what 
extent a new trend has been emerging with respect to the recognition of the political 
organs of opposition groups. 
 The chapter aims to explore the various levels of political recognition that could 
be granted to opposition groups and the extent to which the credibility and stability of 
these groups could impact such recognition. The chapter also focuses on the recognition 
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of an opposition group as the legitimate representative of the people as being the highest 
possible level of recognition. It attempts to determine to what extent the use of such 
expressions to recognise an opposition group could indicate that these groups are 
entitled to exercise the right to self-determination. More specifically, the chapter 
intends to examine the similarity and differences between the use of this expression 
within the context of the R2P and to refer to NLMs. The chapter, then, address the 
possibility to recognise these groups as the new government. 
The fourth chapter examines the international R2P and the role of opposition 
groups. This chapter aims to determine the extent to which the involvement of 
opposition groups in the context of the R2P impacts the nature and scope of the 
international R2P. It addresses the possible measures and actions that could be 
advanced by third states to protect civilian populations and the extent to which the 
increased involvement of opposition groups following the adoption of the R2P has 
impacted the nature and scope of this international responsibility. Based on the reaction 
of the international community to R2P situations, this chapter examines two main issues 
related to third states’ responsibilities. It first discusses the issue concerning the 
international R2P and the transfer of arms. The aim of this discussion is to trace any 
changes in the framework regulating the transfer of arms to the parties to internal armed 
conflicts and the extent to which the concept of civilian protection has played a role in 
such changes. 
The chapter also examines the potential changes in relation to the international 
R2P and the authorised use of force after the adoption of the R2P. Additionally, it 
examines the extent to which the further involvement of opposition groups contributed 
to these changes. The focus on this part is on the Libyan case as the only example where 




The Legal Framework Regulating Organised Armed Groups as Parties to 
Internal Armed Conflicts and the Concept of the R2P 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Principally, states are considered to be the primary actors of the international 
community,1 and therefore, their recognised governments are the main subjects of 
international law.2 However, as the international community has developed, entities 
other than states have started to emerge. Some of these entities exist and operate within 
the territories controlled by functioning governments.3 In fact, in some cases, non-state 
entities may exercise powers that go beyond the control of the parent states.4 Moreover, 
such cases are evident in situations of internal armed conflicts where non-state entities 
take the form of armed groups and fight against the de jure governments.5 
  Although the phrase armed groups has been used occasionally to refer to these 
actors, it still seems to be too general to decisively clarify what is meant by such an 
expression. In other words, even though the phrase armed groups reflects the intention 
of these entities to resist and oppose,6 it does not clearly identify the potential 
differences between these entities in nature, structure and motives. Groups opposed to 
governments could be of different types and adopt various characteristics.7 The matter 
                                                 
1 R. Wolfrum & C. E. Philipp, ‘The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights Under 
International Law’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 559, at 585. 
2 J. V. Essen, ‘De Facto Regimes in International Law’ (2012) 28 (74) Utrecht Journal of International 
and European Law 32. 
3 See M. Schoiswohl, ‘De Facto Regimes and Human Rights Obligations-The Twilight Zone of Public 
International Law?’ (2001) 6 Austrian Review of International and European Law 46, at 50. 
4 Y. Ronen, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors’ (2013) 46 Cornell 
International Law Journal 21, at 23. 
5 See E. Lieblich, International law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent (Routledge, UK, 2013). 
6 See Oxford Dictionaries, available online at: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/opposition.  
7 See Essen, (n 2), at 32-33. 
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becomes more controversial as to the definition of organised armed groups. Another 
important issue that has been raised repeatedly is related to the applicability of IHL and 
organised armed groups. Although it is highly accepted that organised armed groups 
are bound by the rules of IHL, it is still problematic why and how these groups are 
bound by the concerned rules.  
The aim of this chapter is to further clarify the legal framework concerning 
organised armed groups as parties to internal armed conflicts. In order to do so, two 
primary issues are addressed. First, the development of the concept of organized armed 
groups is evaluated. Second, the questions why and how organised armed groups could 
be bound by the rules of IHL. The objective of this chapter not only to determine the 
development of the legal framework related to organised armed group under 
contemporary international law, but also to indicate any potential development after the 














1.2 The Development of the Concept of Organised Armed Groups: What is Meant 
by the Concept of Organised Armed Groups? 
The main objective of this section is to clarify what is meant by the concept 
organised armed groups. The objective of this section is achieved in two steps. First, 
the movement from the concept of recognition under traditional international law to the 
concept of population protection is discussed. Second, the concept of organised armed 
groups is defined.  
 
1.2.1 The Departure from the Concept of Recognition: From Recognised 
Belligerents to Unrecognised Insurgents for the Purpose of more Population 
Protection 
 Traditional international law recognises three different categories of armed 
groups: rebels, insurgents and belligerents.8 The recognition of belligerency is the only 
act that justifies the internationalisation of civil war.9 Nevertheless, despite the explicit 
recognition of armed groups under traditional international law, the act of recognition 
is discretional and places attention on the interests of the recognising states, and it has 
minimal impacts on the protection of population.10 
After the drafting of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, contemporary 
international law departed from the concept of recognition and adopted different 
measures based on the concept of protection.11 The focus of the Geneva Conventions 
was to provide the minimum protection for non-participants in non-international 
                                                 
8 See A. Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010), at 1. 
9 See Lieblich, (n 5), at 76-78. 
10 See Ibid, at 81. 
11 See for ex. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Art. 3, 
available online at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html.  
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conflicts.12 Although contemporary IHL considered the definition of non-international 
armed conflicts as a basis for its implementation, it did not ignore the status of armed 
groups. Various capacities of armed groups indicated in the various provisions 
intending to define internal armed conflicts.13 
Unlike the recognition of armed groups under traditional international law, the 
implementation of modern IHL is not a discretional act. The approach adopted under 
the Geneva Conventions allows for more involvement of various categories of armed 
groups for the purpose of population protection.14 Moreover, to further clarify the way 
international law moved from the concept of recognition to the concept of population 
protection, the two systems, which are traditional international humanitarian law and 
contemporary international law, should be discussed.  
 
1.2.1.1 The Recognition of Armed Groups under Traditional International Law 
Before the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions, different categories of 
armed groups were recognised based on the degrees of control over territory and 
recognition by the concerned governments.15 Although traditional international law 
recognised the status of rebellions, it did not impose any international rights or 
obligations on such a status. The status of rebellion indicates that the existing situation 
is of a highly temporary and unsustainable nature.16 In accordance with Kotzsch, 
                                                 
12 H. A. Wilson, International Law and The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1988), at 44. 
13 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, at Art. 1 (1) & (2), available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b37f40.html.  
14 See Lieblich, (n 5), at 81. 
15 Wilson (1988), (n 12), at 24; L. Oppenheim & H. Lauterpacht (eds.), International Law: A Treatise 
(Disputes, War and Neutrality), 7th edn, Vol. II (Longman, London, 1952), at 209-216. 
16 See Wilson (1988), (n 12), at 23; R. A. Falk, ‘Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal 
War’ in J.  N. Rosenau (eds.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1964), at 197. 
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‘domestic violence is called rebellion…so long as there is sufficient evidence that the 
police force of the parent state will reduce the seditious party to respect the municipal 
legal order’.17 Accordingly, it was accepted that such a situation would not necessitate 
the implementation of the laws of war.18 Instead, acts of rebellions would normally fall 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the concerned state, and they would be governed by 
its national laws.19 
The absence of a positive recognition of rebellions under traditional 
international law suggests that it would be deemed unwarranted to provide these groups 
with any external support or assistance.20 As asserted by Falk, any help from a third 
party state to the rebels would be considered a violation of the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of the parent state.21 He went on to add that states 
that are not involved in the conflict would be under further obligation to disallow the 
use of its territory ‘as an organising base for hostile activities’.22 Hence, although 
traditional international law explicitly recognised the status of rebellion, the recognition 
did not include any rights or obligations. It was for the benefit of the host state to govern 
the situation according to its domestic laws. 
Rebels must progress to the status of insurgency before rights and obligations 
under international law apply.23 Nonetheless, insurgents would only have rights and 
obligations in relation to states that recognise them as such.24 Although traditional 
                                                 
17 L. Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law (Librairie E. Dorz, 
Geneva, 1956), at 230. 
18 R. P. Dhokalia, ‘Civil wars and International law’ (1971) 35 The Indiana Journal of International 
Law 219, at 224.  
19 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (a/k/a Dule), IT-94-1-AR, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) 2 
October 1995, at para. 96, available online at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm.  
20 Cullen (2010), (n 8), at 10. 
21 Falk, (n 16), at 198. 
22 Ibid. 
23 A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 88 




international law recognises insurgency, the status of insurgency is enfolded with a high 
degree of uncertainty.25 
Insurgency had neither a clear set of conditions for its application26 nor a 
detailed legal framework regulating the rights and obligations of such a status.27 As 
noted by Wilson, as far as the status of insurgency is concerned, ‘there are no 
requirements for the degree of intensity of violence, the extent of control over territory, 
the establishment of a quasi-governmental authority, or the conduct of operations in 
accordance with any humanitarian principles’.28 She went on to add that the only 
notable requirement justifying the recognition of an opposition group as insurgents is 
necessity.29 
In fact, it was argued that the concept of insurgency was initially founded on a 
factual rather than legal basis.30 In accordance  with the US Supreme Court in the case 
of The Three Friends, insurgency indicates the existence of war in a material rather than 
a legal sense.31 Furthermore, Falk asserted that insurgency is ‘a catch-all 
designation…It is an international acknowledgment of the existence of an internal 
war’.32 Nevertheless, although no decisive conditions were established as to when 
armed groups could be legitimately recognised as insurgents, it is still possible to 
generally define the boundaries of the concept. It would be unjustifiable to assign the 
status of insurgency to a group challenging a legitimate government that still exercises 
sufficient control over the conflict.33 It was argued that necessity as a condition for 
                                                 
25 See Wilson (1988), (n 12), at 24. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Cullen (2010), (n 8), at 11. 
28 Wilson (1988), (n 12), at 24. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See G. G. Wilson, ‘Insurgency and International Maritime Law’ (1907) 1 The American Journal of 
International Law 46; Wilson (1988), (n 12), at 24; Falk, (n 16), at 199. 
31 See U.S. Supreme Court, The Three Friends (1897),166 U.S. 1, available online at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/166/1/.  
32 Falk, (n 16), at 199. 
33 See Wilson (1907), (n 30), at 46. 
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recognition suggests that the status of insurgency would be granted when the interests 
of the recognising state, whether it is the official government or a third party state, are 
affected by the ongoing situation in a manner necessitating the entrance into relations 
with the insurgents.34 
As stated by Lauterpacht, the recognition of insurgency could be accorded ‘for 
reasons of convenience, of humanity, or economic interest’.35 Moreover, as further  
clarified by Cassese, for rebels to be recognised as insurgents ‘(1) rebels should prove 
that they have effective control over some part of the territory and (2) civil commotion 
should reach a certain degree of intensity and duration’.36 Despite the attempts made to 
clarify the possible criteria for insurgency, the status of insurgency by its nature is 
uncertain, providing the recognising state with a higher degree of discretion as to 
whether to establish a relation with the insurgents.37 As noted by Lauterpacht, ‘any 
attempt to lay down the conditions of recognition of insurgency leads itself to 
misunderstanding’.38 According to Falk, the recognition of insurgency ‘serves as partial 
internationalization of the conflict, without bringing the state of belligerency into 
being’.39  He went on to add that such a status ‘permits third states to participate in an 
internal war without finding themselves “at war”’.40 
The concept of insurgency ‘leaves each state substantially free to control the 
consequences of’ its relation with the insurgents.41 Apart from granting insurgents the 
right to be regarded ‘as contestants-in-law, and not as mere law-breakers’,42 the rights 
                                                 
34 Cullen (2010), (n 8), at 11. 
35 H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1947), 
at 276-277. 
36 A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), at 125. 
37 See Lauterpacht, (n 35), at 276-277. 
38 Ibid, at 276. 
39 Falk, (n 16), at 200. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, at 199. 
42 R. Higgins, ‘International Law and Civil Conflict’ in E. Luard (eds.), The International Regulation of 
Civil Wars (New York University Press, New York, 1972), at 171. 
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and duties of such groups are primarily based on the agreement achieved with the 
recognising state.43 Thus, the recognition of the status of insurgency does not lead to 
the implementation of IHL unless it is agreed on.44 Nevertheless, the conflict would be 
automatically internationalised and the laws of war would be directly implemented once 
the rebels progress to the status of belligerency.45 
The recognition of belligerency was deemed as granting the recognised 
opposition groups almost a similar status as that of states in international armed 
conflicts rather than recognising them as parties to internal armed conflict, per se.46 
Furthermore, such an assertion adheres to the fact that traditional international law 
recognised only states as members of the international community.47 As asserted by 
Oglesby, ‘[a] de facto insurgent government recognised as a belligerent has 
international standing’.48 Nevertheless, the legal personality granted to belligerents is 
partial and temporary for the purpose of warfare.49 As a result, the act of recognition 
could create a grey area of contradictions or convergences between the de jure 
government and the rebelling de facto government regarding their sovereign rights 
during the time of hostilities.50 Therefore, although the recognition of opposition groups 
such as belligerents in itself may seem prima facia clear, there is still a high degree of 
uncertainty not only as to the nature of the act of recognition but also in relation to the 
rights and obligations emanating from such recognition. 
                                                 
43 Falk, (n 16), at 199. 
44 E. J. Castren, Civil War (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, Helsinki, 1966), at 207-223. 
45 See U.S. Supreme Court, The Santissima Trinidadand The St. Sander (1822), 20 U.S. 283, available 
online at: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/20/283/; Lieblich, (n 5), at 76- 78. 
46 See the Santissima Trinidadand The St. Sander, (n 45); J. E. Bond, Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict 
and the Law of War (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992), at 51; Cullen, (n 8), at 17. 
47 See Bond, (n 46), at 51; Cullen (2010), (n 8), at 17. 
48 R. R. Oglesby, Internal War and the Search for Normative Order (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 
1971) at 78. 
49 H. A. Smith, ‘Some Problems of the Spanish Civil War’ (1937) 18 British Year Book of 
International Law 17, at 18-21. 
50 See Lieblich, (n 5), at 80. 
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Regarding the act of recognition, it is controversial whether the fulfillment of 
the aforementioned conditions is sufficient to oblige states to grant an opposition group 
the status of belligerency.51 Some have argued that when the aforementioned 
requirements are satisfied, states would be under an obligation to recognise insurgents 
as belligerents.52 For instance, Lauterpacht asserted that ‘[t]o refuse to recognise the 
insurgents as belligerents although [the] conditions are present is to act in a manner 
which finds no warrant in international law’;53 however, others have argued to the 
contrary.54 It was contended that the right to recognise opposition groups as belligerents 
is a discretional political act.55 
 As to the rights and obligations granted by the recognition of opposition groups 
as belligerents, the act of recognition produces rights and obligations between third 
state parties and belligerents on the one hand and the de jure governments and the 
opposition groups on the other hand. Regarding the relation between belligerents and a 
third state, the recognising state is under an obligation to remain neutral until the 
hostilities cease. Third party states are legally obligated to not intervene in the conflict 
whether in favour of the de jure government or the belligerents.56 The obligation of 
neutrality means that the states must treat all parties to the dispute equally, or ‘each 
sovereign in its respective areas of control’.57 
  Although the status of neutrality imposes an obligation on a third state to not 
directly intervene in the conflict, it does not prevent the establishment of relations with 
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the belligerents to a certain degree.58 Even though belligerents as a group are not 
entitled to exercise diplomatic and other political rights normally enjoyed by de jure 
governments, they can enter into relations on a lower level with other states. It is argued 
that when the status of belligerency is granted, insurgents would be eligible to conduct 
informal negotiations with third states and enjoy certain positive rights.59 For instance, 
belligerents would have the right to search neutral vessels on the high seas.60 They 
would also be able to impose blockades on the high seas and prosecute any potential 
violators.61 In general, the rule of neutrality aims to protect third states’ interests by 
restricting the possibility of extending the impacts of hostilities to parties other than 
those involved.  
Regarding relations between the de jure government and the belligerents, under 
the doctrine of belligerency, unlike before the act of recognition, both parties are 
obliged to apply the laws of war. As stated by Khairallah, when the status of 
belligerency is granted, ‘the laws of war…become applicable to both parties in the 
conflict, not only for the conduct of hostilities but also for all other war activities, such 
as caring for the sick and wounded and prisoners of war.62 Nonetheless, although the 
recognition of the status of belligerency led to the application of the laws of war over 
the conflict,63 the laws regulating war under traditional international law did not give 
sufficient weight to the concept of population protection. As Lieblich argued, ‘a striking 
aspect of the early instruments of IHL, such as those adopted in the Hague conferences 
of 1899 and 1907, is the absence of explicit reference to the protection of civilians in 
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armed conflicts’.64 It is apparent that neither the reference to the law of humanity in the 
Hague Convention (II) nor the rules embodied under the Hague law is sufficient to 
assert the existence of the concept of the protection of the population under traditional 
international law. 
The reference to ‘the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public 
conscience’ in Martens Clause appeared for the first time in the preamble to the 1899 
Hague Convention (II) concerning the laws and customs of war on land; however, as 
indicated in the preamble of the subsequent Hague Conventions of 1907, the reference 
was primarily intended to serve as an umbrella to provide further protection for people 
against certain harmful acts that were not prohibited by the pre-existing rules. 
Nevertheless, a high degree of uncertainty has always existed as to what was actually 
meant by the law of humanity and whether it entailed legal obligations or was simply a 
pure law of morality.65 In other words, it was argued that acts violating the laws of 
humanity could not be criminalised until the legal statutes of the laws of humanity could 
be confirmed.  
On the other hand, Hague Law, concluded at the Hague Conferences of 1899 
and 1907,66 is more concerned with regulating the conduct of hostilities. It aims to 
restrict the implementation of certain types of war methods that may cause unnecessary 
suffering.67 More specifically, although the restrictions imposed by the Hague law 
constitute measures aiming to reduce the possibility that civilians would be direct 
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targets of unjustified violence, there have been no indications that the concept of the 
protection of the population had existed as a principle under international law. 
In summary, although traditional international law explicitly recognised three 
statuses of armed forces, more importantly, as clarified previously, the protection of 
civilians had never been considered a requirement to achieve the status of belligerency. 
In other words, although belligerents would be responsible for wrongful acts committed 
in the territory under their control in general, these violations would not affect their 
status.68 
 
1.2.1.2 The Unrecognised Armed Groups under Modern International Law: The 
Capacity of Armed Groups and the Protection of Population 
Unlike traditional international law, modern international law adopted wider yet 
more sustainable measures as to the implementation of IHL over armed groups. The 
concept of population protection was considered the primary objective behind the 
application of IHL. Moreover, the increase in the significance of the concept of 
protection led to the establishment of a separate framework to regulate internal armed 
conflicts.69 Nevertheless, the framework did not contain any reference to the concept of 
recognition regarding armed groups. Despite this, the departure from the concept of 
recognition is intentional. It accords with the nature and policy behind the adoption of 
the laws regulating internal armed conflicts under the four Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols, which are to expand the implementation of these laws for 
more effective population protection.70 
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In fact, despite the departure from the concept of explicit recognition under 
contemporary international law, the primary focus on the concept of protection during 
hostilities makes the consideration of armed groups as parties to internal armed 
conflicts more significant. It is unclear how the protection of population could be 
effectively achieved without binding all parties involved in the conflict, including 
armed groups, to adhere to the obligations emanating from the framework that regulates 
internal armed conflicts. 
 Contemporary IHL considered the definition of non-international armed 
conflicts as a basis for its implementation; however, it did not ignore the capacity of 
armed groups. The different attempts made to define internal armed conflicts indicate 
the relevance of the various capacities that could be obtained by armed groups based 
on the implementation of certain rules of IHL.71 
The reference to the capacity of opposition groups was explicit in the definition 
of internal armed conflict stated under Article 1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol 
of 1977. In accordance with Article 1 (1), the internal armed conflict governed by the 
provisions of the Protocol is one that erupts between governmental armed forces and 
other armed groups that operate ‘under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol’.72 
The definition of non-international armed conflict for the purpose of applying 
the Protocol was further clarified under Article 1 (2).73 The provision excludes from the 
scope of the Protocol ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other  acts of a similar nature’.74 It was argued 
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that the negative definition under Article 1 (2) was provided to identify ‘the lower 
threshold of the concept of armed conflict’.75 Nonetheless, unlike Article 1 (1) of the 
second additional Protocol, Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions did not 
include a clear measure for its application.76 
It was argued that although Common Article 3 is considered to be the 
cornerstone for the framework regulating internal armed conflicts, it includes neither a 
reference to armed groups nor a definition of what is meant by internal armed conflict;77 
however, an examination of the nature of the Article and the policy behind its drafting 
suggests that the lack of a clear definition of non-international armed conflict is not a 
major shortcoming.78 In fact, the non-definition approach adopted by Common Article 
3 was considered by some scholars as an advantage, as it conformed to the policy behind 
the drafting of the Article.79 According to Moir, the non-definition approach adopted 
by the Geneva Conventions reflects the drafters’ intentions to not restrict the scope of 
Common Article 3 to certain types of non-international armed conflicts.80 Cistern 
argued that the absence of a definition of non-international armed conflict, and therefore 
the absence of an explicit reference to the parties to the conflict, was intentionally done 
to ensure a wider application of the Article.81 Pictet further suggested that ‘the scope of 
application of the article must be as wide as possible’.82 Nevertheless, this contention 
is highly criticised.83 
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As noted by Moir, the unlimited application of Common Article 3 suggested by 
Pictet is dangerous. Moir asserted that such an approach, if adopted, would stretch the 
scope too wide and would cover low-intensity acts that had never been intended to be 
included under the Article.84 The ICTY made productive efforts to further develop the 
definition of non-international armed conflict.85 The ICTY aimed to provide a wider, 
more flexible definition of armed conflicts for the purpose of implementing Common 
Article 3.86 As interpreted by the Tadic Trial Chamber, the definition of armed conflict 
provided by the Appeal Chamber is founded primarily on two criteria: ‘the intensity of 
the conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict’.87According to the 
tribunal, these criteria are sufficient to differentiate an internal armed conflict from 
other activities not intended to be governed by international humanitarian law.88 
In the Delalic case in 1998, the Trial Chamber considered this interpretation of 
the definition of internal armed conflict.89 The chamber stated that to determine the 
existence of an internal armed conflict and differentiate it from other acts, such as civil 
unrest and terrorism, ‘the emphasis is on the protracted extent of the armed violence 
and the extent of organisation of the parties involved’.90 The ICTR affirmed the validity 
of the two-element test in the Akayesu case, as described in the previous case.91 To 
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decide whether an internal armed conflict existed in Rwanda, the tribunal ‘evaluate[d] 
both the intensity and organization of the parties to the conflict’.92 
In addition, the Tadic definition expands the scope of non-international armed 
conflicts to include other potential parties. Unlike the definition provided in Article 1 
(1) of the second Additional Protocol, which limits the existence of internal armed 
conflicts to situations involving the armed forces of de jure governments, the Tadic 
definition includes conflicts between armed groups. The recognition of de facto armed 
conflicts that emerge between armed groups without the involvement of official forces 
filled a huge gap caused by the restrictive definition in the second Additional Protocol 
and addressed the renewed nature of armed conflicts.93 Hence, although the absence of 
a definition of non-international armed conflict broadens the scope of Common Article 
3, this does not make the Article applicable in all situations of internal strife, as will be 
further explained later.94 
It should be emphasised that although contemporary IHL imposes some duties 
on certain types of armed groups as parties to internal armed conflicts regardless of any 
act of recognition issued by the host state or by any other third state, it is still possible 
that governments would refuse to admit the existence of the conditions required for the 
application of the concerned law.95 As asserted by Clapham, the admission of the 
emergence of a situation of an internal armed conflict producing certain obligations on 
armed groups could be ‘seen as an admission that the governments have lost a degree 
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of control and has an “elevation” of the status of rebel’;96 however, such an assertion 
ought not to be fully admitted without elaboration. 
The recognition of the emergence of a situation of an internal armed conflict is 
still much less discretional than the recognition of the status of armed groups under 
traditional international law. The designation of a situation as an armed conflict is a 
legal matter based on facts on the ground, whereas the recognition of armed groups 
under traditional international law is almost a political act. It is also significant to 
mention that the primary focus on the protection of the population after the adoption of 
the four Geneva Conventions makes the admission of the status of internal armed 
conflict a matter of international interest. Unlike traditional international law in which 
the recognition of the status of belligerency is impacted by the interest of the 
recognising state, the designation of the existence of an internal armed conflict goes 
beyond this and attracts the interest of the international community as a whole. For 
instance, the emergence of the status of an internal armed conflict allows the 
involvement of non-state actors, such as the ICRC. As included in Common Article 3, 
‘an impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict’.97 
 It is argued that although the admission of the status of internal armed conflict 
by the host state could facilitate and accelerate the process of implementing IHL, it is 
not required to establish such a situation. The implementation of the obligations of the 
framework that regulates internal armed conflicts depends on the achievement of the 
threshold for the application of these obligations.98 On many occasions, the emergence 
of the situations of internal armed conflicts were affirmed by UN resolutions regardless 
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of the acceptance of the concerned governments.99 For instance, the existence of an 
internal armed conflict’s situation was referred to by the UNGA in relation to the 
situation in El Salvador.100 The UNGA deemed that the situation existed between the 
government of  El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional 
as an internal armed conflict requiring the implementation of IHL and the concerned 
rules of human rights.101 
 
1.2.2 The Definition of the Concept of Organised Armed Groups: Organised and 
Non-Organised Groups (the Element of Organisation) 
The element of organisation qualifying an armed group to be labeled as an 
organised armed group is a quite general idea. There are different levels that indicate 
different capacities afforded to these armed groups. Although there is almost no 
consensus as to what is decisively meant by ‘organised armed group’, the ‘collective 
and planned military activities would be the most significant element of proof’.102 
Furthermore, the operation of such armed groups under a responsible command is 
another piece of evidence confirming its organisation.103 Nevertheless, such a 
requirement is not fundamental. In certain circumstances, an armed group could still be 
labeled as an organised armed group regardless of its command structure.104 The control 
over a territory is another indication of the level of organisation achieved by the 
concerned armed group; however, it is still a quite flexible element. The armed group 
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could still be considered organised whether the control over the territory is permanent 
or temporary.105 
Hence, to further clarify what is meant by organised armed groups for the 
purpose of implementing IHL, the concept is evaluated in relation to the relevant 
treaties. In addition to discussing the concept of organised armed groups under Article 
1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol of 1977, which is considered to represent the 
highest level of organisation required for the implementation of IHL, the element of 
organisation under Common Article 3 is evaluated. The contributions made by some 
international tribunals as to the definition of the concept of organised armed groups for 
the purpose of applying Common Article 3 are observed. It is also relevant to examine 
the latest development in treaty law related to the concept of organised armed groups 
as defined under international criminal law as codified in the ICC Statute.106 
 
1.2.2.1 The Second Additional Protocol and the Element of Organisation 
 With regard to the definition of the concept of organised armed groups under 
Article 1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol, it is important to recall that the 
Additional Protocol restricted its scope to defined criteria of non-international 
conflict.107 As a result, the level of organisation required by the Protocol is considered 
quite high.108 The initial intention, as proposed by the ICRC, was to adopt ‘a broad 
definition based on material criteria [which is]: the existence of a confrontation between 
armed forces or other organized armed groups under reasonable command, i.e., with a 
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minimum degree of organization’.109 Nevertheless, although the general idea of the 
proposal was accepted, the suggested criteria failed to achieve a sufficient consensus. 
Instead, a more restrictive formula was finally adopted and included in Article 1 (1) of 
the Protocol. In accordance with Article 1 (1), the principles contained in the Additional 
Protocol would only be applicable to armed conflicts: 
[w]hich take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.110 
 The wording of Article 1 (1) may lead to the assertion that in addition to 
organisation, the armed group ought to satisfy other requirements to implement the 
Protocol. It suggests that the organised armed group needs to operate under a 
responsible command and exercise a control over a territory ‘as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol’.111 
Nevertheless, further elaboration on these elements clarifies that they are included in 
the features of organisation rather than being separate elements required for the 
application of the Protocol.112 
Regarding the element of responsible command, there have been some 
indications that responsible command is a separate element that ought to be satisfied in 
addition to organisation.113 Moreover, such a contention finds support in the 
jurisprudence of the ICTR and the SCSL.114 Nonetheless, as observed by 
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Mastorodimos, there are no indications that the clarification provided by the ICTR 
regarding the element of responsible command contributes to the element of 
organisation in any way.115 
As argued by Moir, the requirement of responsible command, as stated under 
Article 1 (1), could be described as being superfluous, considering the fact that these 
armed groups are already required to have a certain level of organisation.116 
Nonetheless, it ought to be emphasised that such a requirement is not completely 
meaningless. It still indicates that the Protocol would not be applicable for intermittent 
acts of individuals.117 Instead, it requires the emergence of a conflict of a collective 
character for its implementation.118 Nevertheless, it ought to be clarified that the 
requirement of responsible command does not mean that the organisation of the armed 
group must be founded on ‘a rigid military hierarchy’.119 Instead, for the purpose of 
achieving the level of organisation required for the application of the Protocol, it would 
be enough to have ‘a de facto authority, sufficient both to plan and carry out concerted 
and sustained military operations and to impose the discipline required for the rules of 
the Protocol to be applied’.120 
 In addition to operation under a responsible command, the exercise of control 
over part of the territory by the armed group is required for the armed group to be 
organised according to the Protocol. The element of territorial control as required by 
the Protocol is quite restrictive.121 The primary element for satisfying the requirement 
of territorial control under the Protocol is primarily related to the quality of such control 
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rather than its proportion or duration.122 As stated by Junod, for the armed group to be 
organised for the purpose of implementing the Protocol, the control over the territory 
‘must be sufficient to enable opposition forces to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and to apply the Protocol. For example, they must be able to detain 
prisoners and treat them decently or to give adequate care to the sick and wounded’.123 
Accordingly, it ought to be sufficient that a certain level of stability is satisfied in the 
areas governed by the concerned armed groups.124 Nevertheless, as argued by 
Mastorodimos, ‘this is not a conditio sine qua non’.125 The control over the territory 
ought not to be permanent. Moreover, according to Mastorodimos, ‘even a small part 
of the National territory (e.g. 1 % of the whole) could be enough, depending on 
circumstances, for the ability to carry out military operations and implement the 
Protocol’.126 
In addition to the element of responsible command and the control over part of 
the territory, Article 1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol also refers to the ability of 
the armed groups to implement the Protocol.127 Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to 
consider the capability to apply the Protocol as an element regarding the definition of 
the concept of organised armed groups. The ability to implement the Protocol suggests 
that the armed group has already reached the required level of organisation stated under 
Article 1 (1).128 
In fact, although it was argued that the wording of Article 1 (1) suggests that the 
armed groups ought to comply with the rules contained in the Protocol before the 
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Protocol becomes operational,129 the prevailing view is that the pre-application of the 
law ought not be considered a requirement for the implementation of the Protocol.130 
As contended by Moir, the assertion that armed groups ought to apply the Protocol 
‘before it becomes operational seems to introduce de jure reciprocity’.131 It suggests 
that states would not be under an obligation to implement the Protocol unless the armed 
groups did so in the first place. Moreover, although the principle of reciprocity used to 
be relevant under the doctrine of belligerency,132 it does not comply with the framework 
of the Geneva Conventions. It conflicts with the primary objective of contemporary 
IHL, which is to humanise internal conflicts.133 The ICTY in the Kupreskic case 
clarified that ‘the defining characteristic of modern international humanitarian law is 
instead the obligation to uphold key tenets of this body of law regardless of the conduct 
of enemy combatants’.134 Hence, as Cassese argued, the Protocol would be applicable 
as soon as the armed group has been proven ‘to be “responsible” and well-organised so 
as to live up to [the Protocol’s] standards’.135 
It is noteworthy to mention that this strict criteria was criticised. It was argued 
that the focus on responsible command and the quality of the territorial control made it 
almost impossible for the armed group to reach the required criteria unless the situation 
would be as advanced as a classic civil war.136 It was also asserted by Green that the 
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criteria adopted by the Protocol set ‘a threshold that is so high in fact, that it would 
exclude most revolutions and rebellions, and would probably not operate in a civil war 
until the rebels were well established and had set up some form of de facto 
government’.137 Further, it was argued that the inclusion of such criteria in the Protocol 
represents a restatement of the traditional doctrine of belligerency.138 Though the 
Protocol relied on the identities of the parties to the conflict to determine the scope of 
its application, this does not mean that the Protocol was based on the traditional concept 
of belligerency. 
An examination of the content of each concept shows that they are not 
identical.139 As clarified by Lootsteen, even though the criteria adopted under the 
Protocol exclude ‘mere civil unrest’, they require a lower threshold than ‘state to state 
warfare’.140 More specifically, unlike the doctrine of belligerency, which requires the 
rebels to found some type of governmental or administrative authority in the controlled 
territory, the criteria adopted under the Protocol requires only military control over part 
of the national territory.141 
In addition, although the drafting process of Article 1 (1) of the Protocol 
reflected a clear intention to restrict the scope of its implementation,142 the narrow 
approach of the Article was proven to be compatible with the nature of rights and 
obligations regulated by the Protocol. The Additional Protocol requires all parties to 
undertake specific actions to fulfil their obligations. The fulfilment of the positive duties 
under the Protocol would require certain criteria to ensure the capability to undertake 
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such obligations.143 The adoption of such a criteria under Article 1 (1) was meant to 
strengthen the primary purpose initially stated in Common Article 3, which is to provide 
more effective protection for populations.144 Hence, to further clarify what is meant by 
the concept of organised armed groups, the concept will be further evaluated under 
Common Article 3, and the way it was subsequently developed under international law 
will be discussed. 
  
1.2.2.2 Common Article 3 and the Element of Organisation: The Subsequent 
Development of the Concept under the Jurisprudence of the ICTY and the Status 
of the ICC 
As mentioned, although Common Article 3 was fundamentally founded on the 
concept of humanitarian protection, it did not include a clear measure of the scope of 
its application.145 The uncertainty caused by not defining non-international armed 
conflict for the purpose of implementing the Article is exacerbated by the absence of 
references to the potential parties to a non-international armed conflict.146 More 
specifically, Common Article 3 neither defined the concept of non-international armed 
conflict nor readopted the traditional differences between the various categories of 
opposition groups as a basis of application.  
Nevertheless, as asserted by Moir, although no criteria for armed conflicts were 
provided in the Geneva Conventions, it is understood that ‘a degree of organisation is 
required on the part of the insurgents before an internal conflict can be said to exist 
under common Article 3’.147 A situation that involves ‘a random group of looters and 
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rioters’ is not expected to attain the intensity normally required to constitute armed 
conflict.148 Nonetheless, although it was accepted that a certain level of organisation 
ought to be achieved by the insurgents to fall within the scope of Common Article 3, 
there has been no consensus on what constitutes this organisation. In other words, apart 
from the logical requirement of fulfilling the obligations contained in the Article, there 
has been uncertainty regarding the criteria to be satisfied before a situation can be 
considered an armed conflict.149 
Considering that Common Article 3 ‘focus[es] on obligations of abstention’,150 
the fulfillment of these obligations could easily be achieved. It was contended that 
Common Article 3 would be applicable whether or not the insurgents exercised 
territorial control.151 In other words, the objective approach as well as the nature of the 
Article suggests that the obligations imposed by the Article are applicable regardless of 
the status of the opposition groups.152 Particularly in the last paragraph of the Article, 
this contention indicates the unwillingness of the drafters to distinguish between the 
various categories of opposition groups; however, further development emerged as to 
the element of organisation required for the implementation of Common Article 3 under 
the jurisprudence of some international tribunals.153 
The element of organisation was advanced by these tribunals as one of two 
factors required for the implementation of Common Article 3 over internal armed 
conflicts.154 In a more recent judgment, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY has made a 
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significant contribution to what is meant by an organised armed group for the purpose 
of implementing Common Article 3.155 It was argued that to achieve the required level 
of organisation, indications ought to exist to show that the armed group has a command 
structure.156 Moreover, the command structure should reflect a certain ‘level of 
logistics’157 and discipline that shows the ability of these groups to apply ‘the basic 
obligations of Common Article 3’,158 suggesting that these armed groups are ‘able to 
speak with one voice’.159 
It is noteworthy to mention that the efforts made by the ICTY to define the 
concept of organised armed groups for the purpose of implementing Common Article 
3 were impacted by the increased concern regarding the concept of population 
protection. One of the justifications provided by the Appeal Chamber in the Tadic case 
was that ‘a State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a 
human-being-oriented approach’.160 The concept of organised armed groups was 
further advanced and developed under the ICC Status.161 The Status partly reintroduced 
the Tadic formula.162 The ICC Statute provides a lower threshold of a non-international 
armed conflict in comparison with the formula provided in Article 1 (1) of the 
Additional Protocol. It implies that an armed conflict may exist whether the armed 
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group exercises effective territorial control or not. It also seems to eliminate the 
requirement of the ability of the armed group to apply international humanitarian law.163  
Article 8 (2) of the ICC Status indicates that the only requirement is the element 
of organisation.164 Nevertheless, as interpreted by an ICC Chamber,165 the required 
element of organisation is satisfied as long as ‘...such groups acted under a responsible 
command and had an operative internal disciplinary system; and (ii) had the capacity 
to plan and carry out sustained and concerted military operations, insofar as they held 
control of parts of the territory of the Ituri District’.166 Despite the fact that the statement 
made by the ICC Chamber suggests a high level of organisation, it is argued that as far 
as the implementation of Common Article 3 is concerned, ‘even a non-organized group 
can generate an internal armed conflict’;167 however, this argument seems to surpass 
the prevailing view advanced by some scholars, as clarified above. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the absence of any requirement of a sufficient 
organisation of the armed groups for the purpose of applying Common Article 3 was 
advanced by the UNSC and the Commission on Human Rights on various occasions.168 
Nevertheless, there are indications that the implementation of Common Article 3 
despite the absence of a sufficient level of organisation of the armed groups was 
advanced by the UNSC in consideration of some exceptional circumstances.169 One of 
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these unique circumstances was observed in the UNSC reaction towards the Somalia 
situation.170  
It was argued that Common Article 3 would be applicable despite the absence 
of any organisation of the armed groups in situations in which a central government 
was collapsed.171 It was asserted that the implementation of IHL over such armed 
conflicts despite the absence of sufficient organisation of the armed groups could be, at 
least theoretically, understood for two reasons. First, the absence of effective control 
by the government suggests that the traditional concern for non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the state, which usually supports a high level of armed group 
organisation, would be less relevant.172 Second, in a failed state’s situation, the national 
legal order would be highly distracted to the extent that no effective human rights 
protection could exist; hence, the implementation of IHL over such low intensity 
conflicts could serve as a lower yet internationally accepted alternative.173 
 It is noteworthy to mention that although such an approach by the UNSC may 
indicate an evolving development in the field regarding the level of armed groups’ 
organisation required for the implementation of the IHL,174 it is argued that due to the 
lack of sufficient state practices in situations of failed states and armed groups, it is 
difficult to indicate the emergence of a new view in support of such a contention.175  In 
relation to Somalia, for example, the UNSC itself repeatedly emphasised ‘the 
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extraordinary nature’ and ‘the unique character’ of the situation in Somalia.176 
Furthermore, in the Boskoski case, the ICTY Chamber asserted that ‘resolutions by the 
UN Security Council, and by States or their officials, are made on a political, not legal, 
basis, and cannot be directly interpreted as evidence of, or a legal interpretation of, a 
factual state of affairs, despite the fact that such resolutions may have legal 
consequences’.177 
 In summary, though the recent practice of the UNSC indicates that no level of 
sufficient organisation of the armed groups is required for the implementation of 
Common Article 3, the practice is based on a political rather than a legal basis. It is 
primarily related to unique and exceptional situations rather than establishing a 
principle. Apart from the UNSC practice, it is obvious that armed groups ought to 
maintain a sufficient level of organisation to implement IHL; however, the required 
level of organisation varies. It depends on the nature of obligations that an armed group 
ought to undertake. While the complaint regarding the advanced and positive 
obligations under the second Additional Protocol is that it requires a high level of armed 
groups’ organisation, the adherence to the obligations under Common Article 3 requires 
a lower level of organisation. Although there has been no explicit reference to the R2P 
regarding the required level of organisation of armed groups to implement the rules of 
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IHL, the variety of the required levels of organisation based on the nature of the 













































1.3 The Applicability of International Law and Armed Groups: To What Extent 
Armed Groups Could be Bound by IHL  
           The aim of this section is to answer these questions. To do so, the section is 
divided into two parts. In part one, direct compliance with the obligations of IHL by 
armed groups is discussed, which basically refers to the acceptance of these rules by 
the armed groups by consent. In part two, the indirect compliance with the obligations 
of IHL by armed groups is evaluated. Under this part, five possible justifications are 
evaluated. First, the principle of legislative jurisdiction is discussed. Second, the effect 
of treaties on third parties is described. Third, the claim of the representation of the state 
is presented. Fourth, customary international law is examined, and fifth, the rules  jus 
cogens is described. 
 
1.3.1 Direct Compliance with the Obligations of IHL by the Armed Groups 
Direct compliance with the obligations of IHL by organised armed groups refers 
to the volunteer acceptance of these rules by organised armed groups. Moreover, such 
an acceptance could be made in different forms.  The compliance with the rules of IHL 
by armed groups can be achieved through mutual agreements.178 The drafting of a 
special agreement is encouraged by Common Article 3, which states that ‘[t]he Parties 
to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention’.179 Common 
Article 3 further indicates that the conclusion of such an agreement should be 
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encouraged, whether between a state and an armed group or between several armed 
groups.180 
Adherence to a special agreement between the state and an organised armed 
group could be facilitated by the fact that the implementation of Common Article 3 
does not indicate any changes in the status of the parties to the conflict.181 In other 
words, the host state may still enter into an agreement based on the application of 
common Article 3 without providing the armed group with any legal status.182 
Furthermore, since it is based on the consent of the parties involved, the content of a 
special agreement could be limited to specific rules regulating internal armed conflicts. 
It might also extend beyond the legal framework concerning internal armed conflict to 
include other rules related to international armed conflict and human rights.183 In fact, 
being primarily concerned with the protection of civilians,184 IHL is supposed to 
encourage the adoption of higher standards than those included under Common Article 
3.185 
These expanded agreements have been achieved in the past.186 For example, 
after a notable role played by the ICRC as a third party, the parties involved in the 
conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina reached a special agreement,187 
which exceeded the standards usually applied to internal armed conflicts. Although the 
parties to the conflict based their agreement to apply IHL on Common Article 3, they 
included various other standards concerned with international armed conflicts.  
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As stated by the ICTY, ‘this Agreement shows that the parties concerned 
regarded the armed conflicts in which they were involved as internal but, in view of 
their magnitude, they agreed to extend to them the application of some provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions that are normally applicable in international armed conflicts 
only’.188 In another agreement achieved in 1990 between the government of El Salvador 
and the Frente Farabundo Mari para la Liberacion Nacional, the parties to the internal 
armed conflict agreed to extend the scope of the agreement beyond the content of 
Common Article 3 to include a commitment to comply with the second Additional 
Protocol and certain principles of human rights.189 
If such an agreement cannot be achieved between parties to internal armed 
conflicts, organised armed groups might  still unilaterally commit themselves to 
implement certain rules of IHL.190 Such unilateral declarations made by armed groups 
to comply with IHL, which could also be referred to as ‘declarations of intent’, have 
various advantages.191 Although armed groups are already obliged to comply with the 
rules of IHL, a unilateral declaration made by an organised armed group could serve as 
an affirmative statement of compliance. Furthermore, despite the fact that armed groups 
may issue such a declaration for purely political purposes, it still provides a better 
chance for third parties to become involved.192 
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Armed groups could be further persuaded to adopt a code of conduct to establish 
a mechanism that facilitates adherence to the rules of international humanitarian law by 
members of their group.193 Despite the fact that a code of conduct is less public by 
nature than the other methods mentioned, it is expected to lead to a more effective 
application of IHL.194 
  In fact, since unilateral declarations and codes of conduct may be issued 
unilaterally by opposition groups in the absence of the consent and involvement of the 
host state, third parties have more opportunities to participate not only in encouraging 
the adoption of these instruments but also in their effective implementation.195 It has 
also been suggested that the involvement of a third party might ensure a reasonable 
balance between the opposition group’s political motivations for agreeing to these 
instruments and the legal advantages of their application. 
 Third states could play a notable role in advancing the conclusion of such 
settlements. By exercising their political powers under the third pillar of the R2P196 as 
well as the obligation ‘to ensure respect’ from common Article 1,197 third states are 
expected to encourage the parties to internal armed conflict to comply with international 
humanitarian law by adopting a suitable mechanism. The role of third states fall within 
the peaceful methods mentioned paragraph 139 of the World Summit.198 It states: ‘[t]he 
international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
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Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations’ from being victims 
of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.199 
 
1.3.2 Indirect Compliance with the Obligations of IHL by the Armed Groups 
 
 
1.3.2.1 Legislative Jurisdiction 
            One of the most common justifications for why and how an organised armed 
group could be bound by the rules of IHL is based on the principle of legislative 
jurisdiction,200 which could be defined as the power to create rules.201 The principle of 
legislative jurisdiction basically means that armed groups are obligated to apply the 
concerned rules of  IHL because the host state consented to do so.202 The international 
rules could obtain their binding nature directly if they are contained in self-executing 
treaties or indirectly by being adopted in domestic laws.203 Moreover, although the 
doctrine of legislative jurisdiction was advanced to bind armed groups by treaty law, it 
could still serve as a legal basis to obligate these groups to obey to CIHL.204 
            The primary advantage of implementing the principle of legislative jurisdiction 
to justify the binding nature of the rules of IHL to armed groups is its conclusive nature. 
It suggests that the involved organised armed groups would be obligated to apply all 
the rules of IHL that the host state agreed to, regardless of the armed group’s consent.205 
Further, it serves as a legal basis to bind the armed groups to all the related rules of 
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international law, such as IHRL and ICL, that the host state accepted being bound by.206 
Nevertheless, in practice, the implementation of the principle of  legislative  jurisdiction 
may not be as promising as it is supposed to be. It was contended207 that the principle 
of legislative jurisdiction as a basis to bind organised armed groups by international 
rules finds indirect support in some of the provisions of the Ottawa Convention, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Prohibition, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.208 Though there is no direct reference 
to armed groups in the Convention, Article 9 states that:  
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, 
including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory 
under its jurisdiction or control.209 
The UNSC in resolution 1379 encourages all parties to armed conflicts to respect: 
the relevant provisions of applicable international law relating to the rights and 
protection of children in armed conflict, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and the obligations applicable to them under the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, the Optional 
Protocol thereto of 25 May 2000, and the amended Protocol II to the Convention on 
Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, ...and the 
Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction...210. 
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           As argued by Maslen and Herby, although it is not widely accepted, it is 
indicated that some parties to the Ottawa Convention implicitly understood the 
provisions of the treaty to be applied to all parties to armed conflicts, including armed 
groups.211 Nonetheless, such a contention does not seem to be recognised by the CIHL 
Study.212 The CIHL study did not include any reference to armed groups as potential 
holders of the obligations under the Ottawa Convention.213 Moreover, as Zegveld 
asserted, despite the fact that various IHL treaties apply obligations to all parties 
involved in armed conflicts, including armed groups, the Ottawa Convention 
exclusively binds states.214 Nevertheless, although the absence of consent as a 
requirement to bind armed groups by the rules of IHL in accordance with the principle 
of legislative jurisdiction may theoretically expand the implementation of IHL, it still 
raises some practical issues. 
            One of the major problems that impacts the effective implementation of the 
principle of legislative jurisdiction is attributed to its nature. The principle of legislative 
jurisdiction suggests that it is founded on the active nationality jurisdiction rather than 
territoriality.215 Furthermore, such an assertion would have a direct effect on the scope 
of the applicable rules of IHL over armed groups. It implies that the concerned rules of 
IHL would be exclusively applied to the members of the armed groups who carry the 
nationality of the host state;216 however, as asserted by Sivakumaran, other members of 
the armed groups would still be bound by the rules of IHL as long as parent states are 
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members of the concerned IHL treaties.217 Although such a finding helps reduce the 
gap that may result from the implementation of  the legislative jurisdiction as a basis to 
bind organised armed groups, it still fails to justify why organised armed groups 
constituted as international belligerents from non-ratified states could be bound by the 
rules of IHL. Moreover, although such an argument does not raise legal issues regarding 
the implementation of Common Article 3, considering the fact that the Geneva 
Conventions are ratified by all states, it still raises concerns as to the other treaties, such 
as the second Additional Protocol.218 
             The other practical difficulty is related to the parties to the armed conflicts: the 
host state and the armed group. Regarding the host state, the principle of legislative 
jurisdiction would be deemed ineffective to bind an organised armed group in a 
situation in which the host state adopts a dualist system requiring the state to transfer 
its international obligations into domestic laws to bind its nationals.219 Nevertheless, 
such a contention has a limited effect. Not only do many states adopt a monist 
approach,220 but some of IHL treaties also contain self-executing Articles ensuring the 
direct application of their obligations domestically.221 Regarding the armed group, it is 
highly doubtful that armed groups would actually accept applying the rules that the host 
state they are fighting against accepted. In this case, the implementation of the rules of 
IHL could be understood as an acceptance of the legitimacy of the government that the 
armed groups are fighting against.222 Hence, the practical effectiveness of the principle 
of legislative jurisdiction could be questionable; however, although the legislative 
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jurisdiction may not be a satisfactory explanation for how the rules of IHL could bind 
organised armed groups for legal and practical matters, it is still one of the most 
common justifications. 
 
1.3.2.2 The Effect of Treaties on Third Parties 
              The effect of treaties on third parties, as introduced by Cassese,223 is primarily 
founded on Articles 34, 35 and 36 of VCLT.224 Although Article 1 of VCLT explicitly 
limits its implementation to states,225 Cassese based his argument on the assertion that 
the concerned Articles of VCLT are of a customary nature and that third parties are 
potential subjects of international law.226 
              In accordance with the Articles of VCLT, two conditions must be satisfied 
before third parties could be bound by a treaty’s obligations. First, the intention of the 
contracting parties to bind third parties by the obligations of the concerned treaty must 
be proven.227 Second, the concerned obligations must be accepted by third parties.228 
              Regarding the first requirement concerning the intention of the contracting 
states to bind armed groups, it is argued to be practically problematic to prove.229 On 
various occasions, the intention of the contracting states could be indicated by the 
language used in the concerned instruments.230 Common Article 3 contains a reference 
to ‘each party to the conflict’,231 and the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property 
and Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
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explicitly states that ‘each Party to the conflict shall be bound’ by the rules of the 
treaties. Though the reliance on the concerned texts may be sufficient to reflect the 
intention of the contracting states to bind organised armed groups, the issue is more 
difficult to resolve when applying the second Additional Protocol.232 Nevertheless, 
Cassese provided three valid justifications to indicate the intention of the contracting 
parties regarding binding organised armed groups by the provisions of the second 
Additional Protocol.233 
First, the intention of the contracting parties could be drawn from the relation 
between Common Article 3 and the second Additional Protocol. Under Article 1 (1), 
the drafters of the Additional Protocol explicitly confirmed the primary purpose of the 
instrument, which is to improve and supplement ‘Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions…without modifying its existing conditions of application’. This means 
that ‘the effects of the two instruments are inseparably connected’.234 Therefore, as long 
as an internal armed conflict occurs in a contracting party, both Common Article 3 and 
the second Additional Protocol would be applied to the organised armed group. The 
second justification to bind organised armed groups by the obligations of the second 
Additional Protocol is founded on the requirements provided under Article 1 (1) of the 
Protocol, which have been evaluated previously.235 As further clarified by Cassese: 
In short, the Protocol only begins to apply when rebels prove to be able to, and do in 
fact, implement it. This being so, it would plainly be absurd to contend that the rebels 
must comply with the Protocol, in order for it to become applicable, yet do not acquire 
any rights or duties. There would be no reason for insurgents to fulfil[l] the obligations 
deriving from the Protocol if they could not benefit from the rights it confers, once the 
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Protocol becomes applicable as a result of their compliance…A contrary interpretation 
would render the whole Protocol nugatory.236 
The third argument advanced by Cassese was based on Article 6 (5) of the 
Protocol.237 According to the Article, ‘at the end of the hostilities the authorities in 
power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related 
to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained’.238 The Article constitutes 
an obligation on ‘the authorities in power’, whether it is the host state or the organised 
armed group, in case they succeeded in overthrowing the government and gain 
power.239 As further clarified by Cassese: 
If this duty is made incumbent on the rebels once they seize power in the territory or in 
part of the territory, it is logical to maintain that the other rules of the Protocol also bind 
the rebels before that final moment. Otherwise one could reach the strange conclusion 
that the Protocol, while it does not grant any legal status to rebels, nevertheless takes 
them into account once they have attained power.240 
It is also argued by Mastorodimos that the intention of the contracting parties to 
bind organised armed groups by the rules of the concerned IHL treaties could be 
founded on the object and purpose behind the drafting of these treaties, which is to 
provide sufficient protection of civilians.241 Moreover, such an object would not be 
achieved unless all parties to the internal conflict, including the organised armed 
groups, adhere to the obligations of IHL treaties. More specifically, the intention of the 
contracting states to humanise the internal armed conflicts would not be recognised 
unless the involved organised armed groups have obligations in addition to the 
                                                 
236 Cassese (1981), (n129), at 424-425.  
237 See Additional Protocol II, (n 13), at Art. 6 (5). 
238 Ibid. 
239 Cassese (1981), (129), at 427. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Mastorodimos (2016), (n 102), at 83. 
67 
 
contracting states.242 Moreover, such a contention finds further support after the 
adoption of the R2P. It is in the same line with the obligations under the first pillar of 
the R2P. As stated under Paragraph 138 of the World Summit:  
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails 
the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means.243 
The obligation stated above is general. It requires the host state to undertake any 
steps necessary to provide the required level of protection. The acceptance of the host 
state to bind organised armed groups by IHL rules seems a basic step towards 
preventing the commitment of the four international crimes by these groups. 
Regarding the second requirement, which is stated under Article 35 of VCLT 
concerning the acceptance of IHL obligations by the organised armed groups, the matter 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.244 Moreover, the assent of the organised 
armed groups to be bound the rules of IHL could exist in various ways, such as ‘by a 
unilateral declaration addressed to the Government, by tacit compliance with the 
Protocol, by a request to the ICRC to intervene and guarantee respect for the Protocol, 
or by any other similar means’.245 Organised armed groups are expected to accept 
adherence to certain rules of IHL to achieve specific purposes. The assent of these 
groups to fulfill IHL obligations could increase their political legitimacy. It may also 
encourage the host state to further respect IHL rules regarding the members of these 
organised armed groups.246 
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Regarding the form that acceptance should take to produce its affects, the 
original Article adopted by ILC in 1966 considered implicit acceptance sufficient for 
the purpose of binding third parties;247 however, Article 35 of VCLT affirmed that third 
parties must expressly accept to be bound by the concerned rules in writing.248 
Moreover, as contended by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Blaski, the enactment of a 
domestic law by a third party in relation to the concerned international obligations 
satisfies the requirement of written acceptance provided under Article 35 of VCLT.249 
As Mastorodimos argued, such a contention could be applied to organised armed groups 
as third parties involved in internal armed conflicts. In other words, implicit written 
acceptance could be sufficient to bind these groups by the concerned rules of IHL;250 
however, although the effect of treaties on third parties could serve as a basis to justify 
binding organised armed groups by the rules of IHL to some extent, it still raises some 
issues regarding its effectiveness.  
First of all, it should be emphasised that although such a justification was 
founded on the assertion that the concerned Articles of the VCLT251 are of a customary 
nature and are applied to all third parties, including organised armed groups,252 this 
contention is still uncertain.253 Moreover, although if it could be proven that the content 
of these Articles could be implemented on a customary basis to states as third parties, 
it is still not established that a similar customary rule exists regarding non-state entities 
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such as third parties.254 As Sivakumaran argued,‘[t]he customary rule may be limited 
ratione personae’.255 
 Second, the argument advanced by Cassese in relation to the effect of treaties 
on third parties to bind organised armed groups was based on the contention that 
organised armed groups are subjects of international law.256 Nonetheless, this assertion 
is not fully accepted.257 As indicated in Common Article 3(4) and other IHL 
instruments, organised armed groups may carry certain obligations regardless of their 
status under international law.258 
 Third, although the effect of treaties on third parties is supposed to be 
considered an indirect tool to ensure compliance with the rules of  IHL by organised 
armed groups, it is still conditioned on the acceptance of these groups.259 Hence, the 
implementation of the rules of  IHL by  organised armed groups in accordance with the 
concept of the effect of treaties on third parties would be highly selective based on the 
willingness of these groups.260 Thus, it could raise issues regarding the equality between 
states and organised armed groups as parties to internal armed conflicts.261 
 
1.3.2.3 Claims of Representation of the State 
 The third basis upon which organised armed groups could be bound by the rules 
of IHL is the claim of representation of the state. As argued in the commentary,‘[i]f the 
responsible authority at their head exercises effective sovereignty, it is bound by the 
very fact that it claims to represent the country, or part of the country’.262 The claim of 
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representation of the state does not only accord with the principle of representation 
required for statehood and the recognition of governments,263 but it is also in line with 
the law of state responsibility as stated under Article 10 of the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.264 
One of the advantages of the implementation of this approach is that it found 
the binding nature of the rules of IHL on organised armed groups to be collective 
entities rather than individual entities. Therefore, it avoids the gaps that may result from 
applying the principle of legislative jurisdiction.265 Nevertheless, the implementation 
of the claim of representation of the state provides a much higher threshold regarding 
the application of the rules of IHL by organised armed groups. More specifically, it 
requires that to bind organised armed groups by the related obligations of IHL, these 
groups must reach an advanced level of organisation that is not expected to be achieved 
at an early stage of the internal conflict.266 It suggests that before armed groups were 
bound by the rules of IHL, they must have achieved a de facto governmental 
organisation indicating their intention to become the new government of the state.267 
Hence, such a justification would not be sufficient to ensure effective application of the 
rules of IHL throughout the conflict. 
It would also be problematic if the organised armed group aims to establish a 
new state in the controlled territory rather than substituting the current government. In 
this case, it would be difficult to bind these groups by the rules of IHL in accordance 
with this justification.268 Nevertheless, although it is generally accepted that 
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international treaties bind states from their creation, this does not apply to treaties 
related to IHL or IHRL.269 
It is also argued that the claim of representation of the state would have limited 
affects as a basis to bind armed groups if these groups claim to represent specific ethnic 
groups rather than representing the state.270 Although this limited representation still 
justifies the implementation of the claim of the representation of the state as a basis to 
bind the armed groups, it still raises issues regarding the status of the armed group under 
international law.271 
Similar to the objection made against the legislative jurisdiction, it is asserted 
that even in a case in which an armed group claims to represent the state as a whole, 
the group may still reject adherence to IHL treaties that the host state they are fighting 
against accepted; however, this argument could be countered on two bases. First, unlike 
the principle of legislative jurisdiction, the claim of representation of the state ‘focus[s] 
on the present factual circumstances and the position to which an organized armed 
group aspires in the future’.272 Accordingly, it would be highly doubtful that organised 
armed groups would refuse to adhere to the concerned IHL rules. It is to the advantage 
of these groups to adhere to the related rules of IHL. It helps organised armed group ‘to 
recognize its independent responsibilities as an entity that resembles a government and 
aspires to represent the state in the future’.273 
Second, the claim of state representation suggests that the organised armed 
group exercises ‘de facto governmental functions proceeds bottom-up...[r]ather than 
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starting with the state against whom an organized armed group is fighting’.274 It is 
expected that an armed group that achieved such an advanced level of structural 
organisation and has the intention to become the new government of the state would 
adhere to the rules of IHL. Compliance with the rules of IHL by the organised armed 
group in this situation could reflect the concern of these groups regarding ‘their 
legitimacy in the eyes of other states and the international community at large’.275 
It has been indicated that the link between the political legitimacy of the 
organised armed group and the binding nature of IHL rules in accordance with the claim 
of the representation of the state gained further support after the adoption of the R2P.276 
Various criticisms were made of the Libyan and Syrian opposition groups for not being 
able or willing to respect IHL during the hostilities.277 Also, although no reference to 
an organised armed group/opposition groups was made in the framework that regulates 
the concept of the R2P, the international reactions to the Libyan and Syrian conflicts 
suggested the emergence of a new trend towards recognising opposition groups  as the 
legitimate representative of the people. As will be discussed in chapter three, even 
though this recognition is purely political, it still produces rights and obligations.278 It 
could also be considered a step towards international recognition of the armed group as 
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the new government.279 Hence, it is to the advantage of the armed group to comply with 
the rules of IHL in accordance with the approach of the claim of the representation of 
the state to gain further legitimacy and to advance the process of its recognition. 
In summary, although it has been indicated that the claim of state representation 
gained further support after the adoption of the R2P, it is still not sufficient in itself to 
ensure the effective application of IHL by organised armed groups. It not only limits 
the implementation of IHL to a certain stage of the armed conflict, but it also requires 
a very advanced level of organisation for the opposition group.   
 
1.3.2.4 Customary International Law 
 One of the most effective justifications to bind organised armed groups by IHL 
is found in the customary nature of IHL. It is based on the assertion that organised 
armed groups have a legal personality as subject to international law; therefore, they 
are bound by customary international law. Although it is internationally accepted that 
NLMs, and to some extent, de facto, entities have temporary and limited legal 
personality, the matter becomes much more controversial regarding organised armed 
groups in relation to Common Article 3.280 Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that in 
some cases, armed groups with no status could still be bound by certain rules of 
customary IHL.281 
As advanced by the Darfur Commission of Inquiry, ‘all insurgents that have 
reached a certain threshold of organization, stability and effective control of territory, 
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possess international legal personality and are therefore bound by the relevant rules of 
customary international law on internal armed conflicts’.282 This statement suggests 
that armed groups have to achieve a certain level of organisation to obtain the legal 
personality that allows them to obtain rights and carry duties under IHL. In other words, 
it indicates that although they are parties to internal armed conflicts, some armed groups 
may not be bound by certain rules of IHL. 
Another issue raised by some commentators283 is related to whether organised 
armed groups could participate in the creation of CIHL. Although it is controversial, 
this issue was addressed by the ICTY.284 In accordance with the ICTY Appeal Chamber 
in the Tadic case, the practice of armed groups involved in internal armed conflict may 
contribute to the creation of customary IHL.285 Nevertheless, this contention was 
rejected by the ICRC study.286 Though it is uncertain whether organised armed groups 
could participate in the foundation of CIHL, it is clear that these groups are bound by 
these rules. The reliance on the international legal personality to bind organised armed 
groups by the rules of IHL has significant advantages. 
Regarding the advantages of binding organised armed groups by IHL based on 
its customary nature, two main arguments could be advanced. First, the CIHL approach 
binds organised armed groups by the concerned rules of IHL as almost an independent 
entity from the states they are fighting against. Unlike the principle of legislative 
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jurisdiction, this approach does not base the binding nature of IHL rules on the 
acceptance of the states. Instead, it is the international society as a whole that binds 
these groups.287 Moreover, this assertion strengthens compliance with the obligations 
of IHL by the armed groups; however, as argued by Kleffner, ‘it needs to be 
acknowledged that the argument does not entirely detach the construction of the binding 
force of IHL on organized armed group from states’.288 Second, in contrast to the 
principle of legislative jurisdiction, the reliance on the legal personality of organised 
armed groups to bind them by customary IHL deals with these groups as a collective 
entity rather than individuals.289 
It is noteworthy to mention that despite the advantages of applying this approach 
to bind organised armed groups, it still suffers from certain disadvantages. There are 
two main arguments that could be made against the reliance on the legal personality of 
the armed groups to bind them by customary IHL. First, the implementation of this 
approach may raise objections by states because the reliance on the legal personality to 
bind them by customary IHL indicates the acceptance of the legitimacy of these 
groups;290 however, as asserted by Kleffner, this argument cannot be fully accepted 
because 'it confuses personality with legitimacy. The fact that a given entity enjoys 
certain rights under international law and is subject to certain obligations does not 
necessarily confer legitimacy on that entity. Indeed, even states as the undisputed and 
only primary subjects of international law are not necessarily legitimate’.291 Second, 
the reliance on this approach to bind organised groups by IHL raises issues related to 
the equality of the concerned state regarding the applicable rules of IHL to internal 
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armed conflicts. While states would be bound by treaty and CIHL, organised armed 
groups would be only bound by CIHL.292  
 
1.3.2.5 Jus Cogens Rules 
 Jus Cogens rules are also referred to as peremptory norms of international law. 
As defined under Article 53 of VCLT, jus cogens ‘is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character’.293 These rules are superior and 
considered to be higher than any other rules of international law. They could be of a 
treaty or customary nature.294 Moreover, due to their fundamental nature, jus cogens 
rules apply to states as well as non-state actors.295 It is argued that organised armed 
groups are bound by the rules of jus cogens regardless their status under international 
law. They are bound by these peremptory rules as individuals rather than as collective 
entities.296  
It is well established that many principles of IHL have the status of  jus cogens; 
therefore, they are applied to all parties to armed conflicts including armed groups. In 
its Advisory Opinion as to the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the 
ICJ considered the principle of distinction between combatants and non- combatants, 
and the principle that prohibits the use of weapons with indiscriminate effects and those 
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causing unnecessary harm as ‘cardinal principles ...constituting the fabric of 
humanitarian law’.297  
Moreover, as stated by the Turkish National Commission of Inquiry in its report 
as to the Israeli attack on the humanitarian aid convey to Gaza, the principle of 
distinction ‘goes beyond simply reflecting customary international law but constitutes 
jus cogens’.298 Furthermore, many international crimes that could be committed during 
internal armed conflicts such as torture,299 genocide,300 and crimes against humanity301 
have the status of  jus cogens; therefore, the prohibition of committing them apply 
equally to states as well as armed groups. 
The reliance on the rules of jus cogens to bind armed groups by IHL is effective 
in general for few reasons. First, it binds armed groups as individuals regardless the 
status of these groups. Second, it attracts international responsibility which enhance the 
compliance by these groups.302 However, this approach still raises some problems. 
First, this approach has limited applicability due to the fact that not all IHL rules have 
the status of  jus cogens. Second, it does not explain how the armed groups are bound 
by these rules before they qualify as   jus cogens.303 However, after the adoption of the 
R2P, the implementation seems to have a wider and more effective application.  
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The World Summit limited the scope of the R2P to four commonly recognized 
international crimes under international law, genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and ethnic cleansing.304 It considered the commitment of these international 
crimes as violation of  jus cogens.305 Thus, the R2P does not only add ethnic cleansing 
as a separate international crimes to the potential violation of  jus cogens, but it also 
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1.4 The Concept of Organised Armed Groups and the Concept of the R2P 
 This section is related to the definition of organised armed groups and the 
concept of the R2P. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, theoretical evaluation 
as to the definition of organised armed groups with the concept of the R2P is conducted. 
In the second part, the concept of organised armed groups and the concept of the R2P 
in state practice is addressed, where direct references to the Libyan and Syrian armed 
groups are made.   
   
1.4.1 A Theoretical Analysis 
As clarified previously, the framework of the R2P has no reference to armed 
groups as parties to internal armed conflicts. Hence, it is not possible to explicitly 
deduce a definition of the concept of organised armed groups from this framework. It 
is also uncontested that there is insufficient state practice regarding the implementation 
of the R2P. Therefore, state practice cannot be ultimately relied upon to trace any 
development in this regard. However, this does not mean that the concept of the R2P 
does not recognise the importance of the concept of organised armed groups in relation 
to civilian protection. In fact, the significance of the concept of organised armed groups 
on the implementation of the R2P in internal armed conflicts could be still implicitly 
deduced from the elements constituting the concept of the R2P and the policy behind 
its adoption. 
Efforts towards expanding and developing the definition of the concept of 
organised armed groups were advanced under the jurisprudence of international 
tribunals in the 1990s. One of the justifications provided by the Appeal Chamber in the 
Tadic case for expanding the definition was to enhance the level of protection provided 
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to civilian populations during internal armed conflicts.306 It further added that ‘a [s]tate-
sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-
oriented approach’.307 This assertion aligns with the approach of the R2P. 
The main objective behind the adoption of the R2P is to ensure that civilians are 
protected better and more effectively during internal armed conflicts. To achieve this 
primary objective, the R2P reinterpreted the notion of sovereignty, introducing it as 
responsibility.308 The concept of sovereignty as responsibility has a humanitarian basis. 
It primarily aims to restrict the authorities of the parent state.309 It conditions the 
exercise of sovereignty by states on the fulfilment of certain obligations related to their 
responsibility to protect civilians.310 
In the 2005 World Summit outcome document, which is considered to be the 
most notable normative development of the R2P, the concept of sovereignty as 
responsibility was introduced as the cornerstone of the concept of the R2P.311 In 
paragraph 138, the report imposed a responsibility upon states to protect their citizens 
from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. It also 
encouraged the international community to help ‘states to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capacity’.312 
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In the context of internal armed conflicts, it is possible that the government may 
not be able to effectively control the state territory. Being the primary objective of the 
concept of the R2P, civilians ought to be protected by all parties throughout the 
occurrence of hostilities. The UNSG clarified that the concept of the protection of 
civilians aims to help all the concerned parties to ‘understand how their responsibilities 
for the protection of civilians should be translated into action’.313 In the context of 
internal armed conflicts, it is highly expected that armed groups would take control 
over a significant part of the territory. 
The control of some populated areas by armed groups indicates that the host 
state has already lost actual and effective control over these parts of the territory; 
therefore, it could not be responsible for failing to fulfil its responsibilities under the 
first pillar of the R2P.314 Moreover, in order to preserve the required level of civilian 
protection, the authorities of the host state might have to be substituted by another entity 
with the capacity to fulfil the responsibilities as required by the R2P. This entity could 
be the armed group. The expert conference held in 2011, which was co-organised by 
the IDMC and Geneva Call based in Geneva, concluded that organised armed groups 
could play a role in protecting civilians ‘where the State is unable or unwilling to do 
so’.315 In fact, the transfer of these responsibilities to armed groups could serve as a 
measure to prevent the violation of jus cogens by these groups. 
The significance of considering armed groups for the implementation of the 
R2P is more apparent when the host state is the perpetrator of the violation of jus cogens 
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against its population. In this case, as mentioned above, the host state would be 
considered unwilling to fulfil its mandates under the first pillar;316 therefore, the 
responsibility to protect would be transferred to a third party with the capacity to do 
so.317 This third party could be the armed group involved as long as it has the required 
capacity to protect as defined under IHL. 
The potential development of the level of organisation required to be maintained 
within armed groups after the adoption of the concept of the R2P could be linked to the 
scope of the concept as introduced in the 2005 World Summit.318 The World Summit 
limited the scope of the R2P to four commonly recognised international crimes under 
international law: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic 
cleansing.319 It considered the commitment of these  types of international crimes as a 
violation of jus cogens.320 The reliance on the rules of jus cogens to bind armed groups 
by IHL implies that armed groups would be bound as individuals regardless of their 
status. It also attracts international responsibility, which enhances the compliance of 
these groups.321 Thus, in accordance with the concept of the R2P, armed groups are 
obligated to not commit any violation of jus cogens regardless of the level of 
organisation maintained. Therefore, the implementation of the R2P enhances the level 
of protection provided to civilians by lowering the level of organisation required to bind 
armed groups by IHL. However, this approach was criticised due to its restrictive 
scope.322 
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In fact, not all IHL rules have the status of jus cogens.323 As a result, if this 
approach were adopted, it would have a limited impact and would restrict the 
application of IHL by armed groups to selective rules.324 Nevertheless, this contention 
does not adequately consider why the concept of the R2P was created and how it 
works.325 Although no direct reference was made to the dimensions of the R2P in the 
World Summit and the subsequent documents, it is agreed that the R2P constitutes three 
dimensions: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the 
responsibility to rebuild.326 Moreover, although the responsibility to prevent was argued 
to have been highly neglected, this dimension of the R2P is still the most significant.327 
The responsibility to prevent, as defined by Strauss, refers to the prevention of 
the ‘root causes of the [four international] crimes’, which form the scope of the R2P.328 
This means that the concerned party is responsible for preventing the emergence of 
‘situations of massive and serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law’ that 
could lead to the violation of jus cogens.329 Thus, the implementation of this preventive 
measure requires adherence to various rules of IHL and IHRL. Organised armed groups 
would be obligated not only to respect and apply their obligations under Common 
Article 3330 and the second Additional Protocol,331 if applicable, but also to ensure 
compliance with certain rules of IHRL. In other words, the concept of the R2P intends 
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to ensure a more effective compliance with the rules of IHL as well as to affirm and 
strengthen the complementary nature of the relationship between IHL and IHRL in the 
context of an internal armed conflict.332 Indeed, that each of these crimes covers various 
types of violations is a firmly established fact.333 
The reliance on jus cogens is argued to be a basis for binding armed groups and 
expanding the scope of obligations beyond IHL to include some fundamental principles 
of IHRL that bind all the subjects of international law.334 The Commission of Inquiry 
on Syria asserted that ‘at a minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory 
international law (jus cogens) bind States, individual, non-State collective entities, 
including armed groups’.335 Further, the United Nations Mission to the Republic of 
South Sudan mentioned the following: 
The most basic human rights obligations, in particular those emanating from 
peremptory international law (ius cogens) bind both the State and armed opposition 
groups in times of peace and during armed conflict. In particular, international human 
rights law requires States, armed groups and others to respect the prohibitions of 
extrajudicial killing, maiming, torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, enforced disappearance, rape, other conflict-related sexual violence, 
sexual and other forms of slavery, the recruitment and use of children in hostilities, 
arbitrary detention as well as of any violations that amount to war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or genocide.336 
Although the approach adopted under the R2P binds members of armed groups, 
as individuals, in accordance with jus cogens norms under IHL and IHRL regardless of 
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the level of organisation enjoyed by these groups, it still has a limited impact as a 
protective tool. This suggests that it imposes a negative rather than positive duty on 
each individual to refrain from committing acts that violate the norms of jus cogens. 
Nonetheless, it does not justify how an armed group, as a whole, could take collective 
action to prevent the existence of such violations. In fact, recent debates and reports 
have suggested that the level of organisation maintained by armed groups is necessary 
not only for the application of IHL but also IHRL.337 
It was asserted that ‘the application of human rights standards to non-State 
actors is particularly relevant in situations where they exercise some degree of control 
over a given territory and population’.338 Further, as observed by the special Rapporteur 
Alston, ‘it is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an armed group to respect 
human rights norms “when it exercises significant control over territory and population 
and has an identifiable political structure”’.339 
 
1.4.2 State Practice 
 Even though there is still insufficient state practice with respect to the definition 
of organised armed groups under the concept of the R2P, some indications in relation 
to the importance of organised armed groups as to the application of the R2P could be 
deduced from the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. Moreover, since the assessment of the 
concept of organised armed groups following the adoption of the R2P will be primarily 
based on the states’ response towards the Libyan and Syrian crises, it is essential to 
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provide a brief background describing how these groups progressed. The evaluation of 
the status of the Libyan and Syrian armed groups will be founded on the established 
principles of IHL, as discussed in the previous sections. 
 
1.4.2.1 The Libyan Armed Groups and the Element of Organisation 
The international response to the Libyan conflict considered a successful 
implementation of the R2P. The concept of the R2P was explicitly stated in UNSC 
resolution 1970.340 The states’ reaction to the conflict was argued to be speedy and 
fruitful. The Libyan armed groups received significant international support, whether it 
was political, financial or military in nature.341  
Without ignoring the significance of the political considerations of third state 
parties,342 the high level of organisation achieved by the Libyan armed groups was one 
of the primary factors leading to such consequences.343 In other words, despite the fact 
that the political harmony among third states, and most importantly the permeant five 
members in the UNSC was the key element leading to the effective international action 
to protect the Libyan population,344 the status of the Libyan opposition groups was 
highly considered by the international community. Yet, the Libyan armed groups had 
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to progress from one stage to another until they reached the required level of 
organisation.345 
The roots of the opposition to Gaddafi regime could be linked to the peaceful 
protest that took place in front of the Benghazi police station, in 15 of February 2011, 
after a human rights activist was detained.346 The protest subsequently evolved into a 
number of peaceful demonstrations that, over time, became confrontations with the 
military forces. Almost two days later, in 17 of February, the National Conference for 
the Libyan Opposition called for a ‘Day of Rage’.347 The attitude of the Libyan military 
and security forces became more feudal, and the protesters became direct targets of 
violence.348 
At this stage, there were no signs that the Libyan opposition achieved either the 
requirements stated under Article 1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol of 1977349 or 
the broad and more fixable criteria provided by the ICTY in the Tadic case.350 In fact, 
the status of the Libyan opposition, in this capacity, fell within the scope of Article 1 
(2) which primarily aimed to exclude ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’ 
from the scope of the Protocol.351 
Nevertheless, although the Libyan opposition, during this stage of the conflict, 
had not achieved a level of organisation required by IHL, the situation would not be 
fully governed by domestic laws. In other words, despite the consensus that this status 
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does not lead to the implementation of IHL, the host state is still bound by the principles 
of IHRL.352 Even though, at this early stage of the conflict, the Libyan opposition was 
not qualified enough to be recognised as being party to an internal armed conflict, the 
opposition amassed greater capacity as the conflict developed. 
 The aggressive attitude of the Libyan forces dramatically changed the situation, 
and a battle erupted in Benghazi. Subsequently, the protests spread across the country, 
with a significant increase in the number of army and security officers who decided to 
join the opposition groups.353 The Libyan opposition groups, the rebels, started to 
behave like fairly organised armed groups.354 Although the Libyan opposition had not 
achieved a sufficient degree of effective control over the territory at this stage, and there 
were no clear indications of these armed groups’ capability in terms of applying IHL,355 
it was likely that the opposition satisfied the Tadic two-element test.356 The conflict 
reached a certain degree of intensity and the opposition achieved a level of organisation 
sufficient to indicate that the situation went beyond crises such as civil unrest and 
terrorism.357 
In response to the speedy progress on the ground, the Libyan opposition founded 
the NTC, in 27 of February, in Benghazi as a new transitional government with the 
primary objective of overthrowing Gaddafi regime.358 After the transitional government 
was established, the Libyan armed groups were able to control more major cities on the 
eastern side of the country.359 They were believed to exercise effective control over 
large areas of Libya. Therefore, it is clear that the Libyan armed groups acquired a 
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greater capacity than that defined in the Tadic case.360 The troops on the ground started 
to operate under the command of a single responsible entity, and they effectively 
controlled a significant part of the Libyan territory. Moreover, achieving this capability 
suggests that the conflict satisfied the requirements under Article 1 (1) of the second 
Additional Protocol of 1977.361 
In fact, as Green argued, it is likely that the Libyan opposition would still meet 
the criteria provided under Article 1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol even if the 
Article were to be interpreted as strictly mandating that the rebels be ‘well established 
and [having] set up some form of de facto government’.362 At an advanced stage of the 
conflict, the NTC introduced itself as a new transitional government with the primary 
objective of replacing Gaddafi regime.363 It is also worth mentioning that the 
achievement of this capacity suggests that the opposition would be, at least 
theoretically, able to implement the protocol.364 Hence, the Libyan opposition could be 
said to have reached the level of organisation required for the implementation of the 
second Additional Protocol.365 
 
1.4.2.2 The Syrian Armed Groups and the Element of Organisation 
With regard to the Syrian opposition, the situation is much more problematic 
than in Libya. Unlike the Libyan opposition, which has gradually moved from one stage 
to another, the progression of the Syrian opposition has been neither stable nor clear. 
States have responded to these groups with reluctance, and international support is 
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inconsistent.366 The conduct of these groups on the ground is criticised,367 and 
international efforts have attempted to improve the organisation of the Syrian armed 
groups.368  
Without ignoring the importance of the continuing differing political dynamics 
between the Libyan and Syrian conflicts and how states have reacted to them,369 the 
lack of sufficient organisation is one of the main reasons for their failure to reach a 
similar outcome in Syria as in the Libyan case. National interests from third states, both 
those directly neighbouring Syria and powerful Western states, have contributed 
significantly to the complexity of the Syrian situation and delayed agreement on an 
effective decision.370 Despite this, one of the main legal justifications for this delay is 
argued to be the uncertainty as to the stability and credibility of the Syrian armed 
groups.  
There are various theories about the roots of the Syrian revolution. It began in 
the first week of March 2011 as a peaceful protest initially targeted against the failure 
of Assad’s regime to fulfil its commitment towards improving the country’s political 
and economic situation.371 The situation worsened significantly within a few weeks as 
a result of the excessive force used by the Syrian authority against protesters. As a 
consequence, the peaceful protest developed into ‘a full-scale armed rebellion’.372 
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Despite occurring at an early stage, this confrontation was considered to still be under 
the control of the official Syrian forces, leading to the assumption that the conflict fell 
within the exception provided under Article 1 (2) of the second Additional Protocol.373 
The situation therefore appeared to exceed the scope of the Syrian domestic jurisdiction, 
even after the formation of the SFA.374 
The establishment of the SFA over July and August of 2011 was an initial 
indication that the Syrian opposition was progressing in a manner similar to that of 
Libya.375 However, the facts on the ground indicated the opposite. Even though various 
armed groups seemed to be, prima facie, fighting Assad’s regime under the banner of 
the SFA, with time it has become clear that the SFA’s leadership has minimal or even 
non-existent operational control over these groups.376 The operations on the battlefield 
indicate that the fighting groups that are assumed to constitute the FSA lack the required 
level of unity.377 Some of these fighting groups are mostly comprised of foreign 
jihadists rather than genuine Syrian freedom fighters. These jihadist groups obviously 
have different agendas besides helping the Syrian people overthrow Assad’s regime 
and establishing a new democratic system.378 The failure of the Syrian armed groups to 
reach a sufficient level of organisation was thus established at this stage. 
In response to the inability of the FSA’s leadership to exercise sufficient control 
over the troops on the ground, the Syrian opposition, encouraged by some Western and 
Arab countries, declared its intention to establish a more operational and centralised 
structure.379 As a consequence, the SMC was formed in December 2012.380 One of the 
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primary objectives behind the SMC’s creation is to have ‘a more moderate and stronger 
alternative to the jihadist rebel groups in Syria’.381 The objective of the new structure 
is to achieve better organisation and unity. 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that many armed groups fall under the umbrella of 
the SMC, a significant number have continued to operate independently and carry out 
different agendas.382 In fact, the affiliated groups are believed to operate independently 
of one another under different commanders.383 As O’Bagy noted, the authority of the 
SMC ‘is based on the power and influence of these rebel leaders. Its legitimacy is 
derived from the bottom up, rather than top-down, and it has no institutional legitimacy 
apart from the legitimacy of the commanders associated with the council’.384 Therefore, 
the SMC in itself is not structurally effective; its command and powers come from the 
cooperation of each of its members.385 The leadership is considered to serve as a 
representative of these groups in the media rather than commanding and controlling 
their activities on the ground.386 
Further, some independent, extremist Islamic groups have gained additional 
troops and fighting power. They play a central role in the armed confrontation with 
Assad’s regime. As a result, the ideological and strategic differences between these 
groups and the more moderate ones has become more apparent.387 The conflicts of 
interest between these various groups has even led to a few armed clashes between 
them.388 
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The absence of a clear structure and an effective, responsible command has 
attracted considerable criticism. Several state officials emphasise the importance of 
unifying the Syrian armed groups under the command of one responsible entity and 
following a clear and accepted agenda.389 The assertion is that the Syrian armed groups 
should show clear signs of stability and credibility before a formal and final statement 
regarding their status can be granted.390 Hence, this requirement is believed to represent 
the difference between the Libyan and Syrian cases. From a legal point of view, it can 
be considered one of the key elements in the application of the R2P in relation to the 
status of armed groups. In fact, statements made by states declaring that the Syrian 
armed groups must obtain a higher level of organisation are often accompanied by 
affirmative proclamations that these groups must ensure the effective implementation 
of IHL and IHRL.391 Therefore, the requirements advanced by states regarding the 
Syrian armed groups are aimed at ensuring that these groups provide better protection 
for civilians. 
Despite this, there are reports that some armed groups belonging to the Syrian 
opposition have committed extreme IHL violations.392 Some extremist groups from the 
Syrian opposition are believed to have committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, which not only affect other minorities, such as the Shia sect and Christians, 
but also other Sunni groups alleged to be pro-government supporters.393 Furthermore, 
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these violations indicate that the Syrian opposition has been unwilling, or at least 
unable, to effectively implement the principles of IHL. 
Accordingly, even though the Syrian armed groups have achieved a capacity 
that exceeds the status defined under Article 1 (2) of the second Additional Protocol,394 
it is difficult to state whether these groups satisfy the requirements of Article 1 (1).395 
There has not been an indication yet that the Syrian opposition, as a whole, operates 
under a responsible command or exercises the stable and effective territorial control 
required to implement the second Additional Protocol. Nevertheless, it should be 
clarified that the failure of the Syrian armed groups to meet the criteria of the second 
Additional Protocol does not fully exclude it from being a recognised party to an 
internal armed conflict under international law. 
It is still possible for these armed groups to pass the Tadic two-element test.396 
The conflict has reached a certain degree of intensity and the opposition achieved a 
level of organisation that is sufficient to indicate that the Syrian conflict exceeds the 
scope of other crisis situations, such as civil unrest and terrorism.397 This contention 
finds further support in the subsequent application of the Tadic two-element test by 
some bodies; this includes the United Nations Special Rapporteur, which applied the 
test to the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories,398 and the independent expert 
of the Commission on Human Rights, which applied it to the situation in Somalia.399 
                                                 
394 See Additional Protocol II, (n 13), Art. 1 (2). 
395 See Ibid, at Art. 1 (1).  
396 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Opinion and Judgment), (n 87), at para. 562. 
397 See Ibid. 
398 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/440 (2001), para. 13, available online at: http://daccess-dds 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/565/49/PDF/N0156549.pdf?OpenElement. 
399 See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in 
Somalia, prepared by the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights, Mona Rishmawi, 
pursuant to Commission resolution 1996/57 of 19 April 1996, 3 March 1997, E/CN.4/1997/88, at paras. 
54-55, available online at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b0700.html. 
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Moreover, although achieving this status would not bind the Syrian opposition under 
the second Additional Protocol, these groups would still be required to ensure civilian 



























The main focus of this chapter was on the legal framework concerning armed 
groups as parties to internal armed conflicts. The primary object of this chapter was not 
only to determine the elements of such a framework, but also to trace any potential 
development of these elements under contemporary IHL. It was evidenced that the main 
focus on the concept of the protection of population under contemporary IHL 
contributed to the development of the framework regulating armed groups. Moreover, 
this development is in conformity with the approach adopted under the R2P. It was 
clarified that the concept of the R2P could already serve as a tool to further clarify and 
strengthen the implementation of some elements, or at least., open the door for further 
development in the future.  The chapter intended to address two main issues related to 
the framework of armed groups. First, the definition of the concept of organised armed 
groups. Second, why and how organised armed groups are bound by the rules of IHL. 
With regard to the definition of the concept of organised armed groups, two 
issues were discussed. First, the movement from recognised to unrecognised armed 
groups. Second, the definition of the concept of organised armed groups under 
contemporary IHL. As to the first issue, it was argued that although the concept of the 
recognition of armed groups under traditional seems to be prima facia clear, it was 
proven to be enfolded with a high degree of uncertainty. It is discretional act of a 
political nature, places attention on the interests of the recognising states, and it has 
minimal impacts on the protection of the population. In contrast, the concept of 
unrecognised armed groups adopted under contemporary IHL proved to be more 
effective as to the protection of populations. The adoption of the definition of internal 
armed conflicts rather than the concept of recognition to apply IHL provides better 
involvement and compliance by these groups as to the application of the concerned 
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rules of IHL. It focuses on the capacity of these groups to carry out the required 
obligations. 
In relation to the definition of organised armed groups, although the concept is 
controversial, it still could be defined. It was argued that even though the second 
Additional Protocol requires a high level of organisation as to the armed groups for the 
purpose of its application, Common Article 3 requires less restrictive definition. 
Despite the fact that Common Article 3 included no reference to organised armed 
groups, the required level of organisation could be still defined. Without ignoring the 
contributions made by some scholars,400 the most significant effort as to the definition 
of the concept of organised armed groups was advanced by the ICTY.401   
One of the justifications provided by the Appeal Chamber in Tadic case for such 
a development was that ‘[a] State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually 
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach’.402 This new approach in conformity 
with the approach adopted under the R2P. The primary aim of the R2P is to provide 
better and more effective protection of civilians during armed conflicts. It achieved this 
object by modifying the notion of sovereignty. The R2P restricted the authorities that 
could be exercised by states through the notion of sovereignty.  It conditions the 
exercise of sovereignty by states on the fulfillment of some obligations related to their 
responsibility to protect civilians. Hence, the concept of the R2P gives more weight to 
the people of the state. It affirms the approach advanced by the ICTY. Therefore, 
although no clear state practice exists yet as to the impact of adopting the R2P on the 
                                                 
400 See Moir, (n 78), at 36; see also, Ronen, (n 4), at 26; Wilson (1988), (n 12), at 44. 
401 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Opinion and Judgment), (n 87), at para. 562; Prosecutor 
v. Zdravko Mucic aka "Pavo", Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo aka "Zenga", Zejnil Delalic (Trial 
Judgement), (n 89), at para. 184.   
402 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (a/k/a Dule), (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction), (n 19), at para. 97.  
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definition of organised armed groups, it could be suggested that the implementation of 
the R2P would support such a development in this regard.   
As to the main issue related to why and how organised armed groups are bound 
by the rules of IHL, two options were discussed. The first option was the direct 
compliance with the obligations of IHL by the armed groups. It refers to the situations 
where armed groups voluntarily consent to be bound by certain rules of IHL. Although 
such a method may lead to limited application of IHL due to the fact that armed groups 
would be free to decide which rules they could be bound by, it still opens the door for 
third states to insure better and more effective application of these rules. It was asserted 
that the adoption of the R2P contributes to the effectiveness of this approach. Third 
state will have more room to participate in such process under the third pillar of the 
R2P concerning international responsibility to protect.     
The second option was the indirect compliance with the obligations of IHL by 
the armed groups. Five potential approaches were advanced. First, the principle of 
legislative jurisdiction. Second, the effect of treaties on third parties. Third, the claim 
of the representation of the state. Fourth, customary international law. Fifth, the rules 
of jus cogens. It was contended that none of these approaches is conclusive. As 
discussed in section two, each one of these approaches has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  
Nevertheless, further development could be indicated as to three of these 
approaches after the adoption of the R2P.  States’ reactions towards the Libyan and 
Syrian crisis indicate the emergence of a new trend towards recognising organised 
armed groups as the legitimate representatives of the people. It was argued that the 
compliance with the rules of IHL in accordance with the approach of the claim of the 
representation of the state adds to legitimacy of armed groups for the purpose of such 
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recognition. The concept of the R2P could also enhance the compliance with the rules 
of IHL by organised armed groups in accordance with the approach related to the effect 
of treaties on third parties. It put more pressure on host states to accept to bind these 
groups by IHL treaties. This contention finds support under the first pillar of the R2P.403 
requiring host states to undertake any steps necessary to provide the required level of 
protection. 
The other potential contribution of the R2P is related to the jus cogens. One of 
the arguments made against jus cogens approach is that it has limited applicability. It 
applies to limited number of rules. Nevertheless, the concept of the R2P expands the 
scope of jus cogens as to violations committed in internal armed conflicts. It refers to 
ethnic cleansing as a separate international crime. It also considers the commitment of 
international crimes, in general, as violations of  jus cogens. The R2P intends to enhance 
the level of protection provided for civilians by binding members of armed groups 
individually not to commit violations to jus cogens. Nevertheless, it still encourages 
armed groups to achieve the highest possible level of organisation to increase protection 
provided in internal armed conflicts and enable organised armed groups to take positive 
role in such a process. In the next Chapter, the obligations of organised armed groups 
as to the protection of civilians will be evaluated.    
 
 
                                                 




The International Obligations of Organised Armed Groups for Population 





It is well established that organised armed groups as parties to internal armed 
conflicts are bound by IHL. Depending on the level of organisation they enjoy, 
organised armed groups could be bound by the obligations relating to Common Article 
3 and the second Additional Protocol of 1977.1 They could be also required to apply 
IHRL in the territories they control. This chapter discusses certain obligations of IHL 
imposed on organised armed groups as parties to internal armed conflicts, to protect 
civilians. It aims to achieve two objectives. The main objective is evaluating whether 
organised armed groups already have a responsibility to protect under the current 
framework regulating internal armed conflicts. In other words, the extent to which 
elements constituting the concept of the R2P could be identified within the framework 
regulating the duties imposed on organised armed groups in internal armed conflicts 
will be determined. The second objective is to trace any potential development 
regarding the obligations of organised armed groups to protect civilians. To do so, the 
analysis is based in both IHL and IHRL. 
Since IHL is binding on organised armed groups as parties to internal conflicts, 
this implicitly suggests that organised armed groups are also obliged to obey at least 
the non-derogable principles of IHRL.2 Also, the link between IHL and IHRL facilitates 
                                                 
1 International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Global Overview 2006, at 13. 
2 J. Pejic, ‘the Right to Food in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Legal Framework’ (2001) 83 
International Review of the Red Cross 1097, at 1098. 
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the implementation of the mechanisms founded by these two bodies of law to ensure 
respect for the rights of civilians and to strengthen the fulfilment of the obligations 
associated with these rights by organised armed groups.3 
Due to the limitations and objectives of the chapter, the analysis will be 
restricted to selected obligations. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one 
relates to the right of civilians to adequate food where the prohibition of starvation and 
the obligation to allow humanitarian assistance are evaluated. Section two is concerned 
with the prohibition of the act of forced displacement and the role of organised armed 
groups regarding this displacement. Section three focuses on IDPs and the 














                                                 
3 Pejic, (n 2), at 1098-1099. 
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2.2 The Right of Civilians to Adequate Food: The Prohibition of Starvation and 
the Allowance of Relief and Humanitarian Assistance and the Role of Organised 
Armed Groups 
 This section focuses on the right to food and the role of organised armed groups 
in time of war. It is divided into three parts. First, it discusses the right to adequate food 
between IHL and IHRL. Second, it evaluates the prohibition on starvation and the 
obligations imposed on organised armed groups. Third, it examines humanitarian 
assistance and the role of organised armed groups.  
 
2.2.1 The Right to Adequate Food between IHRL and IHL: IHL Complements 
the Right to Food under IHRL 
 The right to adequate food is one of the most basic and fundamental human 
rights. It ought to be granted to all human beings, whether in times of peace or war. It 
refers to freedom from starvation and access to safe and nutritious food. The right to 
food means that food must be physically and economically accessible, and available in 
sufficient quantity and quality to all individuals, with no discrimination based on race, 
colour, sex, language, age, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.4 
 The main reference point to the right to adequate food is located within 
the UDHR.5 Article 25 of the UDHR states, ‘[e]veryone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including 
food’.6 Although the UDHR is not a binding international legal instrument, it provided 
                                                 
4 See National Economic & Social Rights Initiative, What is the Human Rights to Food, available 
online at: https://www.nesri.org/programs/what-is-the-human-right-to-food.  
5 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 




a reference point for the human rights legislation following it. For instance, Article 11 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to the 
right to adequate food in detail. It states: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, ...  
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-
operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:  
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by 
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of 
the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a 
way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources;  
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting 
countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to 
need.7 
References to the right to food were made in other treaties, such as the 
Convention on the Right of Child8 and the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man.9 Nonetheless, unlike IHRL, IHL does not contain any explicit reference 
to the right to adequate food. Moreover, this applies to the frameworks regulating both 
international armed conflicts and internal armed conflicts. Even though IHL includes 
no mention to such a right, it still contains various provisions intending to ensure ‘that 
persons or groups not or no longer taking part in hostilities are not denied food or access 
to it’.10 
                                                 
7 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, at Art. 11, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html.  
8 See United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 
1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, at Arts. 24 & 27, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html.  
9 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948, at Art. 11, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3710.html.  
10 Pejic, (n 2), at 1098. 
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Reality has shown that the displacement of civilians is a primary cause of 
starvation in internal armed conflict. Consequently, one of the primary objects of IHL 
is providing civilians with all necessary means to remain in their homes, thereby 
ensuring that their basic needs are met, including those related to food.11 IHL 
complements IHRL regarding the right to adequate food in two ways. First, it prohibits 
starvation. Second, it regulates the access of international relief and humanitarian 
assistance. Organised armed groups as parties to internal armed conflicts are obligated 
not to use starvation as a method of war and are required to allow and facilitate the 
access of humanitarian assistance.  
 
 
2.2.2 The Prohibition of Starvation  
Parties to armed conflicts, whether international or internal, are not completely 
free to choose the methods and means of warfare. They are bound by IHL not to apply 
methods and means of war that may cause unnecessary damage or excessive harm. In 
the context of internal armed conflict, organised armed groups ought to conduct 
themselves in accordance with the principles of proportionality and due diligence.12 
They must not use war methods leading to unnecessary suffering, and they must 
distinguish between military and civilian objects.13 One of the restrictions that parties 
to armed conflicts ought to obey is not using starvation as a method of warfare.14 
Therefore, organised armed groups may not intentionally implement starvation to 
achieve success on the ground.15 
                                                 
11 Pejic, (n 2), at 1100. 
12 M. John-Hopkins, ‘Regulating the Conduct of Urban Warfare: Lessons from Contemporary 
Asymmetric Armed Conflicts’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 469, at 479. 
13 Ibid. 
14 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 





As stated under the Statute of the ICC, ‘[i]ntentionally using starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva 
Conventions’, is a war crime when committed in international armed conflict.16 
Moreover, although there is no similar provision in the ICC Statute criminalising 
starvation in internal armed conflict, Pejic argued, ‘this act does constitute a war crime 
under customary international law’.17 
It is noteworthy to mention that the use of starvation as a method of warfare was 
legitimate and acceptable under IHL. For instance, in response to the failed attempt to 
declare independence in Biafra, a member of the Nigerian government asserted that 
‘starvation is a legitimate weapon of war’.18 Similarly, a British Foreign Secretary 
argued that starving the enemy is legitimate method of war that has been utilised in the 
past.19 However, the use of starvation as a method of war was expressly prohibited after 
the adoption of the Additional Protocols in 1977.20 Furthermore, it is now recognised 
as a norm of customary international law.21 
                                                 
16 United Nations General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 
2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, at Art. 8 (b) (xxv), available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html.  
17 Pejic, (n 2), at 1099-1100. 
18 Chief Anthony Enahoro, Federal Commissioner for Information and Labor of Nigeria, quoted in L. 
Garrison, ‘the ‘‘Point of No Return’’ for the Biafrans’, New York Times Magazine, 8 September 1968, 
102, cited in G. A. Mudge, ‘Starvation as Means of Warfare’ (1969-1970) 4 International Lawyers 
228. 
19 Statement of British Foreign Secretary, Hansard Vol. 786 No 143 c 953, cited in, E. Rosenblad, 
‘Starvation as a Method of Warfare-Conditions for Regulation by Convention’ (1973) 7 International 
Lawyers 252, at 253. 
20 See international Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, at Art. 54 (1), available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html; Additional Protocol II, (n 14), at Art. 14. 
21 J. M Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: 




As defined in the Commentary on the Additional Protocols, starvation ‘means 
the action of subjecting people to famine, i.e., extreme and general scarcity of food’.22 
The prohibition of starvation under IHL is only applicable to ‘the intentional starvation 
of civilians’.23 Therefore, the prohibition does not include situations where starvation 
is an incidental or unavoidable consequence of military actions.24 Organised armed 
groups may not be held responsible if the starvation of civilians under their territorial 
control resulted from unseen or unavoidable causes. Nonetheless, deciding whether the 
starvation was incidental or intentional is quite a delicate task.25 Therefore, each 
instance ought to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
The prohibition of intentional starvation is forbidden under IHL not only when 
it results on death, but also when the lack of food leads civilians to suffer hunger.26 
Moreover, the prohibition under IHL is not only limited to the act of starvation in itself, 
it also includes other intentional military activities potentially leading to starvation.27 
IHL imposes explicit obligations on organised armed groups to avoid the conduct of 
any military activities that may lead to starvation. They are under an obligation not ‘to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the 
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and 
irrigation works’, when the purpose of such action is starvation.28 Accordingly, the 
obligation imposed on organised armed groups regarding the prohibition of starvation 
                                                 
22 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC, 1987), at 1456. 
23 International Institution of International Humanitarian Law, The Manual on the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict with Commentary (Sanremo, 2006), at 46.  
24 The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict with Commentary, (n 23), at 46.  
25 See S. Sivakumaran, the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012), at 424. 
26 J. Pejic, (n 2), at 1099. 
27 S. Sivakumaran, (n 25), at 424. 
28 Additional Protocol II, (n 14), at Art. 14. 
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is of a preventive nature. It makes organised armed groups responsible for preventing 
actions leading to starvation. This formula conforms with the preventive dimension as 
defined under the framework of the R2P.29 Hence, it can be argued that, in relation to 
the prevention of starvation, just the like host states under the first pillar of the concept 
of the R2P organised armed groups have a primary responsibility to protect civilians. 
Organised armed groups are under a duty not to attack ‘works and installations 
containing dangerous forces such as dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations’.30 Consequently, the obligation imposed on organised armed groups in relation 
to the prohibition of starvation goes beyond the concept of territorial control. IHL 
requires organised armed groups to obey certain obligations necessary for the protection 
of populations regardless who controls the attacked territory. Therefore, although the 
concept of effective control is necessary for the implementation of certain duties, 
organised armed groups are still bound by IHL rules in areas controlled by the other 
party. Organised armed groups are responsible for protecting civilians, regardless of 
who controls them. This approach goes beyond the concept of sovereignty as 
responsibility, as introduced within the framework of the R2P.31 
As noted in the Commentary to the Protocols ‘the verbs [employed in Article 
14 of the second Protocol] “attack”, “destroy”, “remove” and “render useless” are used 
in order to cover all possibilities, including pollution, by chemical or other agents, of 
water reservoirs, or destruction of crops by defoliants’.32 As a result, Pejic argues, ‘the 
deployment of landmines in agricultural areas or in irrigation works with the specific 
                                                 
29 See E. Strauss, The Emperor's New Clothes?:The United Nations and the Implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009), at 26. 
30 Additional Protocol II, (n 14), at Art. 15. 
31 See United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution / adopted by the 
General Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, at paras. 138-139, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/44168a910.html.  
32 Commentary on the Additional Protocols, (n 22), at 655. 
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purpose of precluding their use for the sustenance of the civilian population would 
likewise constitute a violation of that prohibition’ falls within the scope of the 
prohibition.33 As noted in the Commentary to the Protocols, the inclusion of the phrase 
‘such as’ in the Article suggests that the provided list of ‘protected objects is merely 
illustrative’.34 The primary purpose behind adopting an illustrative approach was 
avoiding overlooking other indispensable objects and providing the Article with further 
flexibility for the better protection of civilians.35 This flexible approach suggests that 
the concept of the R2P could play a notable rule in further expanding the scope of the 
prohibition of starvation. It is noteworthy to mention that parties to internal armed 
conflict may enter into agreements affirming their obligations regarding the prevention 
of starvation.  
In a bilateral agreement signed in 2002 between the government of the Republic 
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the parties intended ‘to refrain 
from targeting or intentionally attacking civilian objects or facilities, such as schools, 
hospitals, religious premises, health and food distribution centres, or relief operations, 
or objects or facilities indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and of a 
civilian nature’.36 Similarly, in 2009, the government of the Philippines signed an 
agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front where they agreed to commit to the 
same obligations stated above.37 
 
 
                                                 
33 J. Pejic, (n 2), at 1099. 
34 Commentary on the Additional Protocols, (n 22), at 655. 
35 S. Sivakumaran, (n 25), at 425. 
36 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement to Protect Non-Combatant Civilians and Civilian Facilities from Military Attack, 10 March 
2002, at Art. 1 (b), available online at: 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_020331_Agreement%20to%20Protect%20
Non-Combatant%20Civilians%20from%20Military%20Attack.pdf.   
37 Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team, 27 October 




2.2.3 Relief and Humanitarian Assistance  
 
 
2.2.3.1 Humanitarian Assistance under IHL and IHRL 
 
 Another obligation imposed by IHL on organised armed groups as parties to 
internal armed conflicts is the duty to accept and facilitate humanitarian relief access. 
Although the right to humanitarian assistance is not specifically addressed under IHRL, 
it still could be founded on the fundamental right to life.38 Establishing the right to 
humanitarian relief on IHRL helps fill in the gaps in the framework regulating 
humanitarian assistance under IHL. Certain obligations are related to the right to 
humanitarian relief, such as the obligation imposed on parties to armed conflict 
ensuring that civilians under their territorial control are adequately provided with food 
and other necessary goods and ‘the duty to cooperate with humanitarian organisations 
cannot be deduced literally from IHL’.39 Moreover, ‘the development of IHRL will 
reinforce and advance the establishment of the majority of norms concerning 
humanitarian assistance in armed conflict as part of customary law’.40 
 More specifically, the contention is that the link between the right to 
humanitarian relief and the right to life suggests an obligation of parties to armed 
conflict to ‘bestow the right to receive humanitarian assistance offered by third parties 
on all the victims of all conflicts’.41 It also helps provide the necessary limitations to 
the right to life. Even though the right to life, as the basis of the right to humanitarian 
                                                 
38 See United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 6: Article 6 
(Right to Life), 30 April 1982, available online at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45388400a.html; R. 
A. Stoffels, ‘Legal regulation of humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts: Achievements and gaps’ 
(2004) (86) International Review of the Red Cross 515, at 516.  
39 Stoffels, (n 38), at 516.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid, at 518.  
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assistance, is of a non-derogable nature, it still can be restricted. In the context of armed 
conflict, IHL founds ‘the substance of this right and the limitations to it’.42 
 The right to humanitarian assistance, as addressed by IHL, is founded on two 
fundamental principles: distinguishing between the civilian population and combatants; 
and ensuring respect, protection and humane treatment for people not or no longer 
participating in the hostilities.43 Furthermore, unlike IHRL, IHL contains various 
Articles to advance and organise humanitarian assistance and relief actions ‘on behalf 
of civilians in armed conflict’.44 
 As to the binding nature of the right to humanitarian assistance on the parties to 
armed conflicts, the right to humanitarian assistance is founded in the fundamental 
norms of both IHRL and IHL. Hence, as asserted by the ICJ, the right to humanitarian 
assistance creates duties of an erga omnes nature for all parties to an armed conflict.45 
This part of the chapter aims to discuss the role of organised armed groups as parties to 
internal armed conflict related to humanitarian assistance and relief actions. 
 
2-2.3.2 Humanitarian Assistance in the Context of Internal Armed Conflicts: 
General Principles and Requirements 
 In general, it is the primary responsibility of each state to provide assistance 
and protection for civilians within its territory. In the context of internal armed conflicts, 
it is argued that each party to the conflict, whether the state or the organised armed 
groups, is obliged to provide the necessary protection and assistance for civilians in the 
                                                 
42 Stoffels, (n 38), at 518. 
43 See Resolution XXVIII of the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
(Vienna, 1965). 
44 M. Jacques, Armed Conflict and Displacement: The Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
under International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012), at 194. 
45 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America); Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 1986, at para. 218, 
available online at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a44d2.html. 
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territory under its control.46 Nevertheless, in certain cases, the responsible party could 
be unable or unwilling to provide this necessary humanitarian assistance. In these cases, 
international assistance would be essential. The hierarchy of providing assistance for 
civilians in armed conflict situations and the link between territorial control and the 
obligation to provide assistance is in line with the language used under the framework 
of the R2P, as clarified above.47 It suggests the implementation of the concept of 
sovereignty as responsibility and establishes the role the international community could 
play in providing necessary assistance. 
The organisation of humanitarian assistance and relief actions in internal armed 
conflicts are dealt with under Article 18 (2) of the second Additional Protocol.48 
According to Article 18 (2): 
If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies 
essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the 
civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and 
which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the 
consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.49 
In accordance with Article 18 (2) of the second Protocol, for humanitarian 
assistance to conform with the principles of IHL, certain measures ought to be 
considered. It is not enough that the assistance is of a humanitarian nature; it must also 
be conducted without any adverse distinction. The humanitarian character of the 
assistance would be proven if the objective behind the relief action is to provide the 
affected civilians with necessary humanitarian relief.50 Regarding the requirement of 
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non-discrimination and impartiality, as stated in the Commentary on the Protocol, this 
means the humanitarian assistance ‘must resist any temptation to divert relief 
consignments or to favour certain groups or individuals rather than others because of 
personal preferences’.51 
Though this Article is significant in establishing the general grounds for 
providing humanitarian assistance, it still focuses on the providers of the relief action 
rather than the parties to the conflict. In fact, most of issues arising from humanitarian 
assistance in the context of internal armed conflict could be attributed to the reactions 
of the parties to the conflict to such assistance. The consent of organised armed groups 
to such assistance and the right of these groups to deny their access are discussed below. 
 
2.2.3.3 Humanitarian Assistance, the Principle of Non-Intervention and the 
Consent of Organised Armed Groups 
 One of the most common reasons that a party to an internal armed conflict may 
reject the access of humanitarian assistance is that the proposed humanitarian relief 
constitutes illegitimate interference in the conflict.52 Unlike the first Additional 
Protocol which explicitly affirms that the supply of humanitarian relief is not 
considered interference in the conflict,53 the second Additional Protocol is empty of any 
express reference to such issues. However, Common Article 3 could still serve as a 
basis for establishing similar legal ground.54 
 Under Paragraph (2), Common Article 3 states that ‘[an] impartial humanitarian 
body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to 
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the Parties to the conflict’.55 Furthermore, as Pictet commented, ‘an impartial 
humanitarian organisation [is] now being legally entitled to offer its services. The 
Parties to the conflict may, of course, decline the offer if they can do without it. But 
they can no longer look upon it as an unfriendly act’.56  
 The issue was also further elaborated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case.57 In 
response to the humanitarian assistance provided by the US government to the 
opposition groups in Nicaragua, the court asserted that: 
There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces 
in another country, whether their political affiliations or objectives cannot be regarded 
as unlawful intervention, or as any other way contrary to international law.58 
The court went on to add, in order that, for the humanitarian relief to be 
legitimate and not be in violation with the principle of non-intervention, it ‘must be 
limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, namely “to prevent 
and alleviate human suffering”, and “to protect life and health and to ensure respect for 
the human being”; it must also, and above all, be given without discrimination to all in 
need in Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their independents’.59 
Regarding the principle of consent as a requirement for the access of 
humanitarian aid, the matter is underlined under Article 18 of the second Additional 
Protocol.60 In accordance with the Article, humanitarian assistance cannot be provided 
until the consent of the government in power is obtained.61 Nonetheless, as stated in the 
Commentary on the Protocols, in certain cases where there is an absence of actual 
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authority and the humanitarian needs are serious, consent as a requirement for providing 
humanitarian relief is presumed.62 Moreover, this assumption goes with the assertion 
made above that humanitarian assistance is provided on behalf of the affected civilian 
populations and it is not a privilege given to the government.63 Even though the Article 
refers only to the consent of the state, state practice suggests that the consent of any 
organised armed groups is crucial for ensuring easy and safe access to humanitarian 
relief in areas controlled by these groups.  
It is also argued that, in cases where there is direct access to the areas controlled 
by organised armed groups, it is not required to receive the consent of the parent state. 
In other words, the consent of the organised armed group is enough to authorise access 
of the humanitarian aid to areas under their control as long as these areas are accessible 
without passing through areas under government authority.64 State practice indicates 
that requesting prior consent from the host state is the initial step followed by third 
states and international organisations before providing humanitarian aid in areas under 
the control of armed groups.65 Although state practice supports such a view, the reaction 
of the international community towards the Syrian crisis may reveal the emergence of 
a new position in state practice for the purpose of protecting affected populations.  
After demanding that all parties to the conflict, particularly the Syrian 
government, allow and facilitate the access of humanitarian aid in various situations,66 
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the UNSC adopted resolution 2165.67 The significance of the resolution stems from the 
fact that it authorised the delivery of humanitarian aid to areas controlled by Syrian 
armed groups without the consent of the Syrian authorities.68 Moreover, the UNSC 
expanded the mandate for 12 months under resolution 2258, adopted in 2015.69 In a 
statement made by the European Commission, this action by the UNSC was welcomed 
and described as ‘a step forward’ in the process of further protecting the Syrian 
population.70 Even though it is not sufficient in itself to establish a new rule regarding 
the access of humanitarian assistance, the decision made by the UNSC, in the present 
situation, it is an important step towards protecting the population.  
 
2.2.3.4 Denial of Humanitarian Assistance in Internal Armed Conflicts 
 Failure to provide necessary humanitarian relief could stem from neutral causes 
not related to the attitudes of the parties to the conflict, such as the intensity of the 
conflict or the impossibility of providing aid workers with the security required to carry 
out the aid activities.71 In some cases, humanitarian assistance could be rejected by 
parties to internal armed conflicts. The refusal of humanitarian assistance could result 
from preventing entry to the country in which the internal armed conflict emerged or 
refusing entrance to certain areas controlled by the other party to the conflict.72 
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 The refusal of humanitarian assistance could be used by a party to an internal 
armed conflict as a war strategy to lead to starvation.73 Hence, it is argued that the 
refusal of humanitarian assistance should not be determined only by concerned parties 
to the conflict. As stated in the ICRC commentary on the protocols: 
If the survival of the population is threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling 
the required conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this 
situation, relief actions must take place.74 
Accordingly, organised armed groups as parties to internal armed conflict are 
obligated to accept international humanitarian assistance as long as it is essential for 
the survival of civilians under their territorial control and the assistance satisfies the 
requirements of impartiality and non-discrimination.75 In other words, organised armed 
groups must have legitimate reasons to deny the access to humanitarian aid.76 
‘[A]rbitrary or capricious’ reasons cannot serve as a basis for such a denial.77 
Organised armed groups could refuse humanitarian relief based on violations of 
Article 18 of the second Protocol. They could argue that the aid is not ‘humanitarian 
and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction’.78 They could 
also base the rejection on grounds related to military necessity.79 Organised armed 
groups may also refuse the supply of humanitarian aid on the grounds that ‘the foreign 
relief personnel may hamper military operations or can be suspected of unnatural 
behaviour in favour of the other party to the conflict’.80 Nevertheless, military necessity 
cannot be allowed to cause starvation. The prohibition of starvation is a rule from which 
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no derogation may be made.81 Hence, preventing starvation must prevail over any 
claims of military necessity related to rejecting humanitarian assistance.82 
On various occasions, the UNSC explicitly considered the unjustified rejection 
of humanitarian assistance by armed groups as a violation of IHL.83 Consequently, it 
seems that, in case no legitimate reason to refuse the access of humanitarian relief 
arises, organised armed groups would be under a positive obligation under CIHL to 
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2.3 Prohibition of Forced Movement of Civilians and the Role of Organised Armed 
Groups  
This section examines the prohibition of forced movement of civilians and the duties 
imposed on organised armed groups in this regard. First, it clarifies the nature and 
legality of the forced displacement of civilians in internal armed conflicts. Second, it 
discusses the forced displacement of civilians by organised armed groups as an illegal 
act that may amount to an international crime. 
 
2.3.1 The Nature and Legality of the Forced Displacement of Civilians and its 
Conditions 
The displacement of civilians could be voluntary, resulting from the hardship of 
armed conflict, or forced. In accordance with the rules of IHL, only forced displacement 
of the civilian population without providing legitimate purpose is prohibited.84 
Therefore, while an organised armed group could still lawfully displace or evacuate the 
population under their control for military or security purposes, the displacement of 
civilians by these groups would be deemed illegitimate if it was done arbitrarily.85 In 
accordance with Principle 6 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
‘[e]very human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily 
displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence’.86 The parameters of 
arbitrary displacement of civilians includes displacement in armed conflict situations; 
displacement founded on policies of apartheid, ethnic cleansing, or actions aimed to 
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change the ethnic, religious, or racial composition of the targeted population; and 
displacement of civilians when it is applied as a collective punishment.87 
Internal armed conflicts are the primary reason for the movement of civilians. 
Nevertheless, the eruption of internal armed conflicts is not a cause leading to the 
movement of civilians. Rather, the lack of effective adherence to the principles of IHL 
and IHRL during the conflict may lead to the forced movement of civilians. As argued 
by Jacques, the forced displacement of civilian population often emerges as a result ‘of 
systematic human rights abuses and violations of the laws of war’ by one of the parties 
to the internal armed conflict, the host state or the organised armed group.88 As one of 
the fundamental principles of IHL, the principle of distinction provides a framework 
preventing the emergence of such a situation.89 According to Lavoyer: 
[D]uring armed conflict, the civilian population is entitled to an immunity intended to 
shield it as much as possible from the effects of war. Even in time of war, civilians 
should be able to lead as normal a life as possible. In particular, they should be able to 
remain in their homes; this is a basic objective of international humanitarian law.90 
Although not explicitly included in any human rights conventions, the 
prohibition of the forced displacement of civilians could be still concluded from various 
human rights provisions.91 It constitutes a violation of Article 12 (1) of the ICCPR 
concerning the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence.92 The prohibition 
of the forced displacement of civilians finds support also in provisions concerning the 
right to privacy. It constitutes a violation of Article 17 (1) of the ICCPR relating to the 
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protection from interference with one’s home,93 and Article 11 (1) of the ICESCR 
concerning the right to adequate housing.94 Unlike the rules of IHL prohibiting the 
forced displacement of civilians, the concerned provisions of IHRL have a derogable 
nature. They may not be applied in extraordinary circumstances, such as emergency 
situations.95 
 The first reference to the issue of forced displacement under IHL was made 
under Article 49 of the Civilians Convention.96 The Article deals specifically with the 
forced displacement of civilians in occupied territory.97 Common Article 3 did not 
include any reference to this issue.98 The legal framework regulating internal armed 
conflicts remained empty of any reference to the prohibition of forced displacement 
until the adoption of the second Additional Protocol in 1977.99 Article 17 of the second 
Additional Protocol explicitly approached matters concerning the forced displacement 
of civilians. Moreover, in accordance with the 2005 ICRC study on CIHL, the 
prohibition of displacement of civilians is a norm of customary international law.100 
Such a prohibition is founded under both treaty and customary laws, and it obligates 
parties to internal armed conflicts, the host state and organised armed groups.101 
Article 17 of the second Additional Protocol distinguishes between the 
displacement of civilians within the territory of a contracting party and forced 
displacement outside this territory.102 The Article reads: 
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1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related 
to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military 
reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible 
measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under 
satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.  
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected 
with the conflict.103 
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 17, the displacement of the civilian 
population is prohibited, unless it is necessary for the security of civilians or it is 
demanded by imperative military reasons. As stated in the official commentary on the 
Protocols, ‘It is self-evident that a displacement designed to prevent the population from 
being exposed to grave danger cannot be expressly prohibited’.104 Thus, organised 
armed groups may request the displacement of civilians when it is essential to protect 
them from being a target of a harmful military act. Furthermore, it is a well-established 
rule of customary international law that, in accordance with the principle of distinction 
and the prohibition of the use of human shields, armed groups are under an obligation 
to remove civilians in the territory under their control from areas that might be 
considered military objects.105 Accordingly, when civilian populations under the 
territorial control of organised armed groups are exposed to serious and unavoidable 
danger, these armed groups are obligated to conduct immediate displacement; 
otherwise, they will be in violation of the principle of distinction. Nevertheless, the 
security of the civilian population, as an exception from the general prohibition of 
forced movement of civilians, has been highly criticised.106 
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 It was contended that the reference to the security of civilians as an exception 
weakens the prohibition embodied in the Article,107 providing parties to internal armed 
conflicts with an easy excuse to override the prohibition and justify the unlawful 
practice of forced movement.108 One example of an abusive application of this 
exception is related to the Burundi’s regroupment policy.109 It was asserted that the 
primary purpose behind the process followed by the Burundi government was 
preventing any support the FNL could obtain from the local population.110 This 
contention was strengthened by the fact that the vast majority of those forcibly 
displaced were Hutu. Furthermore, as argued by Cohen and Deng, it was quite evident 
that the process of displacement of civilians conducted by the Burundi government was 
ethnically targeted, thus representing a form of ethnic cleansing.111 Accordingly, 
organised armed groups alleging the existence of such exceptions is not enough; clear 
evidence must be provided ensuring that the displacement of civilians is necessary for 
their security. 
Regarding the displacement of civilians for military purposes, exacting 
standards are required to deem such an action lawful. As explained by the ICRC, to 
determine the legality of such an action, each case ought to be considered separately.112 
The ICRC went further to add, ‘imperative military reasons cannot be justified by 
political motives. For example, it would be prohibited to move a population in order to 
exercise more effective control over a dissident ethnic group’.113 It is also unlawful 
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under IHL to use the displacement of civilians as a method for preventing the local 
support of civilians to a party to the conflict.114 More specifically, the forced 
displacement of civilians could not be used by armed groups as a war tactic to ‘weaken 
the support base of adversaries and punish those who are perceived to support them, 
and to reward their own fighters’.115 
It is not enough that one of these two situations—security of civilians or 
imperative military reasons—exist to deem displacement of civilians by organised 
armed groups legal. The lawfulness of the movement is based on the conditions under 
which such a displacement is conducted. Therefore, the act of civilian displacement 
would be deemed unlawful, even if it was founded on one of the two exceptions 
mentioned above, as long as the requirements stated under Article 17 (1) were not 
applied.116 It is a customary rule of international law to ensure ‘all possible measures 
be taken in order that the civilians concerned are received under satisfactory conditions 
of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition and that members of the same family 
are not separated’.117 In accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, in all circumstances, the displacement of civilians ‘shall not be carried 
out in a manner that violates the rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those 
affected’.118 Furthermore, the displacement must be temporary and limited to the 
purpose behind it.119 For instance, as stated by HRW, the government of Burundi failed 
to provide the displaced civilians with adequate food, water and suitable housing, and 
it was not able to decisively determine the period of displacement.120 
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 With regard to paragraph 2 of Article 17 concerning the forced displacement of 
civilians outside the territory of the contracting party, the prohibition of such an action 
is absolute.121 Regarding the ICRC, the intention of the drafters suggests that the 
reference to ‘their own territory’ in the Article refers ‘to the whole territory of a 
country’.122 The ICRC went on to add that the obligation not to forcibly displace 
civilians outside the territory applies to both the host state and the armed groups 
involved.123 Although organised armed groups may legally require the displacement of 
civilians to an area within the territory of the state for security or military purposes, 
they cannot, under any circumstances, force civilians to move outside the national 
territory. 
 
2.3.2 The Forced Displacement of Civilian Populations as an International Crime 
The forced displacement of civilians could be conducted by organised armed 
groups in violation of Article 17 of the second Additional Protocol.124 The forced 
displacement of civilians might be carried out as a step towards, or a part of committing, 
the crime of ethnic cleansing. As clarified by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
on Human Rights, ‘The term ethnic cleansing refers to the elimination by the ethnic 
group exercising control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups. A 
wide variety of methods are used to accomplish this end, including… transfer or 
relocation of population by force’.125 
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The unlawful forced displacement of civilians is considered, under Article 147 
of the fourth Geneva Convention, as a grave breach of the Convention.126 Moreover, as 
defined under Article 85 (5) of the first Additional Protocol of 1977, grave breaches to 
any of the four Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols ‘shall be regarded as 
a war crime’.127 Under Article 20 (a) (vii) of the ILC, the ‘unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of protected persons’ is considered a war crime.128 
The Statute of the ICC followed the same example as the ICTY,129 the ICTR130 and the 
SCSL,131 considering the deportation or transfer of civilian populations a crime against 
humanity.132 Though the criminalisation of such acts is well established under the rules 
governing international armed conflicts, there is a high level of ambiguity regarding 
this matter under the framework regulating internal armed conflicts. 
Although prohibiting the act of forced displacement of civilians is observed 
under the framework regulating internal armed conflicts, the criminalisation of such 
acts has not been as clear.133 Until the foundation of the ad hoc international tribunals 
in the 1990s, there was no indication that the rules governing internal armed conflicts 
included individual criminal responsibility.134 As clearly stated in the Final Report of 
the Commission of Experts on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, the customary 
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international law concerning internal armed conflicts does not seem to contain any rules 
regarding ‘the concept of war crimes’.135 
The absence of any reference to personal criminal responsibility in the early 
efforts to found the framework regulating internal armed conflicts is attributed to the 
high attention paid to national sovereignty by contracting states.136 As argued by the 
Appeal Chamber in Tadic case, ‘State parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not 
want to give other States jurisdiction over serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in their internal armed conflicts—at least not the 
mandatory universal jurisdiction involved in the grave breaches system’.137 Therefore, 
the Article in the Geneva Conventions related to ‘grave breaches’ does not include any 
reference to illegal activities committed in violation of Common Article 3.138 
The second Additional Protocol, adopted specifically to further regulate internal 
armed conflicts, does not include any article concerning grave breaches or personal 
criminal responsibility.139 Nevertheless, because of civil wars and their awful effects, 
serious attempts have been made to modify the framework regulating internal armed 
conflicts to include personal criminal responsibility for grave breaches. Such efforts 
have been advanced by growing concerns regarding the importance of human rights 
protection, and the belief that claims related to national sovereignty do not justify 
violations of fundamental human rights. 
In accordance with the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case, 
‘regardless of whether [the concerned grave breaches of the laws] were committed in 
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internal or international armed conflicts’,140 these breaches still raise questions about 
personal criminal responsibility.141 Unlike the ICTY, the Statute of ICTR explicitly 
refers to personal criminal responsibility. As stated under Article 4 of the ICTR, ‘The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of 
Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977…’.142 Later, personal criminal 
responsibility for grave violations of Common Article 3 was affirmed under Article 8 
(2) (c) of the Statues of the ICC.143 The forced displacement of civilians is explicitly 
categorised as a war crime under the Statute of the ICC. In accordance with the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, the forced displacement of civilians in internal armed conflicts for 
reasons relating to the conflict without legitimate justifications constitutes a war 
crime.144 
The international reaction regarding the situation in Syria indicates a need for 
further development regarding the criminalisation of the act of forcible displacement 
committed during internal armed conflicts. As affirmed by the UN Commission of 
Inquiry, the arbitrary and forcible displacement of civilians was one of the serious 
violations of international law committed by Syrian armed groups.145 The Commission 
went on to add that the orders issued by ISIS to all Kurdish civilians living under the 
territorial control of the terrorist group ‘cannot be justified on the grounds either of the 
security of the civilians involved or of military necessity’.146 Moreover, in accordance 
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with the Commission’s findings, the acts of ISIS constitute ‘a widespread and 
systematic attack against the Kurdish civilian population’ that reaches the threshold of 
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2.4 IDPs and the Role of Organised Armed Groups 
 This section addresses IDPs and the role of organised armed groups. First, it 
provides a general overview as to the principles concerning IDPs. Second, it evaluates 
the obligations imposed on organised armed groups to provide IDPs with food, water 
and healthcare. Third, the section examines the duties of organised armed groups as to 
displaced women. Fourth, it discusses the obligation imposed on organised armed 
groups as to the unity of displaced families. 
 
2.4.1 General Principles Regarding IDPs 
 After discussing the prohibition of forced displacement of civilians, the IDPs 
resulting from such acts, and the protection provided by organised armed groups for 
these groups, must be evaluated. As a concept, IDPs refer to persons ‘who [have] been 
obligated to move within the borders of [their] own country because of an armed 
conflict or internal unrest’.148 Unlike refugees who cross the borders of their own 
countries looking for a safe harbour in other, neighbouring states,149 IDPs remain within 
the national territory.150 Therefore, IDPs could end up in areas controlled by either the 
government or the organised armed groups.  
 The expert conference held in 2011, co-organised by the IDMC and Geneva 
Call in Geneva, concluded that organised armed groups could play a role in protecting 
IDPs ‘where the State is unable or unwilling to do so’.151 The language used reflects 
some similarity with the formula provided under the concept of the R2P regarding the 
                                                 
148 M. C. Hickel, ‘Protection of Internally Displaced Persons Affected by Armed Conflict: Concept and 
Challenges’, International Review of the Red Cross 83 (843) 699, at 701. 
149 Mooney, (n 84), at 177-178. 
150 See Hickel, (n 148), at 701. 
151Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Armed Non-State Actors and the Protection of 
Internally Displaced People, June 2011, at 4. 
130 
 
responsibility of third states to protect.152 As it was included within the framework of 
the R2P, ‘sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but when they 
are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader 
community of states’.153 
  The subject of IDPs is not directly addressed by IHL. However, if the IDPs 
were not involved in the hostilities, they would be covered by the general protection 
provided for civilian populations under IHL.154 Unlike the framework regulating 
international armed conflicts, there are not as many rules regarding the protection of 
IDPs during internal armed conflicts. IDPs in internal armed conflicts would benefit 
from the protection provided under IHRL in times of both peace and war. The 
importance of IHRL regarding protection for IDPs provided by organised armed groups 
as parties to internal armed conflicts increased after the adoption of the R2P. The 
responsibility to prevent requires further adherence to the rules of IHRL to eliminate 
activities that may lead to serious violations of jus cogens.  
 As previously stated under section one, IHL deems organised armed groups 
responsible to take all necessary measures to ensure that IDPs under their control are 
‘received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and 
nutrition’.155 Moreover, under Principle 18 of the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement: 
1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.  
2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, 
competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe 
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access to: (a) Essential food and potable water; (b) Basic shelter and housing; (c) 
Appropriate clothing; and (d) Essential medical services and sanitation.  
3. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of women in the 
planning and distribution of these basic supplies.156 
 
2.4.2 Organised Armed Groups and the Rights of IDPs to Food, Water and 
Healthcare 
 A primary issue IDPs suffer from is the lack of an adequate standard of living.157 
As the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA stated: 
A principal cause of mortality for internally displaced persons, as with refugees and 
other war-affected populations, is malnutrition. Lack of food kills on its own and 
malnourished individuals are more susceptible to disease. Poor sanitation and 
contaminated water supplies also contribute to high death rates. Similarly, those 
without adequate shelter and clothing are more susceptible to life-threatening diseases 
and exposure to sever weather conditions.158 
The lack of adequate food and water supplies in IDPs camps could have many 
explanations. The poor food and water conditions in IDPs camps could be caused by 
natural factors related to the geographical locations of the camps, or the nature and 
intensity of the conflicts. These poor living conditions could also result from the 
inability or unwillingness of the parties to internal armed conflicts or the international 
community to provide IDPs with the required support and care.159 Recent practice has 
shown that the absence of the required level of food and water supplies may be 
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intentional when used by parties of the conflict as strategies of war.160 As stated in the 
report of the International Crisis Group on Sudan, issued in 2002: 
Instead of adopting a “hearts and minds” strategy to peel away [armed groups] SPLA 
popular support, the government has consistently targeted the “stomachs and feet” of 
civilians. By actively encouraging their displacement and steadily undermining their 
ability to feed and support themselves, including by destroying livestock, the 
government has sought to leave civilians in broad swathes of eastern and southern 
Sudan as vulnerable as possible. Famine in the war-torn regions is not a by-product of 
indiscriminate fighting but a government objective that has largely been achieved 
through manipulation, diversion and denial of international humanitarian relief. The 
calculation seems to be that a dispirited and enfeebled population will be unable to 
assist the insurgency. However, this has done little to persuade southerners that there 
is any place for them in a Sudan governed by the current leadership in Khartoum, and 
it poses a direct challenge to the international community’s responsibility to protect 
innocent civilians from the worst excesses of armed conflict.161 
Another issue just as important as the supply of food and water is providing 
IDPs with adequate access to healthcare. As noted by the IDMC, although most health 
issues IDPs normally suffer from are treatable, these diseases lead to the death of a 
significant percentage of IDPs, especially children, due to the lack of access to 
healthcare and medication.162 Besides the breakdown of the health system in the regions 
directly affected by hostilities, and the natural causes related to the geographical and 
unstable locations of IDPs camps,163 more specific factors could negatively affect the 
provision of healthcare and medication for IDPs. For instance, the lack of sufficient 
financial resources significantly affects the level of healthcare provided during war 
time.  
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The absence of adequate health services could be caused by the lack of security 
or freedom of movement.164 Consequently, to facilitate the access to health services, 
organised armed groups are responsible for ensuring the security of medical teams, as 
well as IDPs, in areas under their control. They are also obliged not to restrict the 
movement of IDPs in a manner that could prevent them from obtaining adequate levels 
of healthcare. Moreover, healthcare and access to necessary medication must be 
provided for all IDPs, regardless their ethnic origin or religious background. Organised 
armed groups ought to allow access to health services on a non-discriminatory basis.165 
 
2.4.3 The Obligations of Organised Armed Groups towards Displaced Women 
Besides the general support and care that organised armed groups ought to 
provide for all IDPs without discrimination, further protection must be provided for 
women and children, as they are more vulnerable than other categories of war victims. 
As clarified at the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women, ‘[w]omen and children 
constitute some 80 per cent of the world’s millions of refugees and other displaced 
persons, including internally displaced persons’.166 Reports regarding the IDPs in 
various conflicts, such as in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad, stated 
that women and children were victims of rape and other types of sexual violence.167 
Moreover, Jacques argued,  ‘Gender-based violence may have serious implications for 
the health of displaced women, including an increased risk of infection from HIV/AIDS 
and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs), as well as unwanted pregnancies’.168 
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Although the legal framework governing internal armed conflicts did not pay 
direct attention to the elevated vulnerability of women as potential victims, various 
general rules could obligate organised armed groups to provide additional protection 
for internally displaced women. Even though Common Article 3 does not directly refer 
to gender-based acts of violence, the prohibition of such acts could be indicated. The 
general prohibition provided under Article 3 (1) (a) and (c) could cover certain criminal 
acts of a gender-based nature.169 
Article 3 (1) (a) prohibits ‘violence to life and person, in particular murder of 
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’.170 Article 3 (1) (c) prohibits ‘outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.171 Article 4 
(2) (e) of the second Additional Protocol explicitly states that it is absolutely prohibited 
at all times and in all situations to subject women to any acts affecting their ‘personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution 
and any form of indecent assault’.172 As the primary purpose behind the adoption of the 
second Additional Protocol is elaborating on and clarifying the meaning of Common 
Article 3, the ‘explicit proscription of rape and other kinds of sexual and physical 
violence [under the Protocol] should be respected by the parties to all internal armed 
conflicts’.173 
Although neither Common Article 3 nor the second Additional Protocol 
includes any provision entailing individual criminal responsibility, the Statute of the 
ICTR has recognised that infractions of the non-derogable rules in Common Article 3 
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and the second Additional Protocol should be regarded as offences against international 
law. According to Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR: 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of 
Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall 
not be limited to: 
(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular 
murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal 
punishment; 
… 
(e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, 
rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
… 
(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.174 
 
Moreover, Article 3 of the Statute explicitly states, ‘The International Tribunal 
for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following 
crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: ‘(g) Rape;’.175 
Similarly, the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia states in 
Article 5, on ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ that ‘The International Tribunal shall have 
the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed 
in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against 
any civilian population: “(g) rape;”’.176 
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2.4.4 The Obligation of Organised Armed Groups to Preserve the Unity of 
Displaced Families 
Another obligation organised armed groups ought to fulfil in relation to IDPs 
under their control is the preservation of family unity. Principally, members of the same 
family ought not to be separated during the act of displacement. Thus, organised armed 
groups must undertake reasonable efforts to avoid the separation of family members 
during the transfer of civilians from evacuated areas to IDPs camps under their 
control.177 Furthermore, such an obligation is not only founded on the rules of IHL, but 
it also finds support in various provisions of IHRL.178 
Article 16 (3) of the UDHR affirms, ‘The family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State’.179 Moreover, 
a similar Paragraph is adopted under Article 23 of the ICCPR.180 Article 8 (1) of the 
ECHR states, ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life’.181 
Moreover, being linked with the idea of fundamental freedom and privacy, the concepts 
related to the protection of family life mean that the authorities must avoid interfering 
with the family, and also make sufficient efforts to prevent interference by third 
parties.182 The ICCPR provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to protection against such 
interference or attacks’.183 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
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interpreted this language as requiring protection ‘against all such interferences and 
attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons’.184 
The concept of non-interference in family life also appears in various 
international instruments related to the rights of the child. The rights of the child support 
protection of the family unity by ensuring the child is ‘not be separated from his or her 
parents’.185 The unity of internally displaced families is more significant when it comes 
to the rights of the child. Children are more vulnerable than other war victims. The 
separation of children from their families does not only violate certain rules of IHL and 
IHRL, but it also makes them more vulnerable as objects of serious violence and abuses 
such as forced prostitution, forced recruitment and sexual assault.186 Therefore, a duty 
imposed on armed groups to ensure the unity of the internally displaced families under 
their control during hostilities helps eliminate the potential for serious violations. In 
other words, the fulfilment of such an obligation by organised armed groups could be 
considered as an exercise of their responsibilities to prevent.  
Similarly, IHL requires respect for family life in the context of armed conflicts. 
In accordance with the ICRC based on the practice and opinion juris of states, the 
obligation to respect family life is part of customary international law in both 
international and internal armed conflicts.187 The ICRC’s customary law study further 
added, ‘In cases of displacement, all possible measures must be taken such that the 
civilians concerned are received under satisfactory conditions...and that members of the 
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same family are not separated’.188 Moreover, as Gulick argued, this customary right 
imposes an equal obligation on any party exercising control over a civilian population 
to make as much effort as is within its power to ensure the unity of internally displaced 
families.189 Besides the initial, primarily negative, duty imposed on armed groups to 
preserve the unity of internally displaced families, IHL requires organised armed 
groups to fulfil another obligation of a remedial nature.190 
In cases where family members are dispersed because of the intensity of the 
hostilities, or during the process of displacement, IHL holds organised armed groups 
responsible to undertake certain steps to facilitate the reunification of internally 
displaced families.191 IHL recognises two main obligations that organised armed groups 
should fulfil. First, organised armed groups should allow families to know the fate of 
their missing relatives.192 Second, organised armed groups are obligated to facilitate 
communication between separated family members and improve the possibility for 
reunification.193 
Since the drafting of the Guiding Principles, the right of families to know the 
fate of their disappeared relatives has been improved and extended under both IHRL 
and IHL.194 The ACRWC was the first human rights convention to address the rights 
of children to have access to essential information regarding missing or absent family 
members.195 
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The 2005 ICRC study on CIHL indicated that organised armed groups are under 
an obligation to ‘take all feasible measures to account for persons reported missing 
because of armed conflict and must provide their family members with any information 
it has on their fate’.196 It argued that such a rule has a customary nature and applies to 
both international and internal armed conflicts. Moreover, the duty of organised armed 
groups to collect and deliver information about missing family members was affirmed 
in many agreements between states.197 
In a resolution adopted in 1974, the UNGA clearly stated, ‘the desire to know 
the fate of loved ones lost in armed conflicts is a basic human need which should be 
satisfied to the greatest extent possible, and that provision of information on those who 
are missing or who have died in armed conflicts should not be delayed merely because 
other issues remain bending’.198 
IHL provides the most detailed guidance on the right to reunification and its 
implementation.199 Unlike IHRL, which implicitly recognises such a right, IHL refers 
directly to the right to reunification in various provisions.200 Although such an assertion 
has merit, it ought to be realised that a new trend recognising the right of families to 
reunion has emerged under IHRL.201 The strongest commitment in this regard is 
contained in the ACRWC.202 According to Article 25 (2) (b) of the ACRWC ‘all 
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necessary measures to trace and re-unite children with parents of relatives where 
separation is caused by internal and external displacement arising from armed conflicts 
or natural disasters’.203 
The general principle is stated under Article 4 (3) of the second Additional 
Protocol.204 Although Paragraph 3 of Article 4 is meant to underline the principles 
concerning the protection of children in internal armed conflicts, it includes the idea 
that ‘all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily 
separated’ by organised armed groups.205 Furthermore, in accordance with the 
commentary on the protocols, organised armed groups must do the best they can do to 
enable the reunion of families.206 Not only should armed groups remove any restrictions 
and allow members of dispersed families to search for their relatives, but they must also 
take a positive part and effectively participate in the process itself. Organised armed 
groups are expected to fulfil their duty not only by participating in the search process, 
but also by cooperating with the concerned international organisations, such as the 
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2.5 Conclusion  
  This chapter focused on examining certain obligations for protecting civilians 
imposed on organised armed groups by IHL. The aim was to determine the extent to 
which organised armed groups already have these responsibilities under the 
frameworks regulating internal armed conflicts, and whether the adoption of the R2P 
has had any contribution. 
  In section one, obligations relating to the right to adequate food under IHL were 
discussed. It was clarified that organised armed groups are under a duty not to use 
starvation as a method of war, as this is considered a war crime. The obligation imposed 
on organised armed groups is not limited to the act of starvation itself; it covers any act 
that may lead to it. Consequently, organised armed groups have a responsibility to 
prevent actions leading to starvation. This prohibition is restricted to intentional, rather 
than accidental, starvation.  
  Section one also addressed the duty of organised armed groups to accept and 
facilitate the access of humanitarian assistance. Organised armed groups are obligated 
to allow access to humanitarian aid if the aid satisfies the requirements stated in the 
second Additional Protocol. Although state practice suggests that the request of prior 
consent of the host state is required before providing humanitarian aid in areas under 
the control of armed groups, the UNSC reaction towards the Syrian crisis indicated 
potential changes. It authorised the delivery of humanitarian assistance to areas 
controlled by Syrian armed groups without the consent of the Syrian authorities.  
  Section two evaluated the prohibition of the forced displacement of civilians 
and the role of organised armed groups. Although organised armed groups can lawfully 
displace or evacuate the population under their control for military or security purposes, 
the displacement of civilians by these groups would be deemed illegitimate if it was 
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done arbitrarily. The lawfulness of the movement is based on the conditions upon which 
such a displacement is conducted. The forced displacement of civilians in internal 
armed conflicts for reasons relating to the conflict without legitimate justifications 
constitutes a war crime,208 or crime against humanity. 
  Section three addressed the obligations imposed on organised armed groups to 
protect IDPs. IHL imposes a general obligation upon organised armed groups to take 
all necessary measures to ensure that IDPs under their control receive satisfactory 
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. In addition, organised armed groups have 
further duties towards women and displaced families. These duties are of a preventive 



























                                                 




The Recognition of Opposition Groups at the International Level after the 
Adoption of the Concept of the R2P: The Recognition of the Libyan and Syrian 




After evaluating the relationship between organised armed groups and parent 
states in the previous chapters, the relationship between opposition groups and the 
international community is addressed. In this chapter, the recognition of these groups 
at the international level is discussed. State practice, after the adoption of the concept 
of the R2P, has indicated the possibility that the political structure of organised armed 
groups may be, under certain circumstances, recognised at the international level. Such 
recognition would go beyond the context of internal armed conflict to suggest certain 
degree of support and acceptance of these recognised groups by the international 
community.1 Despite the great differences between the international reactions to the 
Libyan and Syrian crises, an examination of both cases suggests that a new trend to 
grant the opposition groups a status at the international level has been emerging since 
the adoption of the R2P.  
State practice towards the Libyan and Syrian oppositions indicated that the 
political structure of opposition groups could be recognised in various ways reflecting 
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different levels of political support.2 At certain stages of the Libyan and Syrian 
conflicts, many states recognised the NTC and the SOC as the legitimate representatives 
of their peoples. Such a status was considered to reflect a high degree of political 
recognition. It also indicated the emergence of some potential legal consequences.3    
 The aim of this chapter is to examine to what extent the process of recognising 
the political structure of the opposition groups has developed after the adoption of the 
concept of the R2P. To evaluate this development, the chapter is divided into two main 
sections. Section one addresses the political recognition of the opposition groups as 
representatives. Section two discusses the legal recognition of the opposition group.  In 
the first part of section two, the potential link between the use of the phrase the 
legitimate representative of the people and self-determination is clarified. In the second 
part of the section, the categorisation of the opposition group as the legitimate 
representative of the people and the recognition of this group as the new government 
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3.2 The Political Recognition of the Opposition Groups after the Adoption of the 
R2P 
 In this section, the issue concerning the political recognition of the opposition 
groups after the adoption of the R2P is addressed. In order to do so, three tasks are 
undertaken. First, the political act of recognition is defined. Second, the various levels 
of political recognition that could be granted to opposition groups is outlined. Third, 
the recognition of opposition groups as the legitimate representatives of the peoples, as 
the highest level of political recognition is evaluated.  The aim is to trace any potential 
requirements and consequence of such recognition.  
 
3.2.1 The Political Act of Recognition 
As Kelsen stated,  ‘[t]he term ''recognition'' may be said to be comprised of two 
quite distinct acts: a political act and a legal act’.4 Nevertheless, unlike the legal act of 
recognition, the political act does not produce any legal consequences.5 It is an arbitrary 
act exercised by the recognising state reflecting its intention to establish a certain degree 
of political relations with the recognised entity.6 Furthermore, being within the arbitrary 
discretion of the recognising state,7 the political act of recognition can be contingent on 
certain requirements.8 Although it does not lead to any legal rights or obligations, the 
act of political recognition could be of political and practical importance for the 
recognised entity.9 It refers to the political existence of the recognised group and adds 
some legitimacy to its financial situation.10 It is noteworthy that, even though the act of 
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Journal of International Law 605. 
5 S. Talmon, ‘Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People’ (2013) 
Chinese Journal of International Law 219, at 231. 
6 Kelsen, (n 4), at 605 
7 Ibid. 
8 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 231. 
9 See US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 12 December 2012, (n 1). 
10 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 231. 
146 
 
political recognition is different from the act of legal recognition, state practice has 
shown a link between these two types of recognition.11 
 As Talmon (2013) commented, ‘recognition is an incremental process’.12 It 
usually starts with political recognition that may develop from one stage to another; 
then, when certain requirements are satisfied, further steps can be followed to grant 
legal recognition.13 In other words, the act of political recognition has no legal 
consequences, but, as a critical initial step, it can lead to legal recognition whenever the 
concerned group achieves the required capacity under international law.14 The 
importance of the act of political recognition as a prerequisite for the legal recognition 
of opposition groups has increased after the implementation of the R2P over the Libyan 
and Syrian crises. The Libyan case is considered a successful implementation of the 
R2P for protecting the population, and the Syrian situation is considered a failure of the 
international community to react to the extreme violations committed by the Assad 
regime against its people. However, both cases emphasise the solid link between the 
political act of recognition and the legal recognition of opposition groups as new 
governments. In other words, the level of political recognition granted in each case 






                                                 
11 See US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 12 December 2012, (n 1). 
12 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 230. 
13 See US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 12 December 2012, (n 1).  
14 Kelsen, (n 4), at 605.  
15 See US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 12 December 2012, (n 1). 
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3.2.2 The Different Levels of the Political Recognition of the Opposition Groups 
Though the international community reacted to the crises in Libya and Syria 
quite differently, states’ reactions to these two conflicts indicated a movement towards 
further recognising opposition groups for implementing the R2P. The treatments of 
both cases by a significant number of states have indicated the emergence of some 
general guidelines as to how opposition groups could be recognised politically.16   
The international reaction to the Libyan situation was unusually fast and 
effective from regional and international organisations. However, states’ prepositions 
as to the Libyan opposition groups have carefully developed from one stage to the 
next.17 At the early stage following the eruption of the conflict, states treated the matter 
with high degrees of caution. Such reluctance could be attributed to the uncertainty 
surrounding the situation on the ground, as clarified in chapter one. Consequently, the 
NTC was carefully recognised by a number of states ‘as a ‘legitimate and credible 
interlocutor’, ‘legitimate political interlocutor,’ or ‘valid interlocutor for the Libyan 
people’’.18 Furthermore, although the use of this new form of recognition may not have 
had any legal affects,19 it showed some signs of acceptance.20 Over time, and as some 
signs of stability and credibility began to emerge in favour of the opposition, states were 
willing to grant higher degrees of political recognition.21 At this stage, the NTC was 
recognised by some states as ‘the legitimate representative of the Libyan people’.22 
                                                 
16 See Obama Recognizes Syrian Opposition Group, (n 2); US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 
12 December 2012, (n 1).  
17 S. Talmon, ‘Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council’ (2011)  15 (16) American 
Society of International Law: Insight, available online at: 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/16/recognition-libyan-national-transitional-council. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 233.   
20 Talmon (2011), (n 17). 
21 Ibid.  




States reactions to the Syrian opposition have reflected higher degrees of 
reluctance and uncertainty, even from some regional organisations and neighbouring 
states.23 After the formation of the SOC,24 which replaced the SNC,25 the member states 
constituting the GCC26 unanimously issued an immediate statement recognising the 
SOC as ‘the legitimate representative of the brotherly Syrian people’.27 Unlike the 
GCC, the Arab League was unwilling to grant the SOC such a status of recognition. 
Even though the league, which had already suspended the membership of Syria,28 
welcomed the foundation of the new Syrian coalition, it was reluctant to recognise it as 
the representative of the Syrian people.29 Some member states were not ready to 
withdraw the political recognition from the Syrian government,30 and others doubted 
the effectiveness of the SOC.31 The Ministerial Council of the league  ‘‘urged regional 
and international organisations to recognise it as a legitimate representative for the 
aspirations of the Syrian people’, and called it  ‘a legitimate representative and a 
primary negotiator with the Arab League’’.32 
                                                 
23 See Arab League gives hesitant welcome to Syria opposition coalition, Ahram online, 13 November 
2012, available online at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/57939/World/Region/Arab-
League-gives-hesitant-welcome-to-Syria-opposi.aspx.  
24 The coalition was established after a formal agreement was signed Sunday evening in the Qatari 
capital of Doha by Moaz al- Khatib, the newly-elected head of the united entity, and George Sabra, the 
new head of major opposition group the Syrian National Council (SNC). See Six Gulf states recognize 
new Syrian opposition bloc, Channel, 13 November 2012, available online at: http://1tv.ge/news-
view/43916?lang=en.   
25 See Syria Crisis: Guide to Armed and Political Opposition, BBC News, 17 October 2013, available 
online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15798218.  
26 The GCC constitutes of six-member states; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, The United Arab Emirates, 
Oman, Qatar and Kuwait.   
27 In a statement made by the GCC chief Abdullatif al-Zayani. See Six Gulf states recognize new 
Syrian opposition bloc, Channel, 13 November 2012, available online at: http://1tv.ge/news-
view/43916?lang=en.  
28 See Syria suspended from Arab League, The Guardian, 12 November 2012, available online at:  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/14/syria-suspension-arab-league-assad-isolated.  
29 See Arab League gives hesitant welcome to Syria opposition coalition, (n 23).  
30 See Ibid.  
31 See Libya and Tunisia Come out Against Syrian Opposition, 24 November 2012, available online at: 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/2012/dgreenfield/libya-and-tunisia-come-out-against-syrian-
opposition/.  
32 Arab League gives hesitant welcome to Syria opposition coalition, (n 23). Arab League reaffirmed 
its recognition of the Syrian opposition as ‘the legitimate representative of the aspirations of the Syrian 
people’ during the meeting that held on November 2013 between Arab League and the SNC. See 
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The uncertainty regarding the most suitable status to grant the Syrian opposition 
groups was more obvious at the international level. States recognised the Syrian 
opposition in various ways. Besides being recognised as ‘the legitimate representative 
of the Syrian people’ or ‘the (sole/only) legitimate representative of the Syrian people’ 
by some states, such as France,33 Turkey,34 Italy,35 the UK36 and the USA at a late 
stage,37 the SOC was described by other states in distinct ways indicating different 
levels of political recognition.38 As argued by Talmon (2013), besides its recognition 
as ‘the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and the sole legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people’, the SOC was given at least four different statuses. 
For instance, the SOC has been categorised as 
(i) a legitimate representative for [of] the aspirations of the Syrian people; 
(ii) legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the Syrian people; 
(iii) a legitimate representative of the Syrian people; 
(iv) legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.39 
                                                 
Syrian National Coalition meets with Arab League, Daily News Egypt, 11 February 2013, available 
online at: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/11/syrian-national-coalition-meets-with-arab-
league/.     
33 See France recognises Syria opposition coalition, Aljazeera English, 14 November 2012, available 
online at:  http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/20121113174633204988.html.  
34 See Statement by Mr  Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of  Foreign Affairs of Turkey, at the 39th Session 
of the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers, Djibouti, 15 November 2012, available online at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-by-mr_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_--at-
the-39th-session-of-the-oic-council-of-foreign-m.en.mfa.     
35 See EU follows Italy’s move to recognize Syrian opposition coalition, RT QUESTION MORE, 19 
November 2012, available online at: http://rt.com/news/syria-opposition-eu-representative-099/.  
36 See UK: Syrian opposition ‘sole legitimate representative’ of  the people, The Guardian, 20 
November 2012, available online at:  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/20/uk-syrian-
opposition-sole-legitimate-representative-people.     
37 See Obama recognizes Syrian opposition coalition, (n 2). 
38 For ex.  The Nordic and Baltic countries accepted the SOC ‘as legitimate representatives of the 
Syrian people’. See Friends of  Syria meeting in Marrakech, 12 December 2012, Nordic-Baltic 
Intervention, available online at: http://www.mfa.is/media/mannrettindi/Syrland-yfirlysing-121212.pdf; 
also, The EU at an early stage, considered the SOC  as ‘the legitimate representatives of the aspirations 
of the Syrian people’. See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Syria, 3199th 
Foreign Affairs Council Meeting , Brussels, 19 November 2012, available online at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133598.pdf.    
39 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 227. 
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Furthermore, after conducting a brief linguistic analysis, Talmon (2013) 
suggested three possible ways to recognise an opposition group politically as 
‘representatives of a people during a civil war’.40 These are: 
(i) a representative/representatives of the aspirations of a people; 
(ii) a representative/representatives of a people; or 
(iii) the (sole) representative of a people.41 
Moreover, without ignoring the significance of the linguistic examination to 
distinguish between these statuses, state practice has further clarified the gradual 
relation between these stages of political recognition.42 In certain situations, states have 
used different statements to show their intention to move from one stage to another and 
grant opposition groups higher degrees of political recognition. These various phrases 
to imply different levels of recognition were gradually applied to the Syrian opposition. 
 For instance, the EU recognised the SOC as ‘the legitimate representatives of 
the aspirations of the Syrian people’43 at an early stage. The EU Council said, ‘The EU 
looks forward to this new coalition continuing to work for full inclusiveness, 
subscribing to the principles of human rights and democracy and engaging with all 
opposition groups and all sections of Syrian civil society’.44 Moreover, such a statement 
indicates the provisional nature of the recognition. As commented by Talmon (2013), 
the statement made by the EU Council suggests that ‘several EU member states still 
had strong reservations about the Opposition Coalition in terms of how representative 
it was and its democratic commitment’.45 
                                                 
40 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 228. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 12 December 2012, (n 1).  
43 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Syria, (n 38). 
44 Ibid.    
45 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 221. 
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Less than three weeks later, and after a meeting with the head of the SOC, the 
EU Council issued a new statement recognising the SOC ‘as legitimate representatives 
of the Syrian people’.46 Unlike the initial recognition mentioned above, the acceptance 
of the SOC by the EU ‘as legitimate representatives of the Syrian people’ was 
accompanied by a statement welcoming the recent efforts made by the coalition ‘to set 
up its structures and to become more operational and inclusive’.47 Nevertheless, the EU 
went on to add that it ‘encourages the Coalition to continue working on these goals and 
to remain committed to the respect of the principles of human rights, inclusivity, 
democracy and engaging with all opposition groups and all sections of Syrian civil 
society’.48 Therefore, even though such a statement suggests a higher degree of 
recognition when compared with the acceptance of the SOC as ‘the legitimate 
representatives of the aspirations of the Syrian people’,49 it does not intend to grant the 
SOC unconditional or complete political recognition. 
In another example, the US seemed to recognise the SOC in various capacities. 
The initial attempt to assess the status of the SOC took place in a press meeting at the 
US State Department.50 In his comment on the French move towards recognising the 
SOC as ‘the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people’, Spokesperson of the 
US State Department Mark C. Toner, after indicating some reservations, described the 
SOC as ‘a legitimate representative of the Syrian people’.51 Toner’s statements 
throughout the meeting not only indicated that the recognition of an opposition group 
as ‘the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people’ represents a high degree of 
                                                 









political recognition requiring the fulfillment of high standards, but also showed that 
the US was still unwilling to provide the SOC full political recognition.52 Though Mr 
Toner repeatedly expressed US support to the SOC, he also indicated some signs of 
uncertainty regarding the most suitable status for the Syrian opposition. On many 
occasions during the meeting, Toner stressed that the SOC must demonstrate clear signs 
of stability and credibility before a formal and final statement of recognition could be 
granted.53 However, almost four weeks later, the US preposition to the status of the 
SOC took a different turn. 
In an interview, the US President Barack Obama announced the US formal 
recognition of the SOC as ‘the legitimate representative of the Syrian people’.54 The 
statement did not only reflect the US intention to provide the SOC with a higher degree 
of political recognition but also pointed to a specific justification to grant the status. 
President Obama explicitly based the recognition of the SOC on the ground that the 
Syrian opposition ‘is … inclusive enough, is reflective and representative enough of 
the Syrian population’.55 
The state practices towards recognising the Libyan and Syrian opposition 
groups suggest that the political act of recognition can take various types. Although it 
is discretional and does not produce any legal consequences, each formula of political 
recognition seems to reflect different levels of support and acceptance. States’ attitudes 
towards the Libyan and Syrian cases indicate that the use of the expression ‘the 
legitimate representative of the people’ is a key element in recognition. It suggests a 
high, if not the highest, degree of political recognition.56 In fact, the recognition of an 
                                                 
52 See US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 13 November 2012, (n 50). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Obama Recognizes Syrian Opposition Group, (n 2). 
55 Ibid. 
56 See France recognises Syria opposition coalition, (n 33); US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 
12 December 2012, (n 1); Obama Recognizes Syrian Opposition Group, (n 2). 
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opposition group as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ was described as 
granting such a group full political recognition.57 
Unlike the international reaction to the Libyan case, state practices regarding 
the Syrian opposition reflected a much higher degree of uncertainty and hesitation.58 
The absence of a common agreement whether to grant the SOC such a status among 
states seems to be a fundamental factor delaying the legal recognition. Therefore, it is 
essential for the purpose of this section to determine why the states’ reactions were 
different towards recognising the Libyan and Syrian oppositions. In the next subtitle, 
the recognition of an opposition group as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ 
is discussed. The aim is to determine the differences between the Libyan and Syrian 
cases that led to different outcomes. 
 
3.2.3 The Recognition of an Opposition Group as the Legitimate Representative 
of the People: Potential Requirements and Consequences 
Though state practice has shown that the recognition of an opposition group as 
‘the legitimate representative of the people’ is highly important, it is still a purely 
political act. However, although the use of the expression to describe opposition groups 
fighting against the de jure government has no legal consequences, it is not without 
impact. Such recognition, although political, indicates significant changes in a 
situation.59 These changes are related to the political status of the official government 
as well as the opposition group. 
                                                 
57 See ‘Friends of Syria’ recognise opposition, Middle East- Aljazeera English, 12 December 2012, 
available online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/201212124541767116.html.  
58 See for ex. US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 13 November 2012, (n 50). 
59 See J. V. Essen, ‘De Facto Regimes in International Law’ (2012) 28 (74) Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 32, at 42-45. 
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 State governments are primarily the representatives of the people in the eye of 
international law.60 Hence, the recognition of the opposition from such a perspective 
could be a sign that the functioning government has already lost its legitimacy, and that 
a new representative of the people should be selected; that is, the recognition of an 
opposition group as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ suggests that no other 
legitimate representative exists at that time.61 It is noteworthy that the concept of  
illegitimacy is enfolded with a high degree of uncertainty. As argued by Arend and 
Beck, ‘no international consensus [has emerged yet] as to what constitutes an 
‘illegitimate’ regime’.62 Nevertheless, the ambiguity surrounding what an ‘illegitimate 
government’ means seems to decrease after the adoption of the R2P. As asserted by 
Talmon, states’ reactions towards the Libyan and Syrian conflicts indicate the 
emergence of an international consensus ‘that governments which [sic] use excessive 
force against their own population to secure their position lose their legitimacy and 
must or should go’.63 
As to the Libyan case, at the regional level, the OIC, the Arab League and the 
African Peace and Security Council strongly condemned Qaddafi’s reactions to the 
protest. The Arab League went even further and suspended Libya’s membership in the 
organisation.64 Moreover, in an extraordinary session, the Council of the Arab League 
emphasised the necessity ‘to provide the Libyan people with urgent and continuing 
                                                 
60 See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1947), at 87. 
61 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 238. 
62 A. C. Arend & R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the Charter Paradigm 
(Routledge, Oxon, 1993), at 193. 
63 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 238. 
64 See A. Hehir, ‘Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’, in A. Hehir & R. Murray 
(eds.), Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the future of Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK, 2013), at 4. 
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support, as well as the necessary protection from the serious violations and grave crimes 
committed by the Libyan authorities, which have consequently lost their legitimacy’.65 
At the international level, further statements condemned the attitude of 
Gaddafi’s regime. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Special 
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Advisor on the Responsibility 
to Protect all issued statements emphasising the need to protect the Libyan population.66 
Moreover, upon a request submitted by the UN Human Rights Council, in an 
unprecedented turn of events, the UNGA unanimously suspended the membership of 
Libya on March 1, 2011.67 Furthermore, in an open statement condemning the extreme 
violations committed by Gaddafi’s regime, US President Barack Obama affirmed that 
Gaddafi ‘has lost legitimacy with his people’.68 Almost a week later, the European 
Council, after strongly condemning the violent repression committed by the Libyan 
authorities against their people ‘and the gross and systematic violation of human rights’, 
declared that the Libyan regime lost all legitimacy.69 
In relation to the Syrian situation, the Arab League condemned the grave 
violations committed by the Syrian regime against its people, and decided to suspend 
the membership of Syria at the organisation.70 The OIC, at its fourth extraordinary 
                                                 
65 League of Arab States, Council Resolution 7360, The Outcome of the Council of the League of  
Arab States Meeting at the Ministerial Level in its Extraordinary Session on The Implications of the 
Current Events in Libya and Arab Position, 12 March 2011, Submitted to President of the UN Security 
Council as S/2011/137, available online at:  
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/libya/Libya_19_Outcome_Le
ague_of_Arab_States_Meeting.pdf.  
66 A. J. Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm’ (2011) Ethics 
& International Affairs 1; G. Evans, Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes: The RtoP Balance Sheet After 
Libya (2011), at 2, available online at: http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech443.html.  
67 See Hehir, (n 64), at 4. 
68 Obama: Qaddafi has lost legitimacy with his people, CBS News, 3 of March 2011, available online 
at: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-qaddafi-has-lost-legitimacy-and-must-leave/.  
69 Extraordinary European Council, Declaration on Developments in Libya and the Southern 
Neighbourhood Region, 11 March 2011, Council Doc. EUCO 7/1/11, available online at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-11-2_en.htm.     
70 See Syria suspended from Arab League, The Guardian, 12 November 2012, available online at:  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/14/syria-suspension-arab-league-assad-isolated.   
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summit, suspended Syria’s membership.71 At the international level, High 
Representative Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the EU, clearly stated that the EU noted 
‘the complete loss of Bashar al-Assad’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people and 
the necessity for him to step aside’.72 The White House issued a statement affirming 
that ‘neither the international community nor the Syrian people accept’ the legitimacy 
of the Assad’s regime.73 In his remark to the UNGA on the situation in Syria, the 
UNSG, Ban-Ki-moon affirmed that ‘it has been evident that President Assad and his 
government have lost all legitimacy’.74 Based on these observations, it could be asserted 
that the official government’s loss of  legitimacy (a potential prerequisite for the 
recognition of an opposition group as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’) is 
satisfied in both cases. 
Nonetheless, it ought to be clarified that although such an action represents a 
new movement towards founding the legitimacy of governments on the concept of 
population protection, the action has no legal power.75 The legitimacy of governments 
concerns the political rather than legal status of governments. Therefore, as a matter of 
international law, illegitimate governments are still recognised functioning 
governments.76 
                                                 
71 See the Organization of  Islamic Cooperation Suspended the Membership of Syria at the 
Extraordinary Summit, Republic of Turkey- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-organization-of-islamic-cooperation-suspended-the-membership-of-syria-at-
the-extraordinary-summit.en.mfa.   
72 See Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the EU on EU action following 
the escalation of violent repression in Syria, Aljazeera Blogs, 18 August 2011, available online at: 
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73 Statement by the Press Secretary on Syria, Office of the Press Secretary- The White House, 21 
December 2011, available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/12/21/statement-press-secretary-syria.   
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With regard to the status of opposition groups, it is useful to recall the statement 
made by US President Obama after recognising the SOC as ‘the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people’. He said that the SOC ‘is now inclusive enough, is 
reflective and representative enough of the Syrian population’.77 That is, for an 
opposition group to gain recognition as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ 
there should be some indications that the opposition has already achieved a certain level 
of representativeness. Talmon (2013) asserted that the representativeness of the 
opposition ‘refers to the qualitative diversity of the represented sections or segments of 
society’.78 Being representative enough for recognition as ‘the legitimate representative 
of the people’ may require the opposition group to be inclusive ethnically and 
geographically. It may also require that both men and women be represented.79 
The recognition of the opposition as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ 
may be contingent on the achievement of a reasonable degree of permanency. The 
requirement of permanency as a basis of political recognition indicates the importance 
of achieving ‘certain political, organisational and institutional structure, both of the 
group’s leadership and on the ground’.80 It is noteworthy that, although there seems to 
be growing consensus on these requirements, states still enjoy high degrees of 
discretion in interpreting exactly what is meant by ‘representativeness’ and 
‘permanency’ for the purpose of recognising opposition groups.81 Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
77 Obama Recognizes Syrian Opposition Group, (n 2). 
78 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 240. 
79 See US State Department, Daily Press Briefing, 8 November 2012, available online at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/11/200347.htm#SYRIA.  
80 Talmon (2013), (n 5), at 241. 
81 For example, although the US and other states recognized the SOC in the ground that it was 
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inclusiveness. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird said Canada ‘still has some concerns 
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implementation of these two measures over the Libyan and Syrian oppositions could 
help to spot the differences between these two cases. 
In the Libyan case, the issues concerning the representativeness and 
permanency of the Libyan opposition groups are less complicated. As mentioned 
previously, after the protests spread across Libya and the number of army and security 
officers who decided to join the opposition groups increased,82 the Libyan opposition 
groups began to act as loosely organised armed groups.83 In response to the speedy 
progress on the ground, the opposition founded the NTC in Benghazi as a new 
transitional government with the primary objective of overthrowing the Qaddafi 
regime.84 
After the establishment of the transitional government, the opposition was able 
to control more major cities in the eastern side of the country.85 At this stage, the NTC 
was not only considered to be exercising effective control over large areas of Libya but 
it also declared its intention to become the recognised government of the country. It 
was clear that, after the foundation of the NTC, the Libyan opposition was able to back 
its organised armed groups fighting on the ground with a significant degree of political 
capacity.86 It was also proven that the opposition was exercising territorial control over 
significant parts of the country.87 Therefore, it is obvious that the Libyan opposition 
enjoyed the high degrees of political, organisational and institutional structure 
necessary to satisfy the requirement of permanency. Even though the ethnical, religious 
and geographical simplicity of the Libyan situation made the representativeness of the 
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opposition less complex, the representation of the oppositions by some well-regarded 
Libyan diplomats at the international level was a key element. It was argued that such 
a representation provided the Libyan oppositions with great international stability and 
credibility.88 
 Aside from those who decided to resign or join the opposition, other diplomats 
chose to take roles more active in the Libyan situation.89 For example, Ibrahim 
Dabbashi, Libya’s deputy ambassador at the UN, called for ‘Qaddafi to step down as 
the country’s ruler’, and if he refused, Dabbashi claimed that, ‘the Libyan people… 
[would] get rid of him’.90 He also referred to UN Libyan diplomats as representatives 
of the Libyan people rather than the government.91 On the same day, Mr Shalgham, the 
Libyan representative at the UNSC, described the situation in Libya as ‘very 
dangerous’.92 He went on to add, ‘Libyans are asking for democracy; they are asking 
for progress; they are asking for freedom; and they are asking for their rights’.93 Mr 
Shalgham ended his speech with an appeal: ‘Please, United Nations, save Libya. No to 
bloodshed. No to the killing of innocents. We want a swift, decisive and courageous 
resolution’.94 
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The significance of the preposition adopted by the Libyan representative can be 
deduced from statements made by states during the UNSC debates.95 Many states 
referred to the representation of the Libyan peoples by the Libyan diplomat as a key 
element in facilitating the adoption of the UNSC resolutions.96 India, Nigeria and Brazil 
described his speech as persuasive.97 South Africa and France welcomed the UNSC 
response to the requests made by the Libyan representative.98 
The issues related to the representativeness and permanency of the Syrian 
opposition groups reflect a higher degree of uncertainty and complexity. As to the 
element of representativeness, it is highly doubtful that the SOC represents all religious 
and ethnic groups in the country.99 As observed by the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry established by the UN Human Rights Council, although the vast 
majority of the Sunni community supported the Syrian opposition, other minorities 
constituting important parts of the Syrian population remained in favour of the Syrian 
regime.100 Some of these pro-government minorities were targets of attacks carried out 
by armed groups belonging to the Syrian oppositions.101  
In addition to the majority of Sunnis who supported the oppositions and the 
other minorities who remained under the authority of the regime, the Kurds remained 
independent.102 In accordance with the commission, the Kurds ‘have clashed with 
                                                 
95 See UNSC Verbatim Record (25 February 2011) UN Doc S/pv/6491,7, available online at:  
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government forces and anti-government armed groups over control of territory’.103 In 
fact, the SOC itself declared that it only represented ‘80 percent of all opponents’.104 In 
other words, in accordance with the SOC statement, 20 percent of the opponents did 
not accept the representativeness of the Syrian opposition groups. 
In addition to the lack of sufficient political acceptance, some fighting groups 
on the ground challenged the representation of the SOC.105 Furthermore, the rejection 
of the leadership of the SOC by some fighting groups not only weakened the level of 
representativeness enjoyed by the SOC but also affected its permanence and stability. 
In a statement read out loud by the political leader of Liwa al-Tawhid, eleven Islamist 
armed groups explicitly refused the authority of the SOC as a representative of the 
opposition ‘and [called] for the opposition to unite under an ‘Islamic framework’’.106 
 Almost two months later, the main Islamist armed groups in Alepoo, Al-Nusra 
Front and Liwa Al-Tawhid, reaffirmed the rejection of the leadership of the SOC and 
declared their intention to found an Islamic state in the Syrian territory.107 The stability 
of the SOC was further impacted by the eruption of some armed clashes between ISIS, 
an offshoot of al-Qaeda, and some moderate armed forces.108 Therefore, although 
illegitimacy of the Syrian regime could be established to allow recognition of the SOC 
as ‘the legitimate representative of the Syrian people’, the level of representativeness 
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and permanency exercised by the SOC is problematic.  Even though the uncertainty as 
to whether the SOC satisfied the requirements of representativeness and permanency 
could be attributed to the absence of clear standards determining what is meant by each 
element, the representativeness and permanency enjoyed by the Syrian opposition are 
still unclear when they are compared to those exercised by the Libyan opposition. 
Even though the Libyan and Syrian cases led to different outcomes, they both 
indicated the emergence of some general guidelines as to how and when opposition 
groups are recognised by states. It is noteworthy that, although the recognition of the 
opposition as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ has no legal impacts, it can 
still provide the recognised entity with some advantages. In accordance with Talmon 
(2011): 
(1) It legitimizes the struggle of the group against the incumbent government; (2) it 
provides international acceptance; (3) it allows the group to speak for the people in 
international organisations and represent it in other states by opening ‘representative 
offices’; and (4) it usually results in financial aid.109 
It is also witnessed from the Libyan and Syrian cases that a high level of political 
recognition may facilitate the legal recognition of the opposition. It could be considered 
as an initial stage required to ensure the stability and credibility of these groups before 
they could be granted certain rights and obligations. Hence, in the next section, the legal 
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3.3 The Legal Recognition of Opposition Groups After the Adoption of the 
Concept of the R2P  
 In this section, the legal recognition of the political structure of the opposition 
groups is discussed. In order to do so, the section is divided into three parts. First, the 
legal act of recognition is defined. Second, the potential link between the recognition 
of the political structure of the opposition group as the legitimate representative of the 
people and the right to self-determination is evaluated. Third, the extent to which the 
recognition of these entities as the legitimate representative of the people could 
facilitate their legal recognition as new governments is examined.  
 
3.3.1 The Legal Act of Recognition 
As clarified by Lauterpacht, the act of recognition can refer to ‘recognition as 
governed by law’ or ‘recognition as determined by decisive considerations of national 
interests’.110 The legal act of recognition is the foundation of a fact rather than ‘the 
expression of a will’.111 It is based on the idea that international law cannot ignore the 
emergence of new facts as long as they do not violate any international legal 
principles.112 Therefore, unlike the political act of recognition, which is discussed 
above, legal recognition creates a legal status comprising rights and obligations under 
international law.113 
As outlined in the previous chapter, an opposition group is party to an internal 
armed conflict and can therefore gain a legal status under contemporary international 
law. Based on its capacity, an opposition group can be granted the status of belligerency 
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or insurgency.114 After the adoption of the concept of the R2P, it was indicated that an 
opposition group could gain a higher degree of legal recognition at the international 
level. State practice suggested that an opposition group could be recognised by states 
as ‘the legitimate representative of a people’. As asserted in the previous section, it is 
the prevailing view that the recognition of the Libyan and Syrian opposition groups as 
the legitimate representative of the peoples is intended to have political effects.115 
Nevertheless, there has been some indications that such recognition may have, or at 
least lead to, some legal consequences.  
On the one hand, the same expression has been used previously to refer to a 
NLMs.116 In these situations, the expression ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ 
refers to ‘organised groups fighting on behalf of a whole ‘‘people’’ against colonial 
powers’117 rather than an opposition group fighting against the de jure government. It 
is well established that the NLMs are provided with international status, which allows 
them to achieve their political objectives.118 They have distinct legal personalities 
producing certain rights and obligations.119 Therefore, the categorization of any NLMs 
as ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ is legal rather than political recognition.  
Nevertheless, it was argued that the use of the term ‘the representative of the 
people’ to refer to the cases discussed in the previous section, and in particular the 
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Syrian opposition, suggests the emergence of a certain link between the utilisation of 
this expression and the right to self-determination.120 
On the other hand, in a few cases, the implementations of the expression ‘the 
legitimate representative of a people’ as an advance form of political recognition were 
accompanied by references to the abilities of the oppositions to establish new 
governments.121 For instance, in an official statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Slovenia affirmed that recognising the legitimacy of the NTC as a 
representative of the Libyan people ‘strengthened its internal political position’ in a 
manner that might facilitate the establishment of a new government.122 In another 
example, France recognised the SOC as ‘the only legitimate representative of the Syrian 
People and thus as the future provisional government of a democratic Syria’.123 Hence, 
these two potential legal status will be evaluated in this section. 
 
3.3.2 The Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of 
the People and the Right of Self-Determination 
 
3.3.2.1 The Foundation of the Principle of Self-Determination and its Primary 
Objectives: The Right to Self-Determination against Colonialism and 
Occupation 
The right of people to rule themselves was one of the primary objectives of 
the new international legal system.124 It was considered a fundamental requirement 
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for international peace and security and was seen as important for the emergence of 
the new community of nations.125 The right to self-determination was indicated in 
Article 1 of the UN Charter. It was also referred to in various UNGA resolutions. 
The first reference to the principle of self-determination by the UNGA was 
made in resolution 421 D (V) of 1950, which was adopted mainly to receive 
recommendations from the Commission on Human Rights concerning the right to 
self-determination.126 Nearly two years later, the UNGA made further efforts to 
articulate the principle of self-determination under contemporary international law 
in resolution 545 (VI) intending to further clarify the significance of such a right for 
international peace and security.127 In 1960, the UNGA adopted the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (declaration 1514 
(XV)) affirming that colonialism constitutes a threat to international peace. The 
Declaration emphasised the importance of ending colonialism and supporting the 
right of all peoples ‘to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the 
integrity of their national territory’. 
As to the scope and nature of the right to self-determination as formed under the 
UN System, it is well established, as explicitly affirmed in the official documents 
outlined above, that the right to self-determination was primarily meant to be exercised 
against colonial domination, occupation and racist regimes.128 In fact, even if one of 
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these situations existed, that besides being concerned with the right to self-governance, 
the right to self-determination would pay significant attention to the importance of 
providing the newly independent states with a certain degree of internal stability.129  
Resolution 1514 (XV), under Article 6, made clear reference to the principle of 
the territorial integrity of newly independent states as a condition of the legitimate 
exercise of such a right. It literally stated: ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.130 Mills points 
out that this article ‘provided the state-centric foundation for...the resistance to applying 
self-determination beyond colonial territories’.131 It imposed an obligation upon those 
who were entitled to rely on the principle of self-determination to limit their exercise 
of self-determination to the borders previously established by colonialism. The 
limitation of the scope of self-determination to the situation of anti-colonialism was 
also stated under the Declaration on Principles of International Law.132 
The Declaration explicitly confirmed that the right to self-determination ought 
not to ‘be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent states’.133 It was asserted that the inclusion of this statement in the 
resolution reflects the intention of the international community to constitute ‘a social 
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and legal system that is relatively stable’.134 Moreover, in a community constituted 
primarily of states, the achievement of such stability requires the preservation of the 
territorial boundaries of newly independent states. In fact, the strong connection 
between the principle of internal stability and the legitimate application of self-
determination has led some commentators to assert that when ‘a territory [is] 
decolonised the right to self-determination ends and territorial integrity reigns 
supreme’.135  
Further, the willingness to provide decolonised states with a certain degree of 
internal stability also impacted how the word ‘peoples’ was defined under 
contemporary international law.136 It was contended that the efforts to preserve the 
borders of newly independent states, as defined by colonies, and the efforts to prevent 
any potential attempt for further modification of these borders, led to the identification 
of those who are entitled to claim the right to self-determination unprecedentedly. It 
was noted that, in the early stages following the articulation of the principle of self-
determination, the right emerging from the principle of self-determination was given to 
all peoples ‘living within the borders of a former colonial entity’, regardless of their 
ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds.137 During the discussions that took place in 
the third committee concerning the draft of Article 1 of the covenants, few comments 
were made regarding the suggested meaning of the word peoples.138 
It is clear that there has been an attempt to define the word peoples in a manner 
that strengthens the stability in newly formed states. As argued by some delegates, the 
                                                 
134 R. McCorquodal, ‘Human Rights and Self-determination’ in M Sellers, The New World Order: 
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the Self-Determination of Peoples (Berg, Oxford, 1996) 9, at 19. 
135 Mills, (n 131), at 70. 
136 Ibid, at 44. 
137 Ibid. 
138 See Official Records of the General Assembly, sixth Session, Third Committee, 366th meeting, at 
para. 25, 29, 397th meeting, at para. 5 & 399th meeting, at para. 5.  
169 
 
word peoples, as included in the UN Charter, was intended to be used to refer to the 
right of communities to freely ‘choose their own form of government’.139 It was 
emphasised that the concept of peoples, as employed in the principle of self-
determination, ought to be understood to mean ‘the multiplicity of human beings 
constituting a nation, or the aggregate of the various national groups governed by a 
single authority’.140 It is noteworthy that even though linking the meaning of peoples 
to the territories in which they lived before the decolonisation process is an effective 
way to enhance the territorial integrity of newly independent states, it may increase the 
potential abuse of the principle of self-determination.141 In other words, it was asserted 
that the complete focus on territorial integrity may lead to an indirect transformation of 
the rights emerging from the principle of self-determination from peoples to 
governments.142 In fact, as noted by Jackson, defining peoples in such a way could 
modify the nature of the right to self-determination. It would change the nature of such 
a right from being a basic human right to be a sovereign right.143 
Therefore, it is obvious that the restrictive general principles regulating self-
determination as initially formed under the UN Charter System do not apply to the 
Libyan and Syrian peoples. Despite the fact that the Libyan and Syrian regimes could 
be considered dictatorships, they are not considered colonial or occupation powers. 
Nevertheless, such a contention ought not to be taken as affirmative statement to deny 
any possibility that the Libyan and Syrian Peoples may rely on the right to self-
determination against their own governments. In fact, the recognition of the Libyan and 
Syrian oppositions as the legitimate representatives of the concerned peoples indicates 
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some similarity with the status previously granted to NLMs for the purpose of 
exercising the right to self-determination. Thus, it seems to be essential to consider such 
a possibility for the Libyan and Syrian oppositions.      
 
3.3.2.2 The Right to Self-determination and the Recognition of NLMs as 
Representatives of Peoples: The status of NLMs and the Recognition of the Libyan 
and Syrian Oppositions as the Representatives of the Peoples  
Even though the right to self-determination is granted to peoples, the right to 
self-determination ought to be practically exercised by a legally recognised 
structure.144 In other words, although the right is primarily given to people, those 
people are required to gather under an internationally recognised structure that is 
qualified to obtain a specific legal personality necessary to exercise the rights and 
obligations emanating from the principle of self-determination.145 International law 
grants the right to people to govern themselves by recognising a qualified entity as 
the ultimate representative of those people. In state practice, the recognition of 
NLMs as the legitimate representatives of the peoples has been considered as 
evidence to grant the concerned people the right to self-determination. More 
specifically, the phrase ‘the representative of people’ has been implemented to 
suggest the emergence of a link between the concerned entity and the right to self-
determination.146  
The UNGA, on various occasions, recognised NLMs as the legitimate 
representatives of peoples to indicate that these groups are legally qualified under 
international law to act on behalf of the concerned people in relation to their rights to 
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self-determination.147 The approach of the UNGA was apparent, for instance, in relation 
to the PLO,148 the African National Congress in South Africa,149 the South West Africa 
People’s Organization in Namibia150 and the African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea and Cape Verde in Guinea Bissau.151  
The link between considering a group as the legitimate representative of the 
people and the right to self-determination was, in particular, apparent in relation to the 
PLO. The UNGA (under paragraph 23 of resolution 37/43 of 1982) explicitly urged ‘all 
States, competent organizations of the United Nations system, specialized agencies and 
other international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people 
through its sole and legitimate representative, the [PLO], in its struggle to regain its 
right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’.152 As consequence of such recognition, the PLO, as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, was entitled to enter into various legal 
agreements with the occupied power, Israel.153 
In the Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip of 28 September 1995,154 mutual recognition was made by both parties. The 
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agreement includes various references to the rights of the Palestinian people to govern 
themselves through a recognised structure.155 Moreover, as affirmed by the ICJ in its 
Advisory Opinion as to the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, these multiple references embodied in the agreement 
indicate the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.156 
The court generally stated that the emergence of the Palestinian people for the purpose 
of implementing the right to self-determination is definite.157 
Furthermore, as argued by the ICJ, such recognition was apparent in the 
exchange of letters of 9 September 1993 between the representatives of the PLO and 
the Israeli government.158 In fact, the recognition of the PLO as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people was explicitly affirmed by the Prime Minister 
of Israel in an official speech concerning the peace agreements signed with the PLO.159 
As Talmon asserted, such recognition ‘was considered by Israel to be a prerequisite for 
the conclusion of these agreements with the Palestinians and constituted legal 
recognition of the PLO’.160 
It is noteworthy to mention that when the right to self-determination is 
recognized, certain legal consequences emerge.161 These consequences have direct 
impacts on the rules regulating armed conflicts. As asserted in the previous chapter, 
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when internal armed conflicts erupted, third state would be under an obligation, 
emanating from the prohibition on the use of force and the principles of non-
intervention, not to provide assistance, in particular, to the opposition groups.162 
Nevertheless, the principle of non-intervention, as well as the prohibition on the use of 
force, would be applied differently when the right of external self-determination is 
granted. Those people, as represented by their recognized legal structure, would be 
entitled to receive international assistance and support.163  
In resolution 2625 (XXV), or the Declaration on the Principles of International 
Law, adopted in 1970,164 considered by the ICJ as customary law, by virtue of the 
consensus,165 it was clearly stated that ‘peoples are entitled to seek and to receive 
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter’.166 Also, under 
resolution 2621 (XXV), passed in 1970, the UNGA requested all its members to ‘render 
all necessary moral and material assistance to the peoples of colonial territories in their 
struggle to attain freedom and independence’.167 Nevertheless, although resolutions 
2625 (XXV) and 2621 (XXV) admitted the right of these recognised legal structures as 
the legitimate representatives of the peoples to be internationally supported, these 
resolutions did not decisively clarify the legitimate boundaries of such assistance.168 
Particularly, it was left unclear whether such assistance could justify military 
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support.169 Nevertheless, the uncertainty as to what such support could include was 
notably decreased in the subsequent resolutions. 
In resolution 3070 (XXVIII), adopted in 1973, the UNGA recognised the right 
of peoples to rely on ‘all available means, including armed struggle’,170 and 
commanded all member states ‘to offer moral, material and any other assistance to all 
peoples struggling for the full exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination 
and independence’.171 Furthermore, the scope of the assistance that could be provided 
to NLMs as the legitimate representatives of the peoples in regard to their right to self-
determination was further clarified in the resolution concerning the situation in Namibia 
mentioned earlier.172 In resolution 35/227, passed in 1980, the UNGA explicitly called 
for ‘increased and sustained support and material, financial, military and other 
assistance…’.173 
The recognition of a legal structure as the legitimate representative of the 
peoples fighting for their right to self-determination also has significant impact on the 
law regulating armed conflicts. Despite the absence of any support from most western 
states,174 the UNGA adopted resolution 3103 (XXVIII) clarifying the status of armed 
conflict involving NLMs.175 This resolution considered armed struggles carried out in 
accordance with the right to self-determination against ‘colonial and alien domination’ 
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to be of international status.176 Furthermore, such a contention was affirmed and it 
gained the status of a hard law after the adoption of the additional Protocols to the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 1977. The types of armed conflicts exercised in 
conformity with the right of self-determination against ‘colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes’ were included under the First additional Protocol 
regulating international armed conflicts, and not the second Additional Protocol 
concerning internal armed conflicts.177 
Hence, it is obvious that the categorisation of NLMs as the legitimate 
representatives of the peoples for the purpose of exercising the right to self-
determination is legal recognition. It provides the recognised structure with a legal 
personality. The armed struggle undertaken in conformity with the right to self-
determination would be considered as an international armed conflict as affirmed under 
Article 1 (4) of the first Additional Protocol. The recognition of a structure as the 
legitimate representative of a people entitles such a structure to receive various types 
of support, including military assistance. In other words, as long as an entity is 
recognised as the legitimate representative of a people, in accordance with the 
principles discussed above, a third state would be able to provide support without 
violating the principles on the prohibition on the use of force and non-intervention.  
With regard to the Libyan and Syrian situations, as clarified in the previous 
section, many states used the phrase ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ to 
describe the political structures of these groups. As clarified above, if such a status was 
applied to suggest the entitlement of the Libyan and Syrian people to the right of self-
determination, significant legal impacts would emerge as to the legal framework 
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regulating these armed conflicts. It would reduce the restrictions imposed by the 
principles on the use of force and non-intervention as to the potential role of third state 
concerning these conflicts. The legitimate representatives of the Libyan and Syrian 
peoples would be entitled to receive international support, including military assistance. 
Nevertheless, the mere use of the term ‘the legitimate representative of the concerned 
people’ is not sufficient in itself to assert the existence of such a status. In fact, in order 
to determine whether such status given to these groups was intended to suggest the 
entitlement of these groups to exercise the right to self-determination on behalf of their 
peoples, the intention of the recognising states must be examined.  
As to whether state practice towards the Libyan and Syrian oppositions 
indicated the emergence of a new trend supporting such a right within the context of 
the R2P, it can be generally argued that the mere use of an expression may not be 
sufficient to reflect the intention behind its implementation. Usually, it would be 
essential to examine the actual intention behind applying a certain description or 
advancing a statement. In regard to the Libyan and Syrian situations, many powerful 
western states such as the US, the UK and France were among the states recognising 
the Libyan and Syrian oppositions as the legitimate representatives of their peoples. 
During the process of articulating the right to self-determination under the UN System, 
there were various indications that these states were not willing to recognise such a 
right as it was proposed by the UNGA.178 Most western states faced the efforts made 
by Socialist and Third World bloc states to advance a resolution recognising further 
rights for peoples fighting for their self-determination. For instance, in 1973, during the 
                                                 
178 Roth, (n 169), at 215. 
177 
 
process of drafting resolution 3103 (XXVIII), it was witnessed that many western states 
were opposed to the project, or at least abstained from attending the meetings.179 
More specifically, state practice also suggested that many states recognising the 
Libyan and Syrian oppositions as the legitimate representatives of their peoples had 
rejected the implementation of such an expression to indicate any legal status for the 
recognised entity in the past.180 For example, although UNGA resolution 35/227, 
passed in 1981, recognised the South West Africa People’s Organization as ‘the sole 
and authentic representative of the Namibian people’,181 many western states were 
unwilling to grant such a status. The representative of the UK, in a statement that also 
reflected the point of view of other states such as Canada, West Germany, France and 
the US, explicitly refused any type of violence from any party to the Namibian conflict. 
It was also affirmed that ‘it is only through negotiations that Namibia can begin its life 
as a truly independent sovereign State’, and that ‘the people of Namibia have the right 
to choose their own Government through free and fair elections’.182 
In addition, as clarified in the previous section, many states recognising the 
Libyan and the Syrian oppositions as the legitimate representatives of their peoples 
explicitly affirmed that such recognition is of a purely political nature.183  It was 
indicated that such recognition was neither intended to provide these entities with an 
internationally legal personality nor to produce legal rights and obligations. Hence, 
although the Libyan and Syrian oppositions were recognised in a similar way to that 
granted previously to NLMs, it did not intend to produce the same legal consequences. 
However, even though the recognition of the Libyan and Syrian oppositions as the 
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legitimate representatives of the concerned peoples is not sufficient in itself to establish 
a link with the right to self-determination, this ought not to fully deny such a possibility.  
 
3.3.2.3 Self-Determination as a Human Right and the Concept of Representative 
Government: To What Extent Do the Syrian People Have a Right to Self-
Determination within the Context of the R2P against their Government? 
One of the primary objectives behind the adoption of UNGA resolution 545 
(VI), one of the earliest UNGA resolutions concerning the articulation of the right to 
self-determination, was to enhance the efforts to include an explicit reference to the 
right ‘of all people and nations to self-determination’ in a future international 
convention.184 In response, the two international covenants on human rights, the 
ICCPR185 and the ICESCR,186 included a direct reference to the right to self-
determination in the first article of each covenant. Article 1 of both covenants clearly 
states: ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political statues and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development’.187 
It is noteworthy that during the discussion in the third committee of the UNGA 
concerning the draft of this Article, many objections were submitted as to the nature 
and scope of such a right.188 Furthermore, one of these objections was based on the 
assertion that self-determination is a collective right rather than an individual right.189 
                                                 
184 UNGA Resolution 545 (VI), (n 127), at para. 1. 
185 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html.  
186 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, available online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html.  
187 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (n 185), at Art. 1; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (n 186), at Art. 1. 




Therefore, it ought not to be included in a treaty concerned with the regulation of 
individuals’ human rights. Nevertheless, such an argument was countered on the 
grounds that, even though self-determination is a collective right, its recognition is 
undoubtedly essential for the enjoyment of other individual human rights.190 In other 
words, it was argued that, although the right to self-determination is ‘the right of a group 
of individuals in association, it [is] certainly the prerogative of a community, but the 
community itself consisted of individuals and any encroachment on its collective right 
would be tantamount to a breach of their fundamental freedoms’.191 
It was also asserted that the right to self-determination was indicated in Article 
2 (1) of the UDHR, which ‘guarantee[s] human rights and freedoms to all without 
distinction of any kind’.192 It was further contended that the inclusion of the right to 
self-determination in the Universal Declaration could easily be spotted in numerous 
articles.193 Hence, in order to ensure consistency with the UDHR, the right to self-
determination ought to be included in the covenants.194 In other words, it was argued 
that since the right to self-determination is considered ‘a basic human right’,195 the 
absence of an explicit reference to it would deem the covenant incomplete.196  
In fact, it was asserted that even though the covenants are concerned with 
individual human rights, they already include references to some collective rights, such 
as ‘the right to freedom of association’,197 which makes the reference to the right to 
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self-determination is consistent with the structure of the Covenants. Thus, the inclusion 
of the right to self-determination in these conventions does not only affirm the human 
rights nature of this right, but also it reflects its permanency. Nevertheless, the scope of 
such a right to self-determination is not unlimited. 
It is argued that contemporary international law, as a general rule, recognises 
the government of the state as the only representative of the people.198 In other words, 
as long as peoples exercised their self-determination, and gained their independence, 
they would not have any separate rights or obligations under international law from the 
rights and obligations granted to their governments.199 As Talmon (2013) asserted, the 
people would be ‘‘mediatized’ by the State, i.e. the people as a legal person has been 
subsumed into the State’.200 Therefore, although the right to self-determination is 
granted to the people, it ought to be exercised by their governments.201 The right of a 
people to freely decide its political, economic, social and cultural systems would be, 
primarily, claimed by the state itself against any external interference.202 Accordingly, 
a single people would not be granted a right to self-determination against its own 
government. As a consequence, international law would not legally recognise any other 
entity claiming to be ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ in their exercise of 
the right to self-determination against the de jure government. Nevertheless, although 
such a contention represents the general rule under contemporary international law, 
some exceptions may exist under certain circumstances.203 
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As clarified previously, the implementation of the right to self-determination is 
restricted by other principles, one of which is the principle of territorial integrity. The 
balance between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity was affirmed in 
UNGA resolutions. For instance, the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
explicitly confirmed that the right to self-determination ought not to ‘be construed as 
authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states’.204 
Nevertheless, unlike other UNGA resolutions passed previously, the Declaration, under 
paragraph 7 as mentioned above, went further to adopt a unique approach. The 
Declaration seems to condition the preservation of the territorial integrity of states in 
conformity with the principle of equal rights and self-determination.205 Furthermore, 
the Resolution considered the possession ‘of a government representing the whole 
people of the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour’ as a measure to 
determine the compatibility of states with the principle of self-determination.206 As 
Pentassuglia contended the formula adopted in paragraph 7 seems to ‘implicitly 
suggests a link between territorial integrity and the existence of a ‘government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour’’.207  
Noteworthy to mention is that the inclusion of the phrase ‘without distinction 
as to race, creed or colour’ has been argued to have a minimal legal impact.208 Summers 
asserted that ‘‘‘race” [as included in paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 (XXV)] [is] 
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presumably  rendering “colour” superfluous’.209 However, the formula, as adopted 
under paragraph 7, enhanced the legality of the struggle of NLMs against racist 
regimes.210 The phrase deemed the activities conducted by NLMs to be consistent with 
the UN Charter. Nonetheless, although the wording of paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 
(XXV) seems to restrict its implementation to certain situations, the subsequent 
interpretations of the Resolution significantly extended its scope. More specifically, 
various efforts have been made to further broaden what is meant by the concept of 
‘representative government’.211 
Unlike Resolution 2625 (XXV) which limited the scope of paragraph 7 to cases 
related to racist regimes, the Vienna Declaration of 1993 extended the concept of a 
representative government to cover the whole population of a state. After affirming the 
link between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity, the Declaration 
went on to add that in order to be in conformity ‘with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples’, the government ought to be representing ‘the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind’.212 Furthermore, such 
an approach was subsequently reaffirmed under the Declaration on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN adopted in 1995.213 The concept of a representative 
government and its relation with the right to self-determination was further developed 
in the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.214 
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 Under paragraph 4 of General Recommendation XXI (48) adopted on 8 March 
1996, the committee asserted that ‘the rights of all peoples to pursue freely their 
economic, social and cultural development without outside interference’ suggest the 
existence of ‘the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any 
level as referred to in article 5 (c) of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination’.215 Therefore, ‘governments are to represent the 
whole population without distinction as to race, colour, decent, national, or ethnic 
origins’.216 Summers commented that the interpretation provided by the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination indicates that the initial formula adopted 
under paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 (XXV) has been significantly broadened to 
include ‘any ethnic or national group within a state’.217 
Although the innovative approach adopted under paragraph 7 of Resolution 
2625 (XXV) and developed in subsequent documents intended to provide a more 
sophisticated balance between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity,218 
it raised a high degree of controversy on its exact meaning.219 The uncertainty is mostly 
related to whether the failure of the government to represent its people may lead to the 
negation of territorial integrity. In other words, to what extent the absence of a 
representative government can lead to the existence of the right to secession was 
debated on. In particular, the matter is significantly important to cases involving 
multinational states.220 
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Generally, unlike the state which consists of a single people, in a multinational 
state which comprises more than one people, it is contended that each group has to be 
able to exercise the right to self-determination.221 Moreover, the denial of such a right 
for a group of people living within a state, by its government, may lead to the 
entitlement of the right to secession.222 As clarified by the Canadian Supreme Court in 
the Quebec Case in 1998, one of the situations in which the right to secession can be 
recognised under international law is when ‘a definable group is denied meaningful 
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural 
development’.223 
The implementation of paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 (XXV) to justify 
secession was more apparent in Russia’s reaction in relation to the cases of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.224 Abkhazia and South Ossetia were two ethnic regions that used to 
be part of Georgia. They used to organise themselves as ‘de facto autonomous 
entities’.225 In 2008, tension between Georgia and these two regions developed 
overtime into armed conflict. After the end of the conflict, Russia recognised Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as two independent states.226 The Russian formal declaration was not 
only based on political justifications, but also it included some legal grounds.227 As 
stated by the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation: 
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In taking this decision, the Russian Federation was guided by the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and other fundamental 
international instruments, including the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations. It should be noted that under the Declaration, every 
State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of their 
right to self-determination and freedom and independence, to promote through their 
action the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to possess a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory. There is no doubt 
that Mikheil Saakashvili’s regime is far from meeting those high standards set by the 
international community.228 
Hence, it seems that Russia based its legal argument on the contention that the 
peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were entitled to exercise the right to secession 
as a result of denying their internal right of self-determination by the government of 
Georgia. Nonetheless, various states challenged the Russian’s recognition by relying 
on the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity.229 In fact, the report of 
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia explicitly rejected the 
Russian contention. It clearly stated that: 
The ‘internal’ aspect of the right to self-determination, to be realised within the 
framework of a state, does not infringe on the territorial integrity of the state concerned. 
However, if the right to self-determination is interpreted as granting the right to 
secession (external right to self-determination), the two principles are incompatible.230 
It was argued that even though the cases where states relied on the denial of the 
right of peoples to internal self-determination by their governments to assert the 
emergence of the right to secession cannot be considered precedents under international 
law, they are not empty of any significance. They still could indicate the emergence of 
                                                 
228 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (n 224). 
229 See Ryngaert & Sobrie, (n 225), at 482.  
230 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Volume 




a new customary rule. Nevertheless, such a new rule would require a stable general 
practice and opinio juris for its existence.231  
Furthermore, as  long as the content of paragraph 7 of resolution 2625 (XXV) 
is concerned, it is argued that the reliance on this formula to suggest the emergence of 
a right to  secession represents an extremely expansive interpretation that goes beyond 
the intended meaning of the paragraph.232 It was asserted that even though the formula 
provided under paragraph 7 created a link between the concept of government 
representative and territorial entirety, it did not include any reference to remedial 
secession. In other words, it was contended that the argument supporting the right to 
secession within the context of paragraph 7 was based on negative implication rather 
than an explicit finding in the text.233 It was also noted that there have been no 
indications suggesting that states intended to consider remedial secession as an option 
during the process of drafting the resolution.234  
In fact, a restrictive interpretation based on the wording of the paragraph would 
lead to the contention that the formula is concerned with the whole people of the state 
rather than some distinct groups.235 As Thornberry commented, the reference in the text 
to ‘the whole people’ indicates that the right to self-determination ought to be advanced 
by ‘the people of the State as unified group’.236 He went on to add that ‘[t]he non-
recognition of the existence of  distinct peoples apart from the people of the State as a 
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whole must be accounted for in any interpretation of the text’.237 Moreover, 
Pentassuglia argued that the formula provided in paragraph 7 of resolution 2625 (XXV) 
suggests  that it is ‘the whole people, not individual groups comprising it, to be entitled 
to react to repressive regimes’.238 In other words, it is asserted that although it is the 
prevailing view not to recognise any right to secession under paragraph 7, the content 
of the paragraph indicates that the whole people constituting the population of a state 
may be entitle to exercise the right to self-determination against their own 
government.239  
The approach adopted in paragraph 7 constitutes explicit departure from the 
traditional common view that the right of internal self-determination is to be exercised 
by governments on behalf of their peoples against any external interference. It provides 
peoples as a whole the right to take remedial action against repressive regimes. It also 
opens the possibility for those peoples to be represented by entities other than their own 
governments for the purpose of exercising the right to self-determination.  
 As clarified previously, although the right to self- determination is primarily 
given to people, those people are required to gather under an internationally recognised 
structure to exercise the right to self-determination.240 Hence, the implementation of the 
formula included under paragraph 7 could facilitate the recognition of a legal structure 
as a legitimate representative of a people in its struggle against an oppressive regime. 
Moreover, in this case, the use of the phrase ‘the legitimate representative of the people’ 
would go beyond its common use referring to situations involving occupation powers 
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and NLMs to cover conflicts that erupt between peoples and their governments.241 In 
general, as clarified above, the recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination 
against their own governments has significant legal impacts as to the legal framework 
regulating armed conflicts.242  
Moreover, as long as the concept of the R2P is concerned, there is no doubt that 
the implementation of paragraph 7 of resolution 2625 (XXV) would contribute to the 
concept of the R2P. It would theoretically strengthen its legal framework which would 
enhance the effectiveness of its implementation over internal armed conflict. It is also 
noteworthy to mention that the application of the formula provided under paragraph 7 
within the context of the R2P would contribute to its clarity. The concept of the R2P 
could further frame the scope of paragraph 7. It may help to clearly define what is meant 
by the concept of ‘government representative’. Instead of being ambiguous and open to 
various interpretations, the failure of the government to represent its people would be 
limited to situations involving extreme violations of human rights constituting breaches 
of jus cogens.  In other words, for the purpose of implementing the concept of the R2P, 
peoples would be entitled to exercise the right to self-determination when they were 
being victims of one of the four crimes mentioned in paragraph 139 of the World 
Summit.243        
As to the Libyan and Syrian situations, it is apparent that there is only a single 
people in each state. Each single people formed the concerned state. Therefore, the issue 
concerning the right to secession would be less relevant. Also, although Gaddafi and 
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Assad regimes are still not founded on discrimination on the grounds of race, creed or 
colour,244 they still could be considered dictatorships giving certain minorities or groups 
favorable treatment in comparison to the rest of the populations. There has been clear 
evidence that these regimes have oppressed their peoples. During these two conflicts 
various extreme violations of human rights were committed against the Libyan and 
Syrian peoples, including violations of jus cogens. There is no doubt that the 
commitment of these violations goes beyond the measure adopted in paragraph 7 which 
is the failure of the government to represent its whole people.  Therefore, the formula 
included under paragraph 7 could be applied over the Libyan and Syrian situations.    
Hence, the Libyan and Syrian peoples would be able to exercise the right to self-
determination against their own governments. As a consequence, the political structures 
of the Libyan and Syrian oppositions could be internationally recognised for the 
purpose of exercising the right to self-determination in accordance with this 
interpretation of paragraph 7. Nevertheless, it ought to be clarified that although the 
formula provided under paragraph 7 could be considered a basis justifying the right of 
peoples to exercise the right to self-determination against their oppressive governments, 
this interpretation is still not authoritative. It is only one of various interpretations 
advanced to clarify the meaning of the paragraph.  As stated by Summers, the formula 
adopted in paragraph 7 ‘is capable of multiple interpretations and their strength and 
relevance may vary over time’.245 However, the absence of consensus as to the exact 
meaning of this formula does not mean it is empty of any significance. It still could 
serve as a starting point for a new trend that may emerge over time.  
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3.3.3 The Legal Act of Recognition as a New Government and the Potential Impact 
of the R2P 
It is the common policy of many states to limit their recognition to states rather 
than governments. Such policy was explicitly adopted by various states such as the UK, 
the US and other Commonwealth countries.246 However, the adoption of such a policy 
ought not to deem statements made by these states as to the recognition of governments 
empty of any political and legal significance.247 Also, although state practice has shown 
that the recognition of governments is a political rather than a legal act based usually in 
the interest of the recognising state, such an act produces legal consequences.248 The 
recognition of a government suggests that the recognised government is accepted in the 
international community as being capable to act on behalf of the concerned state.249    
  Although the reactions of some states to the Libyan and Syrian cases indicate 
the emergence of a link between the political recognition of an opposition group as ‘the 
legitimate representative of a people’ and its legal recognition as the new government 
of the state, the recognition of a government, as a legal act, must still be founded on 
legal facts.250 As asserted by Talmon (2013), ‘the recognition of a group of people as a 
‘‘government’’ is the ‘establishment of the fact that the group satisfies the conditions 
for government status in international law’.251 Hence, it seems to be essential for the 
purpose of this section to briefly outline these legal requirements. 
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State practice has shown that the recognition provided by states usually includes 
certain criteria.252 Although no agreement exists among states as to the nature of these 
criteria, the element of effectiveness seems to be a common requirement.253 As a 
requirement of recognition, effectiveness has been defined by states in various ways. 
Nevertheless, the common feature of all these definition is the new entity’s ability to be 
‘in control of, at least, the larger part of the territory as well as its administration and 
that such control is not just of a temporary nature but of consolidated one’.254 Therefore, 
as argued by Talmon (2013), for an entity to exercise the territorially effective control 
required for government status, ‘it must be in possession of the machinery of states 
which, as a rule, requires control of the State’s capital’.255 
It is essential to clarify that, despite the significance of the concept of territorially 
effective control, state practice has exposed uncertainty as to whether the exercise of 
certain degree of effective control over a territory is sufficient to satisfy the criteria 
required for a government’s recognition. For example, in 1965, Rhodesia declared its 
independence by citing its right to national sovereignty. However, though the 
government was exercising effective control over its territory, its unilateral declaration 
of independence was rejected by the international community. The universal refusal 
was based on violation of jus cogens.256 
Another example suggesting that the exercise of territorially effective control 
does not necessarily lead to a government’s status is in the effective and speedy 
reaction of the international community to the Haitian situation in 1991.257 Although 
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257 See D. Malone, ‘Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study’ (1997) 39 (2) Survival 126. 
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the military regime that overthrew the legitimate government in 1991 was exercising 
effective control over Haitian territory, the international reaction to the situation 
indicated that the exercise of effective control over a given territory was not sufficient 
to assert the legitimacy of a government.258 In fact, as indicated in UNSC resolution 
940, the international community continued to recognise the democratically elected 
government as the legitimate authority in Haiti despite its lack of effective control 
on the ground. 
Further evidence strengthening the view that governments may be considered 
sovereign despite their lack of effective control over territories is found in the 
recognition of transitional and interim governments by the international community. In 
certain cases, transitional or interim governments are considered capable of enjoying 
sovereign rights even if they have no effective territorial control. Such a sentiment 
obvious in the international community’s treatment of the situations in Iraq and 
Somalia.259 Even though the transitional governments in these two countries had almost 
no control over territories beyond their capitals, the international community 
considered their consents sufficient to legalise the external forcible interventions.260 
Prima facie, the previous examples could suggest the emergence of a trend 
under international law in favour of certain values over the concept of territorial 
effective control. These values, as indicated by the incidents above, are the fulfilment 
of jus cogens obligations, the protection of the will of the people and the enhancement 
of democracy and the support of the newly founded regimes. They generally fit within 
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the wide concept of human security.261 Therefore, there is no doubt that such a 
contention, were it to prevail, would conform to the new concept of R2P.262 It would 
present the concept of the R2P with a legal foundation. Nevertheless, further 
examination of these examples illustrates that the actions of the international 
community towards the incidents mentioned above were motivated by non-legal 
factors. The reaction of the international community was based on political rather than 
legal considerations.263 However, though these examples may not contribute to the 
emergence of a new legal trend, they do reflect inconsistency in the implementation of 
the concept of territorially effective control in state practice. 
Although the exercise of effective control over territory as a criteria for 
recognition is usually enfolded with ambiguity, the matter could be more problematic 
if the concerned entity were party to an internal armed conflict. It has been asserted 
that, in an ongoing civil war, the de jure government could continue to be the ultimate 
representative of the state as long as it could exercise a sufficient degree of resistance.264 
It has also been contended that recognising an entity participating in the conflict as a 
government of the state could be considered not only as ‘a premature recognition’ but 
also a violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the 
concerned state.265 Accordingly, for an opposition group to gain government status, it 
must exercise effective control over the entire territory of the state, otherwise the 
recognising state would be in violation of the principle of non-intervention. The 
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requirement that an opposition group exercise effective control over the whole territory 
seems to be the prevailing view after the adoption of the R2P.266 
In accordance with the US State Department spokesperson, the US recognised 
the NTC as the new Libyan government in two incremental steps. First, the US provided 
the NTC with political recognition as ‘the legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people’. Then, when Al Qaddafi’s regime lost control of the country, the US was able 
to take a legal step and recognise the NTC as the new government of Libya.267 The 
reason behind the adoption of such a policy requiring the exercise of effective control 
over the whole territory before the legal recognition could be granted was clarified by 
the legal advisor to the US State Department.268 He stated that the US policy is not ‘to 
recognise entities that do not control entire countries because then they are responsible 
for parts of the country that they don’t control’.269 He went on to add, the US ‘is 
reluctant to derecognize leaders who still control parts of the country because then [that 
could absolve] them of responsibility in the areas that they do control’.270 
Therefore, although the exercise of effective control over the entire territory by 
the oppositions is still a fundamental element for legal recognition, the policy behind 
such a requirement has changed. While the requirement is founded primarily on the 
principle of non-intervention, it is based on the idea of the R2P. Furthermore, such a 
change finds support in the concept of sovereignty as responsibility, as explained in the 
first chapter. 
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This chapter addressed the issue concerning the international recognition of the 
political organ of the opposition groups following the adoption of the R2P. It aimed to 
examine the extent to which the international community’s reaction towards opposition 
groups has changed following the implementation of the R2Pconcept. In order to 
achieve this objective, the chapter was divided into two sections: section one focused 
on the political recognition of the opposition groups as representatives of the peoples, 
and section two discussed the legal recognition of the opposition groups. 
Section one revealed that states’ action towards the Libyan and Syrian 
oppositions indicated that the political structure of opposition groups could be 
recognised in various ways, reflecting different levels of political support. It also 
clarified that even though this recognition is purely political with no legal 
consequences, the recognition of an opposition group as ‘the legitimate representative 
of the people’ is highly relevant. Such recognition indicates significant changes in the 
status of the opposition group and represents the highest possible level of political 
recognition. It further suggests that the functioning government has already lost its 
legitimacy and that a new representative of the people should be selected, that is, the 
recognised opposition group. 
The conclusion also conveyed that in order to qualify as the representative of 
the people, an opposition group should satisfy two requirements: representativeness and 
permanency. Although states still exercise a high level of discretion in determining the 
scope of these requirements, it is still possible to generally define them. While 
representativeness refers to the inclusiveness of the opposition groups in ethnic and 
geographical terms, permanency indicates that the opposition groups maintain certain 
a political, organisational and institutional structure. The final argument was that the 
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political recognition of opposition groups as the representatives of the people might 
facilitate their legal recognition. 
Section two addressed the legal recognition of the opposition groups, discussing 
two main issues: first, the recognition of the opposition groups as the representative of 
the people and the right to self-determination and, second, the recognition of the 
opposition group as a new government. With regard to the recognition of opposition 
groups and the right to self-determination, this section asserted that the recognition of 
opposition groups as the legitimate representatives of the people indicates a similarity 
between the status opposition groups and NLMs. Nevertheless, the discussion clarified 
that the recognition of opposition groups similar to that granted previously to NLMs 
does not mean that the recognition would provide the opposition groups with the same 
legal status and produce the same legal consequences. 
Section two also explained that although a link between opposition groups and 
NLMs cannot be established, the right to self-determination could still be advanced to 
legally justify the struggle against the functioning government. It argued that the most 
recent interpretation of paragraph 7 of Resolution 2625 (XXV)271 suggests that the 
people of a state have a right to self-determination against repressive regimes. In other 
words, the contention was that although it is the prevailing view not to recognise any 
right to secession under paragraph 7, the content of the paragraph indicates that people 
together constituting the population of a state may be entitled to exercise the right to 
self-determination against their own government. The section also examined the 
possibility of recognising an opposition group as the new government of the state and 
evaluated the traditional requirements. 
                                                 




In sum, although no direct changes have emerged on the legal status of 
opposition groups after the adoption of the R2P, some indirect legal impact is still 
indicated. States’ action in response to the situation in Libya and Syria suggest the 
emergence of a new trend towards recognising opposition groups as the legitimate 
representative of a people whenever they satisfy certain conditions. Even though this 
status is purely political and has no legal consequences, it is still of crucial importance 
in political and practical terms. It was indicated that the political recognition of 
opposition groups as the legitimate representative of a people was applied by some 



































The International Responsibility to Protect the Population after the Adoption of 
the R2P: Responsibilities of Third States and Opposition Groups 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 This chapter covers third states’ responsibilities with respect to the protection 
of civilians with a focus on the possible role played by opposition groups. The 
significance of this chapter lies in the ambiguity surrounding the role that could be 
played by third states in the protection of civilians within the context of internal armed 
conflicts. 
The uncertainty regarding the decisive role that might be exercised by third 
states in protecting civilian populations is related to the nature of IHL itself. Despite 
the fact that the primary objective of modern IHL was to enhance the protection 
provided to populations during hostilities, it has done so by primarily focusing on the 
parties to armed conflict rather than on third states.1 Furthermore, as far as internal 
armed conflicts are concerned, modern IHL was intended to impose restrictions that 
would reduce the possibility of third states’ involvement in the conflict. These 
restrictions were considered effective means to limit the negative effects of internal 
armed conflicts.2 Nevertheless, following the adoption of the R2P, further attention has 
been paid to third states’ protective responsibility. Third states are expected to play a 
more active role to prevent, react and rebuild. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to determine the kind of responsibilities 
placed on third states to ensure the improved and more effective protection of the 
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population during armed conflicts. Given the constraints of the project, the chapter 
focuses on selected issues. Accordingly, it is divided into three sections. 
Section one is concerned with the international R2P and IHL and intends to 
provide a legal basis for the international R2P. Section two focuses on the issue related 
to the supply of arms to opposition groups for the purpose of protecting civilians. It 
aims to examine two possibilities. First, it evaluates the legality of the unilateral arming 
of opposition groups Second, this section examines the possibility of basing the legality 
of the supply of arms on the explicit authorisation of the UNSC and the extent to which 
the concept of the R2P contributed to the issue. Section three discusses the issues related 
to the use of force for the purpose of protecting civilians. It evaluates the authorised use 
of force to protect civilians. It intends to evaluate the legality of such an authorisation 
and to determine its scope. The discussion in section three is primarily focused on the 















4.2 The International Responsibility to Protect and IHL 
 Section one aims to address two main issues related to the international R2P and 
the framework of IHL. First, the theoretical and legal foundation of the international 
R2P is discussed. Second, the prevention and reaction as dimensions of the international 
responsibility are addressed.  
 
4.2.1 The International Responsibility to Protect: Theoretical and Legal 
Foundation 
As clarified previously, the R2P is generally best described as soft law.3 
Moreover, as contended by Stahn, though the first pillar of the R2P concerning the 
primary responsibility of the host state to protect its population is well established under 
international law, the second and third pillars of the R2P related to the subsidiary 
international responsibilities to help to protect are surrounded by a high degree of 
uncertainty.4 It is highly controversial to what extent international law recognises direct 
and decisive positive responsibilities of the international community concerning the 
second and the third pillars of the R2P.5 
Although arguable, one of the possible ways to establish the legality of the 
international responsibility to protect as to internal armed conflict is to base it on the 
content of  Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions.6 Common Article 1 
                                                 
3 H. Breakey, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Overlap 
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5 Ibid. 
6 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (First Geneva 
Convention); Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 
(Second Geneva Convention); Convention (III)relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 
12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Third Geneva Convention); 
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reads as follows: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure 
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’.7 The content of common 
Article 1 was later reaffirmed under Article 1 (4) of the first Additional Protocol.8 
Although common Article 1 as well as the first Additional Protocol are primarily 
concerned with international armed conflicts, it is argued that the obligation to respect 
and ensure respect embodied in these documents is also applicable to internal armed 
conflicts.9 
As asserted by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case of 1986, the general obligation to 
respect and ensure respect enacted under common Article 1 applies over the obligations 
related to internal armed conflicts included under common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.10 Though it is important to emphasize that this does not mean 
Common Article 1 provides more protection than Common Article 3, this argument 
only refers to third state responsibilities to protect. In accordance with the ICJ, the 
general obligation to respect and ensure respect ‘does not derive only from the 
Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian law to which 
the Conventions merely give specific expression’.11 
The obligation to respect and ensure respect is two-sided. The first part of the 
obligation is ‘to respect’, which is a restatement of the provisions of the Geneva 
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Conventions of 1929.12 As Brollowski asserted, the obligation imposed on states under 
common Article 1 to respect ‘should be understood as a repetition of the general 
obligation of States derived from the principle of pacta sunt servanda that requires 
States to adhere to their treaty obligations in good faith’.13 Hence, it implies that states 
are obligated to undertake all possible means to ensure that the relevant principles of 
IHL are adhered to by all natural and legal persons under their jurisdictions.14 
The second part of the obligation embodied under common Article 1 is ‘to 
ensure respect’. States parties to the Geneva Conventions are not only obliged to ensure 
their own adherence to the principles of international humanitarian law, but are under 
a general obligation to undertake all possible legal means to ensure effective universal 
respect for these principles. The extensive scope of Common Article 1 finds further 
support in various diplomatic statements and other international instruments.15 
As stated in the resolution adopted by the 1968 Tehran Conference on Human 
Rights in Armed Conflict, states parties to the Geneva Conventions are required ‘to take 
steps to ensure the respect of [IHL] in all circumstances by other States, even if they 
are not themselves directly involved in an armed conflict’.16 More recently, the ICJ in 
the Wall Advisory Opinion commented that in accordance with Common Article 1, 
‘every State party to that Convention, whether or not it is a party to a specific conflict, 
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is under an obligation to ensure that the requirements of the instruments in question are 
complied with’.17 Such a view puts the implementation of the principles of IHL 
concerning the protection of civilians at the center of the international community’s 
interests.18 This assertion has a link with the R2P, particularly in relation to the third 
pillar concerning the international responsibility to protect. More specifically, being a 
third state’s responsibility, the obligation to ensure respect is in line with the second 
and third pillars of the R2P that are the international responsibility to help host state to 
protect and to protect.19 
As clarified previously, paragraph 139 of the World Summit outlined the 
obligations imposed upon other states once the responsibility to protect moves to the 
international community, due to the failure of a state to fulfil its duties and protect its 
population. It states: ‘[t]he international community, through the United Nations, also 
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect 
populations’ from being victims of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.20 Further, since these peaceful methods can, in some cases, fail to 
protect citizens from the crimes mentioned above, as a last resort, the report refers to 
the option to ‘take collective action…through the Security Council, in accordance with 
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis, in cooperation with relevant 
regional organisations as appropriate’.21 
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As clarified in the ICISS report representing the initial attempt to introduce the 
concept of the R2P, the complementary responsibility of the international community 
was intended to attain three objectives: prevention, reaction and rebuilding. The report 
states that the ‘prevention option should always be exhausted before intervention is 
contemplated’.22 It adds: ‘[t]he exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react 
should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before 
more coercive and intrusive ones are applied’.23 
 Thus, the implementation of the obligation ‘to ensure respect’ as embodied in 
common Article 1 within the framework of the R2P provides two layers of application. 
Firstly, the obligation to ensure respect may be implemented to strengthen the 
international responsibility to prevent. More specifically, the reliance on Common 
Article 1 provides third states with a legal basis to prevent the commitment of 
international crimes in armed conflicts. This preventative responsibility could be 
achieved by ensuring that parties to internal armed conflicts adhere to the principles of 
IHL during hostilities,24 as briefly addressed in chapter one.  
Secondly, it was argued that the obligation included under Common Article 1 
could provide third states with an opportunity to take a positive action when 
preventative measures fail and violations to IHL exist, especially when these violations 
constitute breaches of jus cogens. The implementation of the obligation to ensure 
respect under the framework of the R2P, to advance the international responsibility to 
prevent and react, benefits also from the interplay between the R2P and other branches 
of international law. Being mainly concerned with the international responsibility to 
protect, the second and third pillars of the R2P could allow the employment of the 
                                                 
22 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Report on the 
Responsibility to Protect, December 2001, at XI. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, (n 9). 
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principles of international responsibility to further frame and clarify the meaning of the 
obligation to ensure respect.25 Being concerned with violations of jus cogens, the R2P 
establishes a link with certain Articles of the ILC. 
The matter concerning international responsibility was the central focus of 
Chapter III of the ILC Draft Articles. The primary objective of this chapter was to 
establish international responsibility for serious breaches of peremptory norms of 
general international law.26 The approach adopted under Chapter III of the ILC Draft 
Articles is in conformity with the general understanding provided under Common 
Article 1 that the rules of IHL are erga omnes; thus, they should be protected for the 
interest of the international community.27 However, Articles 40 and 41 provide a more 
restrictive and framed interpretation of the general obligation provided under Common 
Article 1. 
In accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 40, international responsibility ‘is 
entailed by a serious breach ... of an obligation’ emanating from peremptory norm of 
international law.28 Accordingly, in order to entail international responsibility, two 
criteria must be satisfied. First, a breach of the peremptory norms of general 
international law must exist. Second, the breach must be of a serious nature.29 
Moreover, a serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law is defined 
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‘as one which involves “a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil 
the obligation” in question’.30 
The article further clarified that ‘the word “serious” signifies that a certain order 
of magnitude of violation is necessary in order not to trivialize the breach and it is not 
intended to suggest that any violation of these obligations is not serious or is somehow 
excusable’.31 It also emphasised that in order to consider such a violation as systematic, 
the breach must be conducted ‘in an organized and deliberate way’. Whereas, as 
asserted by Article 40 of the ILC, the term “gross” refers to the intensity of the violation 
or its effects.32 Moreover, in, order to determine the seriousness of such a breach, 
various measures could be consulted. These measures would include the intention to 
breach the norm, ‘the scope and number of individual violations and the gravity of their 
consequences for the victims’.33 
The analysis of the content of Article 40 of the ILC would lead to the assertion 
that the Article could serve as a basis for the third pillar of the R2P adopted by the 
World Summit concerning the subsidiary international responsibility to protect. The 
implementation of Article 40 over internal armed conflicts would suggests that the 
international responsibility would be entailed when the host state intentionally 
committed serious and systematic violations of jus cogens against its population. 
Furthermore, the intentional commitment of these breaches indicates that the host state 
                                                 
30 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Report of the International Law Commission, GA 
Official Records, Fifth- Third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), 23 April- 1June and 2 July- 10 
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is unwilling to fulfil its obligations under the first pillar of the R2P.34 Therefore, the 
international community ought to fulfil its duties under the third pillar.35 
 
4.2.2 The International Responsibility to Protect: Prevention and Reaction 
 
4.2.2.1 The International Responsibility to Prevent and IHL 
In addition to the straightforward obligation ‘to respect and ensure respect’,36 
common Article 1 suggests the existence of a negative obligation imposed on third 
states ‘to neither encourage a party to an armed conflict to violate international law nor 
take action that would assist in such violations’.37 Furthermore, such an obligation is 
affirmed under Article 16 of the ILC.38 According to Article 16 of the ILC Articles ‘[a] 
State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) That State 
does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State’.39 
One of the most relevant and obvious examples of the negative obligation 
embodied under common Article 1 is the transfer of arms and other equipment to the 
parties to an internal armed conflict, which are known to be used in perpetrating 
international crimes.40 It is a well-established rule that the supply of arms to the host 
state is considered lawful, whereas the arming of the opposition by a third state is 
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39 Ibid. 
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208 
 
deemed an illegal act under international law in general.41 Nevertheless, after the 
adoption of the R2P, it was indicated that changes had emerged regarding the matter 
concerning the transfer of weapons to parties to internal armed conflicts. The reactions 
of states to the conflicts in Libyan and Syria suggest the emergence of a new trend 
towards supporting the view that the supply of arms to parties to internal armed 
conflicts could be either broadened or narrowed, depending on the implementation of 
the concept of the protection of population as it is included in the framework of the R2P 
as it will be discussed in section two. 
 
4.2.2.2 The International Responsibility to React and IHL 
The international responsibility is entailed when serious breaches of peremptory 
norms are conducted by a party to an internal armed conflict. As a result of such 
breaches, third-party states would be under an obligation to react. It is suggested that 
the international responsibility regarding such violations could be divided into negative 
and positive obligations.42 
 With regard to the negative obligations imposed on third-party states, in 
accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 41 in the case that a serious breach of a 
peremptory norm emerged, all states would be under an initial obligation not to 
recognise such a situation as lawful. This situation also obligates third-party states not 
to provide any aid or assistance that may contribute to maintaining such a situation.43 
Furthermore, as to the non-recognition obligation, this refers to an initial reaction 
measure that is of a collective nature. The collective non-recognition of a breach of a 
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42 See UNGA, Report of the International Law Commission, (n 30), at 286. 
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peremptory norm of international law can be considered to represent a minimum 
necessary response by the international community to such a breach.44 
In addition to the obligation not to recognise a situation resulting from a breach 
of jus cogens, third-party states are under another negative obligation, that is, not to 
provide aid or assistance that may contribute to the maintaining of the situation 
emanating from such a violation.45 Moreover, such an obligation not to aid or assist is 
different from that established under Article 16 of the ILC, as discussed previously. As 
clarified by the commentary, the obligation underlined under Article 41 ‘deals with 
conduct ''after the facts'', which assists the responsible State in maintaining’ such a 
situation.46 It also adopts a lower threshold than the one required under Article 16. 
Unlike Article 16 of the ILC, which requires a state be held responsible for providing 
aid or assistance if that state had ‘knowledge[d] of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act’,47 Article 41 deems any aid or assistance illegal in all 
circumstances.48 
 With regard to the positive obligation to react, Article 41 (1) sets the general 
grounds for this international responsibility. It places all states under an obligation to 
‘cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breaches’ of peremptory 
norms, as elaborated previously.49 Nevertheless, the Article did not specify what types 
of cooperation states could undertake. As clarified by the commentary, this cooperation 
could be advanced through international institutions such as the UN or by adopting non-
institutional measures.50 However, Article 41 did not include a reference to any 
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46 UNGA, Report of the International Law Commission, (n 30), at 290. 
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48 UNGA, Report of the International Law Commission, (n 30), at 291.    
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measures that could be implemented by third-party states to end serious breaches to 
peremptory norms. Therefore, the Article seems to aim to encourage further 
cooperation among states rather than to suggest certain reaction measures. The 
international responsibility for serious breaches of peremptory norms of international 
law was further elaborated under Article 48 of the ILC Draft Articles.51 
Article 48 concerns with the invocation of responsibility by third states in the 
basis of collective interest. In accordance with Article 48 of the ILC, in the event that 
serious breaches to peremptory norms existed, third states would be entitled to claim 
from the responsible state: 
(a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition in accordance with article 30; and  
(b) performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding 
articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation 
breached.52  
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the reference to ‘the beneficiaries of the 
obligation breached’ is of significant importance. It indicates that the international 
responsibility could be implemented by third states not only in behalf of the injured 
state, but also in behalf of other beneficiaries of the obligation violated. As commented 
by Sassoli, ‘[t]hose beneficiaries will often be the individual war victims’.53 Moreover, 
the inclusion of other beneficiaries other than the injured state is of crucial significance 
for internal armed conflicts. Article 48 suggests that a third state could hold the host 
state responsible for committing serious violations against its civilians. Hence, the 
contention provided under Article 48 of the ILC could serve as a legal ground for the 
third pillar of the R2P concerning the responsibilities of third states to protect. In fact, 
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when Article 48 is read in conjunction with Article 40 of the ILC, discussed previously, 
it would be found that the conclusion would lead to a quite similar concept of 
international responsibility to that formulated under the third pillar of the R2P.54 The 
international responsibility would be entailed on behalf of civilians in accordance with 
the third pillar of the R2P  when the host state failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
first pillar by intentionally committing serious breaches of jus cogens against its 
population. 
It is worth mentioning that although the ILC Draft Articles did not determine 
certain measures to be applied by third states, it explicitly excluded, under Article 50 
(1), the use of measures that may contain the use of force or violations of fundamental 
human rights.55 The commentary to the ILC relied on a statement made previously by 
General Comment 8 (1997) of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
on the effect of economic sanctions on civilian populations. It restated the Committee’s 
statement that ‘it is essential to distinguish between the basic objective of applying 
political and economic pressure upon the governing elite of a country to persuade them 
to conform to international law, and the collateral infliction of suffering upon the most 
vulnerable groups within the targeted country’.56 
Although the restriction as to the violations of fundamental human rights is 
absolute, the use of force could be still used to react to serious breaches of  jus cogens. 
In other words, despite the fact that the use of force is not recognised as a counter 
measure under the framework of jus in bello, it still could be adopted under the 
framework of jus ad bellum to react to serious violations of IHL.  Nevertheless, this 
would be restricted to the authorisation of the use of force by the UNSC as confirmed 
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under the World Summit Outcome.57 In fact, the matter has gained further importance 
and clarity after the military intervention in Libya conducted in accordance with UNSC 
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4.3 The International Responsibility to Protect and the Transfer of Arms to 
Opposition Groups 
This section discusses the issue related to the legality of arming opposition 
groups after the adoption of the R2P. It aims to determine the extent to which the 
adoption of the R2P contributed to the subject. In order to do so, the section is divided 
into two parts. Part one is concerned with arming opposition groups without the 
authorisation of the UNSC. Part two focuses on arming opposition groups based on 
implicit authorisation by the UNSC.  
 
4.3.1 Arming Opposition Groups Without the Authorisation of the UNSC as a 
Potential Development: Unilateral Support by a Third State 
 The transfer of weapons to the opposition groups by a third state has been of 
central importance in relation to the debate as to internal armed conflicts. Before the 
foundation of the UN Charter, it was widely accepted that any act intended to arm the 
opposition groups before they are internationally recognised as belligerents would 
constitute an illegal act against the host state, however, such an act would be deemed 
legal as long as the opposition groups achieved the status of belligerency.59 
Nonetheless, such an act, if committed by a third state, would not be without a price.   
The transfer of arms to the belligerents by a third state, although  possible, would impact 
the third state’s status of neutrality.60 The obligation of neutrality means that the states 
have to treat all parties to the dispute equally, or ‘each sovereign in its respective areas 
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of control’.61 According to Falk, after the recognition of rebellions as belligerents, any 
‘interventionary participation [by a third state] on behalf of either the incumbent or the 
insurgent is an act of war against the other’.62    
As affirmed under Article 6 of Hague Convention XIII concerning the rights 
and duties of neutral powers in naval war, it is prohibited under the rules of neutrality 
to supply, whether directly or indirectly, a belligerent group ‘war-ships, ammunition, 
or war material of any kind’.63 Furthermore, as Dinstein contended, although no similar 
provision was included in Hague Convention V respecting the rights and duties of 
neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, it is undutiful that the same rule is 
still applicable as to the status of neutrality on land.64 However, the legal status of the 
transfer of arms to an opposition group by a third state changed after the adoption of 
the UN Charter. 
 Although the issue concerning the transfer of arms has not been regulated 
throughout the twenty century under international law,65 the matter was decided by the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case of 1986.66 The issue regarding the supply of arms to 
opposition groups was included in the part concerning the law on the use of force and 
non-intervention considered authoritative in nature.67 Furthermore, such a finding was 
subsequently reaffirmed by the court in the case concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo of 2005.68 Although the supply of arms to the host state is 
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generally considered lawful, the arming of the opposition by a third state is deemed an 
illegal act.69 Nevertheless, even though the finding of the ICJ has been the prevailing 
view under international law, states’ reactions regarding the conflicts in Libya and Syria 
indicates the existence of a different interpretation or understanding that is worth 
examining.  
 The UNSC exercised its authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and 
adopted resolution 1970. Although the resolution did not authorise the use of force, it 
was crucial for several reasons. First, the resolution implicitly considered the situation 
in Libya as an internal armed conflict, which was clear when it referred to ‘the serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law[s]…being committed’.70 
Second, it made the connection between the situation in Libya and the concept of the 
R2P clear by ‘recalling Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population’.71 
Third, and more importantly to the discussion in this section, the resolution imposed an 
arms embargo that ought to be implemented by member states.72 Paragraph 9 of 
resolution 1970 reads as: 
all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct 
or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their 
territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related 
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and 
technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities 
or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the 
provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their 
territories…73 
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 A few weeks later, on the17th of March 2011, the UNSC adopted resolution 
1973.74 The resolution not only reaffirmed and strengthened the obligation imposed 
under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 mentioned above concerning the arms embargo,75 
but it went further to authorise states to ‘take all necessary measures, notwithstanding,  
[the arms embargo], to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack’.76 In response to these resolutions, many states started to arm the Libyan 
opposition or at least declared their intention to do so.77 
 One of the arguments that was advanced to justify such an action was founded 
on the expression ‘the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’, as included in paragraph 9 of 
resolution 1970,78 to assert that the arms embargo was adopted, primarily, to target 
Gaddafi regime rather than the Libyan opposition.79 Another argument relied heavily 
on the language used in resolution 1973 by heavily relying on the authorisation to take 
all necessary measures is made ‘notwithstanding’ the arms embargo. As argued by 
Hillary Clinton, the creation of a no-fly zone and the authorisation of the use of force 
to protect civilians ‘effectively amended or overrode the absolute prohibition on arms 
to anyone in Libya’.80 Nevertheless, these arguments have been highly challenged as to 
their validity to establish a legal basis for the concerned action. 
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 As to the argument restricting the implementation of the arms embargo to the 
Libyan authorities rather than the fighting armed groups, it was asserted that such an 
argument violated the wording of the resolution imposing the embargo.81 It also in 
contrary to the practice of the UNSC.82 The paragraphs concerning the arms embargo 
in resolutions 1970 and 1973 were inclusive in nature. They intended to apply the 
embargo over the whole territory of Libya. The territorial nature of the arms embargo 
suggests that member states were under an obligation to refrain from transferring 
weapons to the Libyan territory regardless of the parties to the concerned conflict.83 
Moreover, such a contention finds support in the practice of the UNSC.  
In similar situations, when the UNSC adopted arms embargos similar in 
wording and nature to the ones under discussion, there were agreements to apply the 
embargos comprehensively over the whole territory of the concerned states with no 
exceptions whatsoever.84 Furthermore, in other situations, when the UNSC intended to 
limit the impact of the arms embargo to a specific party to the conflict, the provision 
concerning the arms embargo would be subjective rather than territorial in nature. In 
other words, the UNSC would explicitly refer to the party being a subject to the 
embargo rather than leaving the matter to the unilateral interpretation of its member 
states.85 For instance, in resolution 1807 adopted in March 2008, concerning the 
situation in the Congo, the UNSC explicitly limited the effects of the arms embargo 
                                                 
81 Booth, (n 79). 
82 D. Akande, ‘Does SC Resolution 1973 Permit Coalition Military Support for the Libyan Rebels?’ 
(2011) European Journal of International Law: Talk!, available online at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-
sc-resolution-1973-permit-coalition-military-support-for-the-libyan-rebels.   
83 Booth, (n 79). 
84 Akande, (n 82). 
85 See United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1807 (2008) [on renewal of 
measures on arms embargo against all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo], 31 March 2008, S/RES/1807 (2008), at paras. 1-2, available 
online at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/47f5f16a2.html.  
218 
 
included under paragraph 1 to non-governmental groups operating in the territory of 
the Congo.86  
With regard to the other argument founded mainly on the wording of resolution 
1973, although it has merit when it is limited to the linguistic meaning of the provision, 
it clearly ignores the established principles concerning the legal status of arming 
opposition groups under international law.87 More specifically, despite the fact that the 
inclusion of the word ‘notwithstanding’ in paragraph 9 of resolution 1973 indicates that 
the UNSC authorisation given to member states ‘to take all necessary measures to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas’,88 altering the absolute nature of the arms 
embargo, it did not deem the supply of arms to the opposition legal.89 In fact, such a 
contention, if accepted, would suggest that a unilateral supply of arms to the opposition 
is lawful unless an arms embargo is adopted. It is noteworthy to mention that the 
controversy as to the lawfulness of unilaterally arming the opposition without explicit 
authorisation of the UNSC was more apparent in regard to the Syrian conflict.90 
In various stages of the Syrian conflict, many states supplied or at least intended 
to supply arms to the Syrian opposition.91 After the foundation and recognition of the 
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FSA, states such as France,92 Saudi Arabia,93 Qatar,94 UAE, Turkey,95 Libya96 and some 
European countries including the UK,97 after lifting the arms embargo imposed by the 
EU earlier,98 were involved in the arming process of the Syrian opposition. In 
September 2014, Obama, the US President, after obtaining authorisation from 
Congress, declared his intention to supply arms to moderate groups in Syria in support 
of their fight against Assad's regime and ISIS.99 However, neither the political act of 
recognition,100 the lifting of the arms embargo nor the authorisation by a domestic 
authority is sufficient enough to deem such an act lawful under international law. 
In accordance with UNGA resolution 2625 (XXV)101 considered to be reflecting 
customary international law,102 the transfer of weaponry to opposition groups is in 
violation of the principles of international law. The resolution affirmed that:   
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.103 
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The principle embodied in UNGA resolution 2625 (XXV) was applied and, later 
on, by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case in 1986.104 The court explicitly stated that although 
‘the supply of arms and other support’ to opposition groups does not amount to an 
armed attack, it constitutes a violation of the principles of the non-use of force and non-
intervention in the internal affairs of the concerned state.105 The ICJ reaffirmed its 
finding in the case concerning the Armed Activates on the Territory of the Congo of 
2005. It explicitly considered the commitment of such an act as in breach of the 
prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention regardless of the 
objective behind it.106 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ went further to examine state practice to 
determine whether a new customary rule emerged, or has been emerging, justifying the 
support of the opposition as an exception to the general principle of non-intervention.107 
In accordance with the court, in order to assert the existence of such a customary rule, 
two elements ought to exist, a well-established state practice and opinio juris 
sivenecessitatis.108 Furthermore, after generally evaluating state practice in regard to 
supporting opposition groups, the ICJ argued that although the support of oppositions 
by a third state exists in state practice, it has never been backed by sufficient opinio 
juris.109 
As Gray commented, in order to decide whether opinio juris emerged in support 
of such a practice, the court had to examine the grounds advanced by states to justify 
their actions. Moreover, by doing so, it would be apparent that states never attempted 
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to legalise their actions in support of opposition groups by asserting the emergence of 
new exceptions to the principles of the use of force or non-intervention.110 In contrast, 
as observed by the court, states usually based their actions in support of the opposition 
groups on political rather than legal grounds.111 
It is also noteworthy to mention that the judgment of the ICJ is of a general 
nature, suggesting that such prohibition would be applicable regardless of the status of 
the opposition group. In other words, the supply of arms would be still considered 
illegal, regardless of whether the opposition exercise territorial effective control and 
operated under responsible command. Hence, the unilateral attempts to arm the Libyan 
and Syrian oppositions cannot be legally justified under international law. However, 
although states’ reactions towards the Libyan and Syrian oppositions cannot be deemed lawful, 
they are not emptied of any significance. In fact, unlike state practice as to the possibility to 
support the opposition groups before the adoption of the R2P, states’ attitudes towards the Libyan 
and Syrian opposition indicate that the supply of arms was advanced as a legal option. Moreover, 
although such a practice is not sufficient enough to constitute opinio juries required for the 
emergence of a new customary law, it indicates the evolvement of a new trend that may further 
develop overtime.    
 
4.3.2 Arming the Opposition Groups under the Authorisation of the UNSC as a 
Potential Development: Implicit Authorisation 
 As mentioned above, even though the unilateral supply of arms to the opposition 
groups by a third state is not considered lawful under international law, it would be in 
conformity with the principles of international law as long as it is explicitly authorised 
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by the UNSC.112 Moreover, although no explicit authorisation was granted by the 
UNSC to transfer weaponry to the Libyan opposition groups, many states supplying or 
intending to supply arms to the Libyan opposition advanced the argument that such an 
authorisation was implicitly granted.113 It was argued that such an authorisation was 
granted under paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 authorising member states to ‘take all 
necessary measures, notwithstanding, [the arms embargo], to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack’.114 
 It was contended that military operations fall within the scope of the phrase ‘all 
necessary measures’.115 Furthermore, such a contention finds support in the previous 
practice of the UNSC. In similar situations, when the UNSC used the same expression, 
it was uncontested that such a formula employed by the UNSC to authorise the use of 
force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.116  
 Such a practice was witnessed in many UNSC resolutions such as resolution 
794 in regard to the situation in Somalia,117 resolution 836 as to the crisis in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,118 resolution 929 concerning Rwanda,119 and resolution 1464 as to the 
situation in Ivory Coast.120 Therefore, it is certain that the reference to the situation in 
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Libya as constituting ‘a threat to international peace and security’121 and the 
authorisation of the UNSC to ‘take all necessary measures’ suggests that the use of 
force against Gaddafi regime is authorised under Chapter VII.122 Having achieved that 
‘Operation Unified Protector’ was in conformity with resolution 1973, it could be 
asserted that such an authorisation altered the absolute nature of the arms embargo 
imposed previously by the UNSC in resolutions 1970 and 1973. 
It is not envisaged to lawfully launch a military operation in the territory of 
another state without waiving the legal impacts of the arms embargo. The forcible 
intervention in the territory of a state in accordance with a UNSC resolution requires 
the transfer of arms and other necessary equipment to undertake such an operation. 
Nonetheless, it would still be controversial to the extent to which such an authorisation 
allows the supply of arms to other parties involved in the conflict. In other words, 
although such an authorisation permits the participating states to transfer weaponry for 
their own use, it is still not decisively clear whether it is allowed to supply arms to an 
opposition group involved in the conflict.123 
Arming the Libyan opposition groups was not mentioned as an option during 
the discussion leading to the drafting of resolution 1973.124 Nevertheless, the arguments 
advanced after the adoption of the resolution proved the matter to be highly 
controversial.125 It was contended that despite the fact that resolution 1973 constitutes 
an exception from the general prohibition on the use of force, such an exception ought 
to be applied restrictively.126 As Macak asserted, resolution 1973 limits the authorised 
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use of force to member states, and it did not refer to the possibility that the UNSC 
mandates could be fulfilled indirectly or through the co-operation with other non-state 
entities.127 He went further to add that such a finding finds support in paragraphs 4 and 
8 of the resolution strictly authorising states to act  ‘nationally or through regional 
organizations or arrangements’.128 
The supply of arms to the Libyan opposition groups was also challenged by 
states and regional organisations. For instance, although Russia abstained, besides 
China, from the SC meeting that led to the adoption of  the resolution, Moscow 
generally criticised the military operation against Libya for exceeding the remit of 
resolution 1973.129 In regard to the arming of the Libyan opposition, Russia’s Foreign 
Minister, Sergei Lavrov, described it as being ‘a very crude violation of UN Security 
Council resolution 1970’.130 Nonetheless, although such an assertion has merit when 
linked to the content of resolution 1970, it ignores the legal impacts and objectives 
behind the adoption of resolution 1973.  
The African Union Commission Chief Jean Ping considered the supply of 
weaponry to the Libyan opposition as being ‘dangerous and puts the whole region at 
risk’.131 He went further to emphasise the possible negative consequences of the transfer 
of arms to the opposition groups fighting against Gaddafi’s regime. These various 
problems possibly resulting from arming the opposition are ‘the risk of civil war, risk 
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of partition of the country, the risk of “Somalia-sation” of the country, risk of having 
arms everywhere... with terrorism’.132 Chief Jean Ping also stressed the fact that these 
serious problems, if they existed, would not only make the situation in Libya worse, but 
they would significantly affect other neighbouring states.133 However, these criticisms, 
if taken as a whole, would suggest that such a transfer of arms would be done freely 
with no restrictions. Moreover, this matter was clearly noted and considered by other 
states advocating the supply of weaponry to the opposition.134 
 On the other hand, others strongly support the legality of arming the Libyan 
opposition as a part of the military operations launched against Gaddafi’s regime.  It 
was argued that the supply of weaponry to the opposition, either directly or indirectly, 
could still be justified as one of the necessary measures authorised by the UNSC in 
resolution 1973 as long as it is restricted to the purpose of protecting the population.135 
It was argued that the reference to acting ‘nationally or through regional organizations 
or arrangements’136 was intended to encourage states to fulfil the UNSC mandates 
rather than to restrict the implementation of resolution 1973.137 
As Akande contended, the adoption of the restrictive approach would suggest 
that NATO, as a regional organisation, would not be permitted under the resolution to 
co-operate with non-member states to fulfil the mandates of resolution 1973.138 He went 
further to add that the authorisation made by the UNSC to member states to act 
nationally does not mean that states are restricted to work individually on their own. In 
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fact, it rather intended to extend the scope of the authorisation by implying that states 
could act unilaterally and not only collectively through regional organisation or 
multilateral arrangements.139 Accordingly, it was argued that member states were 
authorised by the UNSC resolution to act individually, either through their own forces 
or other non-state entities.140 
The arming of the Libyan opposition was also advocated for by states. The 
supporting states not only sought to assert the lawfulness of the transfer of arms to the 
Libyan opposition, but they also intended to determine certain measures required for 
such an act to achieve its objectives.141 Although the UK did not officially announce its 
intention to supply weapons to the Libyan opposition, it did not eliminate such a 
possibility. As affirmed by David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, although the arms 
embargo imposed by resolution 1970 is of a territorial nature ensuring its application 
over the whole territory of Libya, the authorisation under resolution 1973 to take all 
necessary measures justifies the arming of the opposition in specific circumstances. In 
other words, he leaves such an option open as long as it becomes necessary to achieve 
the objective behind the UNSC resolution, which is the protection of the population and 
populated areas.142 The UK Minister of Defense followed a similar line by asserting 
that the UNSC resolutions concerning Libya could be interpreted in a manner that 
justifies the supply of defensive weapons to the Libyan opposition.143 
Even though the US seemed to take a similar approach to the one adopted by 
the UK, President Barack Obama went a bit further by stating that the US would provide 
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assistance to the Libyan opposition ‘in the form of humanitarian aid, medical supplies 
and communications equipment’.144 In fact, one day later, it was reported that Obama 
secretly authorised covert aid to the Libyan opposition.145  
Unlike the UK and the US, France explicitly admitted supplying weaponry to 
the Libyan opposition.146 French military chiefs affirmed that ‘French planes had 
dropped consignments of machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank 
missiles to rebels in the western Nafusa mountains’.147 As asserted by a French 
diplomat, the transfer of defensive arms to the Libyan opposition was primarily done 
for the purpose of protecting the Libyan population from instant danger. Therefore, 
such an act was in conformity with the UNSC resolutions concerning the Libyan 
conflict.148  He went on to emphasise that no further weapons would be transferred, and 
if a decision was made to do so, it would be determined on a cases by case basis.149  
Hence, it could be indicated that even though France explicitly supported the view that 
the Libyan opposition ought to be armed to the extent required to ensure a certain degree 
of population protection, it did not intend to establish a general rule applicable to similar 
situations. 
The French approach was supported by Akande.150 He considered the transfer 
of arms by France to the Libyan opposition groups a necessary measure to provide the 
Libyan population with instant protection. Nevertheless, he stressed the possibility that 
such an action may exceed the objectives behind it. The supplied arms could be used 
by the opposition to achieve other objectives that go beyond the mere protection of 
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population such as the overthrow of the regime, as it will be further discussed in the 
next section.151 It is apparent that the utilisation of these weapons by the opposition to 
reach other objectives would not only violate the authorisation provided by the UNSC, 
but may also raise the supplying state’s responsibility.  
In sum, although the UNSC did not explicitly authorise the supply of arms to 
the Libyan opposition, it was argued that such an act was justified as one of the 
necessary measures authorised under resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan population 
and populated areas. Nevertheless, the reaction to the Libyan situation showed a very 
restrictive implementation of this measure. The supportive states not only limited the 
supply of arms in regard to their amount and types, but they also stressed the fact that 
the Libyan situation reflected unique circumstances. 
It is also noteworthy to mention that although the status of the opposition groups 
was not explicitly mentioned, during the debate, it is still important to the issue 
concerning the supply of arms to opposition groups. As affirmed by the supporters of 
the view that resolution 1973 implicitly authorises the arming of the opposition, the 
supplying of weaponry must be restricted to the purpose of protecting population. They 
also confirmed that these weapons ought to be of defensive nature.152 Therefore, it could 
be argued that in order for the supply of arms to achieve these objectives certain 
requirements ought to be satisfied. 
 First, the opposition groups have to unite under responsible command insuring 
the use of these weapons for the purposes mentioned. Second, in order to effectively 
protect population and populated areas, the opposition groups need to exercise stable 
territorial effective control. It is unseen how an opposition group could fulfill its 
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obligation as to the protection of population without exercising effective control over 
them. Third, the supply of arms for defensive means suggests that these arms do not 
have to be used for other purposes. For instance, the supplied arms ought not to be used 
to target other populated areas under the control of the de jure government. Thus, it 
could be asserted that it is important that opposition groups show clear indications of 
their ability to respect and fulfil their obligations under IHL. These requirements, if 
confirmed, would suggest that in order to deem the arming of the opposition groups 
legal, these groups ought to achieve a status quite similar to the one defined under 
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4.4 The International Responsibility to Protect and the Authorised Use of Force 
Resolution 1973 represents the first mandate by the UNSC for the use of force 
based on the concept of the R2P against a de jure government.154 The implementation 
of the R2P over the Libyan crisis indicated an important development in the jus ad 
bellum framework. It reflected the emergence of a new trend supporting the view that 
the authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII could be granted for the purpose 
of protecting population.155 Some consider the Libyan precedent as a step towards the 
realisation of the concept of the R2P and as a consequence where the legality of the 
military operations is recognised. Others have raised doubts on the lawfulness of certain 
aspects of the operation. Nevertheless, they have refrained from directly asserting the 
illegality of the operation.156 
The debates, which took place after the end of ‘Operation Unified Protector’ in 
Libya, indicated that in order to consider such an operation legal, it ought to be 
restricted to the purpose of protecting the population. It must not aim to unnecessarily 
overthrow the regime. Further, it should not target the national infrastructure and 
destroy the military’s capacity.157 More specifically, even though there has been a 
consensus among the vast majority of states that the use of force against the Libyan 
regime is in conformity with the UNSC resolution 1973, the third states’ reliance on 
force to back up the Libyan opposition groups was highly controversial. Based on the 
Libyan case, this section aims to determine the legality of the use of force for the 
purpose of protecting civilians and its legitimate boundaries. The Syrian crisis is not 
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covered in this discussion since the UNSC did not authorise the use of force in this case.
  
4.4.1 The Legal Basis for the Use of Force and the R2P 
The main objective of ‘Operation Unified Protector’ was to implement the 
UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973, which were adopted in 2011.158 In resolution 1970 
issued on 26 February, the UNSC urged the Libyan authorities to respect IHRL and 
IHL,159 referred the matter to the ICC,160 founded an arms embargo161 and adopted 
targeted sanctions against high-ranking Libyan officials.162 
Subsequently, in resolution 1973 adopted on 17 March, the UNSC 
‘[c]ondemn[ed] the gross and systematic violations of human rights’ committed by the 
Libyan authorities; further, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it demanded 
the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and authorised member states ‘to take all 
necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack’ and ‘to enforce compliance’ with the no-fly zone. It has been effectively argued 
that the use of force against the Libyan regime was founded on the authorisation 
included in these provisions.163 
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As clarified previously, the UNSC’s practice suggests that the expression ‘all 
necessary measures’ included in resolution 1973164 covers subsequent military 
operations.165 In similar situations, when the UNSC used the same expression, it was 
well-established that such a formula was employed to authorise the use of force under 
Chapter VII.166 This practice was witnessed in many UNSC resolutions, such as 
resolution 794 on the situation in Somalia,167 resolution 836 on the crisis in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,168 resolution 929 concerning Rwanda,169 resolution 1464 on the situation 
in the Ivory Coast170 and resolution 1264 in relation to the situation in Timor.171 
Therefore, the reference to the situation in Libya as constituting ‘a threat to international 
peace and security’172 and the authorisation of the UNSC to ‘take all necessary 
measures’ certainly suggests that the use of force against Gaddafi regime was 
authorised under Chapter VII.173 Moreover, this contention was heavily endorsed by 
the intervening states. 
France relied on resolution 1973 as a strong legal basis to justify the use of force 
against the Libyan authorities.174 Further, the UK government argued that the UNSC 
adopted resolution 1973 ‘as a measure to maintain or restore international peace and 
security under Chapter VII’ of the UN Charter.175 The UK also asserted that ‘this 
Chapter VII authorisation to use all necessary measures provides a clear and 
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unequivocal legal basis for deployment of UK forces and military assets to achieve the 
resolution’s objectives’.176 Many other states participating in the campaign launched 
and controlled by NATO177 made similar declarations.178 
 In a speech delivered to explain his decision to use force in Libya, Obama 
explicitly made the following announcement: ‘I authorized military action to stop the 
killing and enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973’.179 Furthermore, even 
though he advanced various arguments to provide a justification for this decision, the 
concept of the R2P was evidently one of the main bases for his justification.180 Obama 
clearly stated that ‘we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world’s many 
challenges. But when our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to 
act’.181 He argued that the use of force in Libya was implemented as a last resort after 
it was established that the Libyan regime failed to fulfil its responsibility to protect 
its citizens.  
Obama further stated that ‘having tried to end the violence without using force, 
the international community offered Qaddafi a final chance to stop his campaign of 
killing, or face the consequences. Rather than stand down, his forces continued their 
advance, bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 men, women 
and children who sought their freedom from fear’.182 Moreover, he contended that 
NATO as well as the other intervening states who decided to join the military campaign, 
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such as the UK, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have done so to fulfil their responsibilities in 
defending the Libyan people.183 It is, therefore, apparent that Operation Unified 
Protector was authorised by the UNSC and was not explicitly challenged by any state. 
It was also established that the formula ‘all necessary measures’ covers the use of 
force.184 Nevertheless, the states’ reaction towards the Libyan situation reflected a high 
level of uncertainty with respect to the scope of the authorisation. This topic is discussed 
in the next section. 
 
4.4.2 The Scope of the Authorised Use of Force and the R2P 
 
4.4.2.1 The Scope of Authorisation on the Use of Force: General 
 Although the Libyan precedent supported the view that the use of force could 
be authorised by the UNSC for the purpose of protecting civilians, it raised some serious 
questions with respect to the limitations of such an authorisation. The wording of the 
UNSC resolution 1973 suggests that the resolution was drafted in a general manner and 
that it intended to impose very limited restrictions on its application.185 
The resolution requires that the participant states notify the UNSC through the 
UNSG of their intention to act in accordance with the authorisation and to cooperate 
with the UNSG.186 Moreover, regarding the measures that member states could rely on 
to implement the resolution, apart from excluding the deployment of ‘a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’,187 the resolution did not 
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include any other restrictions. It was not limited to a certain time or until a specific 
objective is achieved.188 Nevertheless, the resolution was restricted to the objectives to 
be achieved. 
Even though the UNSC resolution 1973 authorised member states to take ‘all 
necessary measures’, it restricted the implementation of these measures to achieve two 
goals. These two objectives are to protect ‘civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ and ‘to enforce compliance with the ban 
on flights’.189 Nevertheless, it was asserted that the military operations indicated a shift 
in the objectives from the mere protection of civilians to the massive military support 
of the Libyan opposition. The military operations targeted the Libyan infrastructure and 
aimed to overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Hence, it is essential to determine the extent 
to which these objectives were in conformity with the primary target of the operation 
as stated in resolution 1973.190 
 
4.4.2.2 The Scope of Authorisation on the Use of Force: Targeted Objects 
 The states’ initial reaction to the resolution 1973 by the UNSC was to prevent 
the emergence of a humanitarian catastrophe that might be perpetrated by the Libyan 
army. On 28 March 2011, Obama made an official statement summarising the primary 
objective behind the military operations in Libya: 
We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi to save that city and the people within 
it. We hit Qaddafi’s troops in neighboring Ajdabiya, allowing the opposition to drive 
them out. We hit Qaddafi’s air defenses, which paved the way for a no-fly zone. We 
targeted tanks and military assets that had been choking off towns and cities, and we 
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cut off much of their source of supply. And tonight, I can report that we have stopped 
Qaddafi’s deadly advance.191 
A few weeks later, NATO began to expand the scope of the military operations, 
targeting the infrastructure of the Libyan regime. Various military and economic 
objects were attacked. It was argued that some of these targeted objects could not be 
linked to the primary objective behind the campaign that entailed the protection of 
civilians from threat of attack.192 According to Pommier, ‘not all the military operations 
[in Libya] seemed to have a direct link to the prevention of acts against civilians’.193 
 Nonetheless, as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted, ‘[p]rotecting 
the population [as aimed by UNSC resolution 1973] isn’t simply neutralizing Gaddafi’s 
armoured vehicles and planes, it’s also weakening his military capabilities, command 
posts and supply networks’.194 This view also finds support in the language used in the 
subsequent UNSC resolution concerning the situation in Cote d’Ivoire.195 In resolution 
1975, the UNSC authorised the member states to implement all necessary means ‘to 
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.196 It is apparent that the 
expression used in resolution 1975197 is stricter than that included in resolution 1973.198 
The UNSC’s intention to limit the use of force to ‘imminent threat’199 with respect to 
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the situation in Cote d’Ivoire indicates that the word ‘threat’ in resolution 1973 implies 
a greater scope in terms of the forcible measures that the member states could apply 
against Gaddafi regime.  
The expansive implementation of the UNSC resolution with respect to the 
applicable forcible measure against the Libyan authorities is not new. A similar 
approach was adopted against Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. 
In the Gulf War, the international coalition extended its mandate beyond the Iraqi troops 
in Kuwait to cover objects inside the territory of Iraq.200 Hence, it could be established 
that objects other than troops in the field could be targeted as long as such an attack is 
a necessary measure to fulfil the objectives behind the adoption of the UNSC. More 
specifically, attacks directed at the Libyan infrastructure would be deemed legal in as 
far as they are necessary to ‘protect civilians and civilian populated areas’.201 
 
4.4.2.3 The Scope of the Authorisation on the Use of Force and the Protection and 
Support of Opposition Groups/Armed Groups 
 One of the main arguments advanced against the military operations in Libya 
was based on grounds that the military support of the Libyan opposition groups was not 
in conformity with resolution 1973.202 The argument was that the authorisation 
provided under the resolution intended to neither protect nor support the Libyan 
opposition groups. There was only one ultimate objective that was to be implemented 
restrictively, namely, the protection of civilians.  
 With regard to the protection provided to the Libyan armed groups, the 
argument from a legal point of view indicated a difference between civilians and 
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rebels.203 The interpretative guidance of the ICRC on the notion of direct participation 
in hostilities made this distinction clear: ‘[f]or the purposes of the principle of 
distinction in non-international armed conflict, all persons who are not members of 
State armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians’.204 
Accordingly, the Libyan armed groups cannot be included under the term ‘civilians’.205 
 Based on this, the argument was that resolution 1973 authorised the use of force 
to protect the Libyan civilians and not the Libyan armed groups. Nevertheless, although 
the principle of distinction is well-established under IHL, it does not necessarily mean 
that the UNSC, via resolution 1973, intended to exclude the Libyan opposition groups 
from the protection provided under paragraph 4.206 As Payandeb asserted, ‘[t]o the 
contrary, the Security Council authorized the use of force not only to protect civilians, 
but also to protect civilian-populated areas under threat of attack’.207 
 The inclusion of the phrase ‘civilian-populated areas’ in resolution 1973 
intended to extend the scope of protection. The protection provided under resolution 
1973 was not limited to the Libyan civilians; however, it goes beyond and covers 
specific territorial areas. In other words, the authorisation granted under the resolution 
aimed to provide protection to civilians as well as ‘geographical zones populated by 
civilians’.208 Moreover, Ulfstein and Christiansen contend that ‘[t]his widely extends 
the mandate, permitting NATO and its allies to also protect cities and towns held by 
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rebel force as well as protecting rebel forces present in such area’.209 However, this 
protection ought to be restricted to its specific meaning under the resolution.  
With regard to the possibility of supporting the opposition groups, the 
authorization granted under resolution 1973 was believed to have enabled this act by 
the member states.210 In fact, some of the coalition members were observed to have 
already sent military advisors to provide the Libyan opposition with the necessary 
advice and training.211 Further, it was evident that, during the campaign, NATO 
intended to provide direct air support to the Libyan opposition groups. It was also 
apparent that the NATO air attacks targeting the Libyan army significantly contributed 
to the progress of the Libyan opposition groups on the ground, helping them conquer 
additional areas and, finally, win the battle.212 
Payandeb argued that the support provided to the Libyan opposition groups was 
a natural result of the military operations. He further asserts that the military operations 
intended primarily to target Gaddafi regime as the main source of threat to the Libyan 
civilians. Moreover, the military attacks weakened the capabilities of Gaddafi’s forces, 
which consequently enhanced the strength of the opponents of the regime.213 Payandeb 
goes on to clarify that ‘[i]n a civil war, the combating parties necessarily act within 
civilian territories. The insurgents were Libyan people, living among civilians, and 
Libyan attacks against insurgents were therefore in most instances carried out against 
territories inhabited by civilians’.214 Nonetheless, the observation of the Libyan 
situation suggests that the strategies implemented by the coalition went beyond the 
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mere protection of civilians. It also indicated that the support provided to the Libyan 
opposition groups was intentional rather than accidental.215 
 It was apparent that the areas under the control of Gaddafi’s forces were not 
under threat of attack by the Libyan authorities. In fact, Gaddafi intended to provide 
protection to the people living in these areas who were his supporters. On the contrary, 
these areas were attacked by NATO and the Libyan armed groups. The NATO air 
attacks purportedly facilitated serious violations of IHL on the part of the Libyan 
opposition groups in areas known to be loyal to the Gaddafi regime.216 The intervening 
states are believed to have made the decision to take a part in the conflict and support 
the Libyan opposition.217 
 The coordination between NATO and the Libyan opposition groups, which led 
to the progress of these groups on the ground, was argued to have constituted a violation 
of the UN principle of impartiality. The principle of impartiality refers to the obligation 
imposed on the intervening states to remain neutral about the political objectives of the 
parties involved in the conflict.218 Unless explicitly specified in the UNSC 
authorisation, member states ought not to support the political agenda of any party to 
the conflict. Corten and Koutroulis emphasise that ‘the text of resolution 1973 (2011) 
reveals a conception based on impartiality and non-interference in the political matters 
of the Libyan people’.219 They further add that ‘[t]he only imperative, which explains 
the somewhat unexpected adoption of the resolution, is the protection of civilians. This 
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refers to civilians of all sides, supporting either the Gaddafi government or the 
opposition’.220 
 One of the main arguments advanced by NATO to justify the support provided 
to the Libyan opposition groups was founded on the acceptance of the Libyan 
opposition ‘as the new effective government of Libya, rather than Resolution 1973’.221 
Nonetheless, this argument cannot be advanced as a legal basis. As 
Ulfstein and Christiansen argued, ‘consent from rebels would only be relevant once 
they had secured sufficient control of Libyan territory’.222 More specifically, before 
consent could be considered, it is essential that opposition groups become the official 
authority in the country. In addition, consent ought to be issued before the situation 
reaches the level of an internal armed conflict.223 To sum up, the authorisation of the 
use of force does not justify the support of opposition groups. In the next section, the 
discussion is advanced to cover the protection of civilians and regime change.  
  
4.4.2.4 The Scope of the Authorisation on the Use of Force and Regime Change 
The most controversial question raised following the implementation of the 
UNSC resolution 1973 was whether member states were authorised to overthrow the 
Gaddafi regime.224 The matter is related to the extent to which the necessity criterion 
justifies a regime change as a measure to protect civilians.225According to some, the 
overthrow of repressive regimes would be necessary in certain cases to protect the 
civilian population.226 Others argued that a regime change cannot be advanced as a 
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necessary measure for the purpose of protecting civilians unless it is explicitly stated in 
the UNSC resolutions.227 
During the debates on the Libyan situation, there were various indications 
supporting the view that the UNSC did not intend to categorically eliminate the 
possibility of overthrowing the Gaddafi regime on the basis of resolution 1973. The 
argument made was that the UNSC’s reaction towards the Libyan crisis indicated that 
the democratic aspect of the Libyan conflict was as important as the protection of 
human rights for the purpose of ending the violence.228 Under paragraph 1 of resolution 
1970, the UNSC ‘demand[ed] an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to 
fulfil the legitimate demands of the population’.229 
In resolution 1973, the UNSC ‘[s]tresse[d] the need to intensify efforts to find 
a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan 
people’.230 It was considered highly unexpected that the legitimate demands of the 
Libyan civilians could be achieved without changing the Gaddafi regime.231 
Nonetheless, even though the reference to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people 
in the UNSC resolutions indicated a certain level of support by the Libyan civilians 
against their repressive government, it still could not serve, in itself, as a legal basis for 
justifying the reliance on force by member states to overthrow the regime. However, as 
Payandeb contends, the reference to ‘the legitimate demands of the population’232 in 
resolution 1973 does not lack significance; it ‘does indicate that the authorisation to use 
force has to be regarded within the overall context of the conflict, which was not only 
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about human rights violations, but also about the realization of the political rights of 
the Libyan people’.233 
Another argument based on the sanctions targeting the Gaddafi regime was also 
advanced to justify the legality of overthrowing the Libyan government. According to 
this assertion, even though the UNSC did not explicitly allow a reliance on force to 
change the Libyan regime, it implemented various forcible measures against the Libyan 
authorities. The aim of these forcible measures was to gradually weaken the regime and 
limit its abilities.234 In resolution 1970, the UNSC imposed a travel ban and froze the 
assets of not only Gaddafi and his family members but also other high-ranking officials 
of his government.235 
 In resolution 1973, the UNSC decided to extend the effect of the financial 
sanctions to cover ‘all funds, other financial assets and economic resources …, which 
are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, …, or by 
individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned 
or controlled by them’.236 Nevertheless, although the implementation of these forcible 
sanctions reflected the intention of the international community to limit the power that 
could be exercised by the Libyan authorities, they still cannot justify the reliance on 
force to overthrow the regime. In fact, as Payandeb contended, despite the fact that the 
main purpose behind the implementation of these sanctions was to weaken the Libyan 
authorities in order to end the violence on civilians, ‘they also supported the struggle of 
the Libyan opposition against the regime’.237 Furthermore, such an expansive 
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understanding of the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 goes beyond the acceptable 
boundaries of interpretation and violates the practice of the UNSC.  
As stated earlier, although states have a degree of discretion to interpret the 
necessity criterion based on the circumstances at hand,238 they are not fully free. States 
are still restricted by certain rules and principles. As argued by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
case, ‘the measures taken must not merely be such as tend to protect the essential 
security interests of the party taking them, but must be “necessary” for that purpose’.239 
It further emphasises that ‘whether a measure is necessary to protect the essential 
security interests of a party is not … purely a question for the subjective judgment of 
the party; the text does not refer to what the party “considers necessary” for that 
purpose’.240 
More specifically, the Institut de droit international, at its 2011 Rhodes session, 
adopted a similar approach.241 Article 9 of the resolution adopted by the institute 
concerning the ‘Authorization of the Use of Force by the United Nations’ states the 
following: 
The objectives, scope and modes of control of each authorization should be strictly 
interpreted and implemented. When the use of force is authorized, it shall be conducted 
proportionately to the gravity of the situation and in full compliance with international 
humanitarian law.242 
 Moreover, Article 10 states that ‘[i]n no case may a previous authorization be 
invoked for any purpose beyond its specific objectives, time and scope’.243 This 
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understanding of the element of necessity ought to be considered when interpreting the 
UNSC resolutions to determine the accurate scope of their implementation. With regard 
to the Libyan situation, a matter of great controversy relates to whether the expression 
in the UNSC resolution 1973 referring to ‘all necessary measures to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas’244 justifies the military support of the Libyan opposition 
groups and regime change.245 
The UNSC’s practice was believed to suggest that in case a regime change 
becomes a necessity, the UNSC would explicitly authorise it.246 This was the case with 
the situation in Haiti in 1994. The UNSC, through resolution 940, explicitly authorised 
member states ‘to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the 
military leadership…the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the 
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti’.247 
The UNSC did not grant such an explicit authorisation through resolution 
1973.248 Hence, the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime as a part of the operation is 
contended to have exceeded the scope of the authorisation provided by the UNSC. To 
the contrary, the formula used in regulation 1973 indicated that the UNSC excluded a 
regime change as a measure necessary to protect the Libyan population.249 The 
resolution affirmed the responsibility of the Libyan authority to protect civilians, as 
restated its ‘strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity 
and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’.250 Hence, the UNSC’s intention 
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appears to have been to encourage the Libyan authorities to cooperate rather than to 
enforce a regime change. 
It was also observed that, during the debates on the UNSC resolution 1973, there 
was clear uncertainty among member states as to whether to rely on force to protect the 
Libyan civilians.251 In fact, it was argued that one of the primary reasons for the 
successful adoption of the resolution was the confirmation that the ultimate objective 
behind resolution 1973 would be the mere protection of the Libyan population, 
accompanied by an affirmative statement to respect the sovereignty and political 
independence of Libya.252 As pointed out by Amr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the 
Arab League, the UNSC authorised only the protection of the civilian population and 
not the overthrow of the Libyan regime.253 Moreover, during the military operations in 
Libya, the communications between NATO and the concerned organs of the UN 
indicated that NATO continued to affirm that its operation in Libya was primarily 
launched for the mere purpose of protecting the civilians.254 
Another assertion supporting the view that the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime 
was in violation of resolution 1973—and therefore, international law—was founded on 
the states’ reaction to Saddam Hussein’s regime during the Gulf War in 1991. Despite 
the fact that the UNSC resolution 678 contained the same expression as resolution 1973, 
namely ,‘to use all necessary means’,255 the member states did not extend the meaning 
of authorisation to justify the overthrow of the Iraqi regime or even support the Kurdish 
armed groups against the Iraqi’s regime.256 However, notwithstanding the fact that the 
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prevailing view still suggests that a regime change cannot be advanced as an objective 
in itself, whether directly or through supporting opposition groups, there has been a 
new trend emerging as to the legality of regime change. 
As an intermediary approach to the question of regime change under the UNSC 
resolution 1973, the argument could be made that although the advancement of a regime 
change as an objective would be in violation of the UNSC resolution 1973, it could still 
be a lawful result of the implementation of certain forcible measures intending to 
protect civilians.257 Moreover, this contention is based on the distinction between 
regime change as an objective behind the use of force and regime change as a 
consequence of forcible intervention.258 
This approach is founded on the differentiation between objectives, measures 
and consequences with respect to the UNSC authorisation.259 Even though the 
protection of civilians and civilian-populated areas was the primary objective of the 
UNSC resolution 1973,260 the resolution did not ‘elaborate on the admissible means 
that [might] be employed in order to implement and achieve this goal’.261 Furthermore, 
despite the fact that regime change is not a lawful measure in accordance with the strict 
interpretation of the UNSC resolutions, it could still be a consequence of implementing 
other legitimate means. Payandeb clarifies this as follows: 
While regime change might not have been a legitimate goal in itself, the distinction 
between means and ends suggests that it might constitute a legitimate consequence of 
measures that were carried out for the protection of civilians. Measures that were 
employed in order to keep the Gadhafi regime from attacking the civilian population at 
the same time contributed to the actions of the opposition against the regime. Therefore, 
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a strict distinction between the objective of human rights protection and measures that 
might lead to regime change cannot be upheld.262 
For instance, although the destruction of the Libyan air force, air defence 
systems and military infrastructure was necessary to protect Libyan civilians who faced 
continuous threat, it significantly weakened the Gaddafi regime and provided the 
Libyan opposition with military privileges on the ground.263 The application of these 
forcible measures by member states was the primary reason behind the overthrowing 
of the Gaddafi regime.264 Further, as long as the main purpose behind the application 
of these measures is to protect the civilian population, the action would be deemed legal 
regardless of the intention of the intervening states. On this point, Payandeb contends 
that ‘[t]he mere fact that the intervening states were at the same time also contributing 
to the overthrow of Gadhafi or even acting with the political intention of achieving this 
goal does not render their attacks illegal’.265 Moreover, this contention finds support in 
the ICJ’s finding on the Nicaragua case when the court relied on objective facts rather 
than the intention of the US to determine whether it planned to change the regime in 
Nicaragua.266 To sum up, although regime change may result from implementing lawful 
measures necessary for the protection of civilians, it cannot be advanced as an objective 
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This chapter focused on the international R2P. It aimed to trace the development 
of the responsibilities of third states for the purpose of protecting civilians in the context 
of an internal armed conflict and the extent to which the adoption of the R2P 
contributed. 
Through section one, this chapter aimed to present a legal foundation for the 
concept of the international R2P based on the rules of IHL. It concluded that the legality 
of the international R2P could be founded on the obligation to ‘ensure respect’, as 
contained in Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions and Article 1 (4) of the first 
Additional Protocol. This section also clarified that the rules of IHL as well as the ILC 
Articles could provide a legal foundation for the international responsibility to prevent 
and react. 
Section two discussed the issue related to arming opposition groups, arguing 
that it is illegal to unilaterally supply arms to the opposition groups. Nevertheless, 
arming the opposition groups could have a legal basis with respect to the implicit 
authorisation of the UNSC. The section concluded that even though the UNSC did not 
explicitly permit the supply of arms to the Libyan opposition, this action was indicated 
to have been indirectly authorised. Arming the opposition could be justified as a 
necessary measure authorised under resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan population. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of this measure would be highly restrictive. The 
supportive states would not only have to limit the supply of arms in terms of the amount 
and type of weapons but would also have to consider each case separately. 
Section three addressed the issue related to the use of force by third states to 
protect the population. It presented the argument that ‘Operation Unified Protector’ in 
Libya demonstrated the international community’s commitment to protect civilians. 
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The R2P was operationalised and implemented in practice through resolutions 1970 
and 1973 to the highest possible level. The authorisation of the use of force could justify 
the expansion of the military operations to cover attacks on objects other than the troops 
on the ground, provided that this action is necessary for the protection of civilians. The 
discussion also clarified that, in certain cases, authorisation could be relied upon to 
provide the opposition groups with protection. Nevertheless, the support of the 
opposition groups in isolation would not be permitted. 
The chapter concluded that international law does not legalise the use of force 
for the mere purpose of overthrowing governments, thereby violating certain principles 
of international law, such as the principle of sovereignty, the principle of non-
intervention and the political independence of other states.267 Therefore, states ought to 
not freely advance regime change as a measure to protect civilians. An authorisation 
granted by the UNSC to use force does not mean that member states are entitled to 
overthrow the government. In fact, a regime change cannot be an objective of any 
military operations unless specifically authorised by the UNSC.268 Nonetheless, a 
regime change could be the consequence of applying other measures intending to 
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Since the 1990s, significant change has occurred with respect to the types of 
issues facing the international community. One of the most critical challenges is the 
widespread proliferation of internal armed conflicts and the lack of adequate legal 
frameworks that serve to regulate these types of conflicts. In response to the changing 
nature of armed conflicts, various efforts have been made by the international 
community to fill this gap. One of the most remarkable and comprehensive solutions to 
be advanced by numerous states involves the introduction of the concept of the R2P. 
However, although the R2P primarily aims to protect civilians embroiled in internal 
armed conflicts, it does not include any explicit reference to opposition armed groups 
as parties to internal armed conflicts. The concept of the R2P focuses on the 
responsibilities of host states under pillar one and on the responsibilities of the 
international community under pillars two and three. Hence, it is apparent that further 
efforts are required to determine the extent to which opposition groups have a 
responsibility to protect civilians. 
This thesis focused on opposition groups as parties to internal armed conflicts 
and the concept of the R2P. The aim of this project was to examine the extent to which 
opposition groups can play a role in the protection of civilians within the realm of R2P. 
This thesis attempted to provide a detailed framework to regulate the role of opposition 
groups in relation to their parent states and the international community (third states) 
for the purpose of civilian protection. In order to achieve this general objective, this 
thesis was divided into two main parts. The first part concerned the regulation of the 
relationship between opposition groups and host states; this was detailed in chapters 
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one and two. The second part dealt with the regulation of the relationship between 
opposition groups and third states; this issue was addressed in chapters three and four. 
In this thesis, it was argued that opposition groups, as parties to internal armed 
conflicts, already have a responsibility to protect civilians. The level of protection that 
these groups are required to provide is dependent on the degree  of organisation they 
possess. Following the adoption of the concept of the R2P, it was indicated that further 
emphasis should be placed on opposition groups to enhance complains with the rules 
that are already in existence under IHL. The implementation of R2P as an interpretive 
tool1 further clarified and strengthened the existing obligations of IHL regarding the 
responsibility of opposition groups to protect civilian populations. Furthermore, states’ 
practices in relation to the Libyan and Syrian crises indicated the emergence of potential 
changes as to the role of opposition groups in the protection of civilians. 
 The international reaction to the Libyan and Syrian situations has suggested 
that more weight should be placed on the political organs of opposition groups at the 
international level. Moreover, it has been asserted that the application of the R2P may 
facilitate a reliance on the argument that the right to self-determination can be used to 
justify armed struggles against repressive regimes. It has also been concluded that the 
adoption of the R2P indicates the emergence of a new trend regarding the use of force 
by third states for the purpose of civilian protection. Reliance on the use of force can 
be indirect, such as through the arming of opposition groups, or direct, as through the 
authorised use of force by the UNSC. In order to further evaluate the findings of this 
project, a brief summary of each chapter is provided. 
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As a starting point, chapter one aimed to evaluate the framework used to 
regulate armed groups in their position as parties to internal armed conflicts. Due to the 
limitations of this project, the chapter focused on two main issues that are most relevant 
to the concept of civilian protection. First, the definition of the concept of organised 
armed groups was evaluated. Second, the question of how to bind organised armed 
groups by the rules of IHL was addressed. Additionally, the chapter tested the 
relationships that exist between R2P and these issues. 
It was found that the concept of the civilian population, the cornerstone of R2P, 
plays a fundamental role within the framework that serves to regulate internal armed 
conflicts in general and within the role of opposition groups in particular. It was asserted 
that although modern IHL has shifted away from the practice of recognising armed 
groups as the basis of its application, it has been shown to be more effective for the 
purpose of protecting civilians. The adoption of definition of ‘internal armed conflict’ 
under contemporary IHL reduced the political discretion attached to the traditional 
concept of recognition and enhanced the level of protection provided to civilian 
populations.  
This chapter also argued that though the concept of organised armed groups is 
associated with a high degree of uncertainty, it is still a definable concept. As defined 
within the framework that regulates internal armed conflicts, the concept of organised 
armed groups is addressed at varying levels, thus reflecting the various capacities of 
armed groups to carry out certain obligations that are necessary for the protection of 
civilian populations. While the definition of organised armed groups provided in Article 
1 (1) of the second Additional Protocol represents the highest level of organisation that 
an organised armed group may achieve under IHL, the definition required for the 
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implementation of Common Article 3 represents the lowest level of organisation that 
armed groups must attain in order to fulfil their obligations under IHL.  
In an effort to enhance the degree of protection provided to civilian populations, 
the ICTY provided a less restrictive definition of organised armed groups for the 
purpose of applying Common Article 3. It was also established that although the recent 
practice of the UNSC indicates that no level of sufficient organisation on the part of 
armed groups is required for the application of Common Article 3, the practice is based 
on a political rather than legal basis. 
Additionally, it was concluded in this chapter that there are two main methods 
of binding organised armed groups by the rules of IHL. First, organised armed groups 
can be bound voluntarily by consenting to apply certain rules of IHL. Moreover, it was 
explained that the significance of direct compliance stems from the fact that it facilitates 
the involvement of third states in the process leading to better compliance with IHL by 
armed groups. Third states would have more room to participate in such processes 
under the third pillar of R2P, which concerns the international responsibility to protect 
civilians. Importantly, the ability of third states to encourage opposition groups to 
enhance their compliance with both IHL and IHRL could serve as an effective 
preventive measure. 
This chapter also clarified that in addition to voluntarily compliance with IHL, 
there are five principles that can be utilised to bind organised armed groups by the rules 
of IHL. These five potential approaches to indirect compliance are: the principle of 
legislative jurisdiction, the effect of treaties on third parties, the claim of representation 
of the state, customary international law and the rules of jus cogens. It was contended, 
however, that none of these approaches is conclusive, and each has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. Therefore, reliance on more than one principle at the same time is 
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required to ensure comprehensive compliance with IHL on the part of organised armed 
groups. 
It was concluded that following the adoption of the R2P, further development 
regarding the issue of how to bind organised armed groups by IHL could be traced. 
Although the concept of R2P does not include legal obligations, it can be used as an 
interpretive tool to clarify and strengthen the obligations that already exist under IHL.2 
The international reactions to the Libyan and Syrian crises suggested that opposition 
groups can be recognised as legitimate representatives of the people. 
 It was argued in this chapter that compliance with the rules of IHL, in 
accordance with a claim regarding the representation of the state, can add to the 
legitimacy of opposition groups and allow them to be recognised at the international 
level. Additionally, this chapter asserted that R2P can be used to enhance compliance 
with the rules of IHL on the part of organised armed groups if applied in conjunction 
with an approach relating to the effects of treaties on third parties. In such an instance, 
additional pressure is placed on host states to accept efforts to bind these groups by IHL 
treaties. This contention finds support under the first pillar of the R2P,3 which requires 
host states to undertake all steps necessary to provide the required level of protection. 
In other words, although the R2P is not the source of these legal duties, it could still 
serve as a tool to strengthen compliance with these obligations.4 
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Another potential contribution of the R2P is related to the concept of jus cogens. 
One argument against the jus cogens approach is that it has limited applicability, only 
applying to a limited number of rules. Nevertheless, the concept of R2P expands the 
scope of jus cogens as it relates to violations committed during internal armed conflicts. 
Indeed, the R2P considers ethnic cleansing to be a separate international crime. The 
R2P also considers the execution of international crimes, in general, to be violations of 
jus cogens. The R2P is intended to enhance the level of protection provided to civilians 
by individually binding members of armed groups to pledges that they will not commit 
violations of jus cogens. Nevertheless, the R2P still encourages armed groups to 
achieve the highest possible level of organisation in order to increase civilans protection 
during times of internal armed conflicts; the R2P also enables organised armed groups 
to adopt positive roles in such processes. In the subsequent chapter, the obligations of 
organised armed groups regarding the protection of civilians were evaluated.  
After addressing questions concerning the definition of organised armed groups, 
and after explaining how such armed groups could be bound by IHL and how R2P could 
be used as a tool to enhance compliance with the rules of IHL, the discussion was 
narrowed in chapter two to an examination of the extent to which organised armed 
groups have a responsibility to protect civilians. In order to achieve this objective, the 
chapter evaluated various important obligations that fall under IHL and IHRL. Due to 
the limitations of this project, the chapter focused on three comprehensive obligations 
that are most relevant to a group’s responsibility to protect civilians according to the 
framework used to regulate internal armed conflicts. The aim of this chapter was to use 
the concept of the R2P as a tool to identify the elements related to civilian protection 
that exist within these obligations. 
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Regarding a population’s right to adequate food supplies, it was clarified that 
unlike IHRL, IHL does not include any direct reference to such a right; however, IHL 
does regulate this right by imposing two obligations on organised armed groups. These 
two obligations are: the obligation not to intentionally starve civilian populations and 
the duty to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance. With regard to the prohibition 
on starvation, this chapter argued that organised armed groups are under a strict 
obligation not to use starvation as a method of war—indeed, it constitutes a war crime 
to implement starvation as a war technique. It was also concluded that the scope of this 
obligation covers all intentional acts that may lead to starvation. As a result, this chapter 
asserted that organised armed groups have a responsibly to prevent the emergence of 
starvation. More specifically, organised armed groups have a responsibility to prevent 
the commitment of a war crime by eliminating any roots that may lead to the starvation 
of civilian populations. 
Regarding such groups’ duty to accept and facilitate access to humanitarian 
assistance, it was contended in this chapter that so long as the requirements of the 
second additional protocol are met, organised armed groups are under an affirmative 
obligation to accept and allow access to humanitarian aid in areas under their control. 
It was concluded that although the consent of the host state is a well-established 
requirement for legitimate access to such aid, UNSC practices employed following the 
adoption of the R2P indicated the existence of significant development regarding the 
consent requirement for the purpose of further protecting civilian populations during 
times of internal armed conflicts. In fact, the UNSC authorised the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to civilians under the territorial control of opposition groups without 
obtaining the consent of the Syrian government.  
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The second requirement discussed in chapter two was the obligation imposed 
on organised armed groups not to forcibly displace civilians. In fact, it was argued that 
organised armed groups have an affirmative responsibility to protect the civilians under 
their control. While such groups are obligated to safely transfer populations, under their 
control to safer areas, when it is necessary, organised armed groups are prohibited from 
forcibly displacing civilians for purposes other than security or military reasons. This 
chapter established that the illegitimate displacement of civilians by organised armed 
groups may amount to the commitment of either a war crime or a crime against 
humanity. Therefore, the prohibition against ordering such a movement falls within the 
preventive dimension and concerns the responsibility of organised armed groups to 
protect the civilians under their territorial control. 
  The third obligation addressed in chapter two concerned the obligation of 
organised armed groups to protect IDPs. It was asserted that organised armed groups 
are under a general obligation to adopt all necessary measures to ensure that the IDPs 
under their control are granted satisfactory conditions with respect to shelter, proper 
hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. Moreover, organised armed groups have 
additional duties towards women and displaced families; notably, these duties are of a 
preventive nature. As such, adherence to these obligations on the part of organised 
armed groups prevents the commitment of international crimes. 
  Chapter three addressed the relationship between organised armed groups and 
the international community (third states) with respect to the international recognition 
of the political organs of opposition groups. The objective of this chapter was to 
evaluate all developments that might emerge regarding the international recognition of 
opposition groups following the adoption of the R2P; in particular, the chapter 
examined the political and legal recognition of opposition groups.  
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With regard to the political recognition of opposition groups, the international 
reactions to the Libyan and Syrian crises allowed for the determination that the political 
structure of opposition groups can be recognised in various ways, thus indicating 
varying levels of international political support. It was also asserted that despite the 
purely political nature of such an act, the recognition of an opposition group as ‘the 
legitimate representative of the people’ is practically significant, as it represents the 
highest level of political recognition. Such recognition indicates that the de jure 
government has already lost its legitimacy and that a new representative of the people 
should be selected—i.e., the recognised opposition group. 
The chapter also argued that the political recognition of opposition groups as 
representatives of the people may facilitate their legal recognition. With respect to the 
elements of representation and permanence as the potential requirements of such 
recognition, it was asserted that while representation refers to the inclusiveness of 
opposition groups, both ethnically and geographically, permanence indicates that a 
given opposition group is able to maintain certain political, organisational and 
institutional structure. 
With regard to the legal recognition of opposition groups, the chapter asserted 
that although the recognition of an opposition group as the ultimate legitimate 
representatives of the people suggests a similarity to NLMs, this does not mean that 
such recognition would grant opposition groups the same legal status or therefore 
produce similar legal consequences. Nevertheless, it was concluded that the right to 
self-determination could still be relied upon to legally justify the struggle against de 
jure governments, as can be deduced from paragraph 7 of resolution 2625 (XXV).5 Yet 
                                                 
5 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with 




this is just one of the interpretations that could be implemented to understand the 
meaning of paragraph 7 of resolution 2625 (XXV). This chapter also outlined that 
opposition groups can be recognised as new governments. 
Chapter four evaluated the international responsibility to protect as well as the 
role of opposition groups in such an endeavour. This chapter aimed to trace any 
developments that occurred following the adoption of the R2P. It was determined that 
one possible method of providing a legal foundation for the international responsibility 
to protect within the framework of IHL is to embrace Common Article 1 of the four 
Geneva Conventions and Article 1 (4) of the first Additional Protocol. Then the issue 
related to the possibility of arming opposition groups for the purpose of protecting 
civilians was addressed. This chapter clarified that although it would be illegal to 
unilaterally provide armed groups with weaponry, it would still be possible to base an 
arming action on an implicit authorisation from the UNSC. 
 It was concluded in this chapter that though the UNSC did not explicitly allow 
for the supply of arms to Libyan opposition groups, such an act was indirectly 
authorised as a necessary measure for the purpose of protecting civilians under 
resolution 1973. Nevertheless, reliance on the expression ‘all necessary measures’ to 
justify the supply of arms to armed groups ought to be exceptionally restrictive. 
Supplying states should not only be required to limit the supply of arms in terms of their 
amount and type, they should also be compelled to consider each case separately. 
Finally, the chapter evaluated the possibility of authorising the use of force for 
the purpose of protecting civilian populations. The aim was not only to determine the 
legal basis for such a forcible act, but also to determine its scope. References were made 
to opposition groups when it was relevant. It was argued that the concept of the R2P 
was operationalised and implemented in practice to the highest possible degree through 
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resolutions 1970 and 1973. This section asserted that this authorisation could be used 
to justify the expansion of the scope of the use of force to cover objects other than 
troops on the ground—so long as it could be established that such an action would be 
necessary for the protection of civilians. It was clarified that the inclusion of the phrase 
‘civilian-populated areas’ in resolution 1973 was intended to extend the scope of 
protection to cover specific territorial areas. In other words, authorisation regarding the 
use of force could be used to provide protection for both civilians and armed groups. 
It was also concluded that international law does not permit the use of force for 
the sole purpose of overthrowing a government. Such an act would violate certain 
principles of international law, including the principle of sovereignty, the principle of 
non-intervention and the political independence of other states.6 It was asserted that 
regime change cannot be the objective of any military operation, unless specifically 
authorised by the UNSC.7 Nonetheless, regime change might be a consequence of the 
application of other measures intended to protect civilian populations. It was concluded 
in this chapter that the use of force cannot be advanced by third states in an effort to 
support opposition groups on the ground. Nonetheless, opposition groups may benefit 
from the use of force, provided that the primary purpose behind such an action is the 
protection of civilians. 
In general, this research has shown that there is common ground between IHL 
and R2P—i.e., the concept of civilian protection. This common ground allows for the 
concept to be utilised as an interpretive tool in order to better understand the obligations 
imposed on opposition groups with regard to civilian protection. Although it does not 
                                                 
6 G. Ulfstein & H.  F. Christiansen, ‘The legality of NATO Bombing in Libya’ (2013) 62 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 159, at 169. 
7 O. Corten & V. Koutroulis, ‘the Illegality of Military Support to Rebels in the Libyan War: Aspects 
of jus contra bellum and jus in bello’ (2013) 18 Journal of Conflicts & Security Law 59, at 72. 
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possess a legal status as a concept, the R2P allows for further clarification regarding 
the meaning and scope of the obligations already in existence under IHL.  
It is important to mention the words that Nathalie Herlemont Zoritchakmade 
delivered as very firm recommendations to states, just two years before the crisis in 
Libya: ‘For the state, the responsibility to protect is primarily to demonstrate a real 
willingness to apply IHL, without any possible diplomatic exemption…’.8 The same 
outcome should be applied to opposition groups as primary actors who are also 
responsible to implement IHL.  
 The actual willingness of parties to internal armed conflicts, specifically 
opposition groups, to comply with and apply IHL without exception is sufficient to 
assert that opposition groups have met their responsibility to protect under IHL. This 
research has clarified that this is the primary objective to be achieved in the effort to 
ensure better protections for civilians during times of internal armed conflict. The 
concept of R2P ought to be treated as a tool that contributes to the application of IHL 
for the purpose of civilian protection.9 The problem is not in the law, the concept of 
civilian protection is well established under IHL and other branches of international 
law, as shown throughout the research.  
The real challenge is how these legal rules could be interpreted in accordance 
with the primary objectives behind them, and more importantly, how the compliance 
with these legal rules by the members of the international community could be ensured. 
This what can be achieved by relaying on the concept of the R2P. Although it is not 
                                                 
8 See Nathalie Herlemont-Zoritchak, ‘Droit d’ingérence et droit humanitaire: les faux amis’, in Revue 
Humanitaire, Enjeux, Pratiques, Débats, 23 December 2009 cited in B. Pommier, ‘The Use of Force to 
Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of Libya and Beyond’ (2011) 93 International 
Review of the Red Cross 1063, at 1080. 
9 See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 




entirely legal concept, the R2P still could significantly contribute to the effective 
application of IHL. In fact, being mostly a political rather than legal idea or, as advanced 
in this project, soft law is an advantage. It provides the concept of the R2P with further 
flexibility and a wider scope as to its utilisation. It could be used as an effective mean 
to restrict the political will of the members of the international community. 
Furthermore, although it does not produce rights and obligations, being a form of soft 
law allows the R2P to interact with hard laws, such as IHL, IHRL and ICL. It may not 
only impact the interpretations of the relevant branches of international law, but it may 
also facilitate the emergence of new binding rules concerning the protection of civilians. 
Therefore, a better application of IHL would be achieved.  
It should be noted that although this research may contribute to the clarification 
of the subject, it has also reflected the need for further elaboration. Despite the 
significant role that can be played by opposition groups in the realm of civilian 
protection within the context of internal armed conflicts, little attention has been given 
to the subject in the literature. Most of the published work as to the concept of the R2P 
was written by non-lawyers who intended to look at the topic from different 
perspectives. Further, the majority of efforts that have been made with respect to the 
implementation and development of the R2P have focused primarily on host states’ 
responsibilities to protect; secondary focus has been placed on the subsidiary role of 
the international community in the protection of civilians.  
In the context of internal armed conflicts, it is unclear how civilian populations 
can be effectively protected without the significant and fundamental involvement of 
opposition groups. It is recommended that additional efforts be made to further clarify 
the fundamental nature of the role of opposition groups in the protection of civilians. 
The reference to opposition groups as parties to internal armed conflicts was explicitly 
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made, for instance, in the second Additional Protocol; hence, it is not impossible to 
include opposition groups in an international document similar to the ICISS10 or the 
World Summit in an effort to further elaborate upon the role that these groups could 
play in the protection of civilians.  
As has been emphasised multiple times in this research, R2P is not law—it does 
not impose any legal obligations and therefore does not have the power to bind either 
states or non-state actors. The R2P is described as a political concept and, at best, as 
soft law; thus, it can be thought of as an interpretive lens.11 Hence, it is recommended 
that the Libyan case be further analysed in order to determine the roots of the negative 
consequences. For instance, it is important to determine whether it was the concept of 
R2P itself or other factors, such as the capacity of the Libyan opposition groups to offer 
protection, that was ineffective. Such an evaluation should not be limited to armed 
groups on the ground; rather, it should also include the political organs that represent 
these groups internationally. More importantly, additional attention ought to be paid to 
the solidity of the link between the two organs that constitute opposition groups. 
Due to space constraints, the scope of this research was limited to certain aspects 
related to the role of opposition groups in the protection of civilians. Hence, it is 
recommended that the concept of the R2P be utilised to further enhance the clarity and 
understanding of other aspects related to this topic. Furthermore, due to its 
comprehensive approach, the concept of the R2P can serve as a valid tool to explore 
other branches of international law, such as IHRL and ICL.  Finally, it is strongly hoped 
that this thesis will contribute to the literature and inspire other scholars to further 
elaborate upon this topic. 
                                                 
10 See the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICIS), Report on the 
Responsibility to Protect, December 2001. 
11 See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
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